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FROM CORPORATE LIBERALISM TO NEOLIBERALISM: 
A HISTORY OF THINK TANKS IN AMERICA 
 
Amos A. Tevelow, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2005 
 
The Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit public policy organizations constituted by section 501c3 
of the U.S. Tax Code (“think tanks”, TTs or “tanks”) monitor and adjust governance norms and 
networks by using research, analysis, and advocacy to structure discourse about social problems 
and solutions among multiple elites and in the popular imagination. Through conversation, 
public communication, participation in government commissions and committees, and other 
methods, tanks strive to keep certain ideas alive (or at bay) until a particular policy idea becomes 
politically feasible and persuasive. Thirty-four case studies illustrate TT roles in constructing two 
basic policy regimes in 20th century America, corporate liberalism and neoliberalism. The two 
policy regimes are contingent discursive achievements, reflected in the adaptations in the 
modalities and rhetoric of think tanks in relation to dynamic processes of capitalist development, 
crisis, realignment, and consolidation. The cases show that while TTs generally function to 
contain and co-opt radical political economic ideas and social impulses, they are are not able to 
stitch interests seamlessly into state policy. Rather, social and economic crises, the changing 
demands and forms of the economy and the state, the actions of other actors, and other forces 
function to constrain the appeal of a given discourse or institution, so much so that individual 
tanks can drift from one ideological pole to another over time in reaction to these forces. These 
forces can also enable think tanks to exert discourse as an autonomous power that transcends the 
material constraints of the organizations themselves.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 C. Wright Mills wrote, “The most important issue of political reflection and political 
action in our time [is] the problem of the historical agency of change, of the social and 
institutional means of structural change.”1 Of the many institutions acting on the historical stage, 
nonprofit public policy research institutes, or “think tanks” (TTs) have operated below the 
scholarly radar screen. This dissertation is a partial attempt to remedy this omission.  
Military scientists and strategists first referred to secure Pentagon conference rooms as 
“think tanks” during World War II.2 Today, the formal North American usage refers to policy 
research organizations varying in size, resource base, and focus,3 and legally distinct from 
government and commercial entities under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. 
The tax code creates financial incentives for the establishment of nonprofit, nonpartisan, 
educational organizations by exempting income taxes for such organizations and enabling 
individuals and corporations to make tax-deductible contributions to them. An organization 
qualifies for charitable educational status if “no part of [its] net earnings…inures to the benefit of 
any private shareholder or individual,” and it does “not participate in, or intervene in (including 
the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate or public office.”4 Treasury regulations specify, “An organization is 
                                                 
1 C. Wright Mills as quoted in Jacobs and Landau, 1966:107  
2 James Allen Smith, 1991 
3 National Institute for Research Advancement, NIRA’s World Directory of Think Tanks (2002) 
4 Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) (1989) extends tax-exempt status to “Corporations, and any community chest, 
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purpose…no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to 
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 not organized or operated exclusively for [exempt] purposes…unless it serves a public rather 
than a private interest.”5 Hundreds of such institutes operate around Washington, D.C. today. 
From the outset, I want to make it clear that while I use a much stricter definition of think 
tanks than most people do in common parlance, their similarities to and interactions with other 
organizations makes strict definitional boundaries almost impossible. Sociologists like William 
G. Domhoff, for example, analyze think tanks alongside foundations like Ford, Rockefeller, 
Carnegie, Mellon, Scaife; institutes affiliated with major universities like the “Chicago School”; 
independent research institutes like Brookings and Heritage; and policy discussion groups like 
the Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, the Business Roundtable, and the 
World Economic Forum.  While my study uses the tax code designation and a focus on federal 
U.S. policy to carve out the heart of its object of analysis, the function and roles of think tanks is 
similar to the types of organizations Domhoff identifies. Further, since tanks often maintain close 
operational and financial connections to such organizations, a certain amount of analytical bleed 
is inevitable.  
Think tanks work at the intersection of political institutions (state forms, bureaucracies 
and elected officials), economic structures (productive modes and capacities), intellectual and 
legal traditions (social science and policy legacies), mass media (technology and popular 
culture), philanthropic foundations (financial investment), and interest groups. They function 
similar to certain governmental organizations,6 parties, interest groups, trade and professional 
                                                                                                                                                             
influence legislation…and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of 
statements), any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.”  
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1976).  
6 Commissions, executive staffs, and research agencies in government 
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 organizations, which link knowledge to policy processes7 by supporting those who possess, 
invent, discover, and propagate ideas.  
Think tanks aim to shape public and elite understanding of the sources and solutions of 
social problems8 in a number of ways. They generate usable data, analysis, and practical 
recommendations; hold seminars, workshops and symposia for elected officials, bureaucrats, 
reporters, interest groups, and donors; participate in formal and informal government advisory 
bodies and commissions; publish books, briefs, journals, op-ed essays, and websites to publicize 
their work; and appear as invited guests on television and radio talk shows and news reports.  
Understanding how tanks exercise authority and function in the political system 
contributes to an understanding of how states use policy expertise, and what generates consent to 
collective action. In defining the terms of debate among policymakers and the national 
imagination, tanks appear to function as a sort of venture capital by which various elites sustain 
an atmosphere9  and ensure that only particular policies have purchase in that climate. Yet 
because tanks possess no legal decision-making authority, they receive little sustained attention 
from political scientists, who focus on the formal machinery of government (legislatures, chief 
executives, departments, elections).10
Researchers who assess the role of nonprofit policy organizations tend to approach these 
issues from three analytic frameworks.11 Pluralist, elite, and epistemic frameworks have defined 
discussion of the role of think tanks in policy processes, and the causes of political outcomes 
                                                 
 
8 They “adjust ideas to people and people to ideas.” See Donald Bryant (1953). 
9 Stoesz 1987 
10 Rich 1999, chapter 1; throughout the 1970s and 1980s, mainstream political science journals published just two 
articles on think tanks (see Dye 1978 and Weaver 1989) 
11 This is a combination of taxonomies offered by Diane Stone (1996) and Donald E. Abelson (2002). 
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 more generally. After addressing the insights and blindness of each, I synthesize them into an 
approach more attentive to the contingent and discursive aspects of policymaking.  
1.1. The pluralist framework 
The key features of pluralism are 1) “rationalist”12 propositions about knowledge transfer, 
and 2) a concept of civil society as a relatively open system of argumentation.13 First, pluralism 
proposes that pure reason and objective inquiry is separable from the corrupting influence of 
power and politics.14 Think tanks in this view function instrumentally, transferring evidence and 
conclusions through direct and indirect means to make public policy more rational. They directly 
influence problem solving by providing detailed solutions that can act as precise blueprints for 
state action, and personnel to serve in commission, committees, or other official positions. They 
also indirectly shape policy by diffusing knowledge and “enlightening” the polity over the long 
term.15  
                                                 
12 Weiss (1979) 
13 David B. Truman (1951) strongly influenced the American pluralist tradition is strongly influenced by These 
rationalist and enlightenment assumptions inform approaches to knowledge and power in mainstream political 
science (Polsby, 1983; McGann, 1992; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Most policy studies today combine pluralist 
assumptions with neoclassical economics in explaining behavior, evaluating courses of action, and recommending 
policies. Under the “public choice” label (Alt and Shepsle, 1990), the explicit application of orthodox economics to 
political science judges any collective activity by how well it models perfect markets (Olson 1965).  Theodore Lowi 
(1992) argues public choice dominates political science because its assumptions are consistent with Republican 
Party laissez-faire beliefs. Free market think tanks promote public choice models to policymakers and thus help to 
structure policy discourse. As Stone (1996:166) notes, public choice theory “has been an important pillar in the 
revival of market liberalism…[and] think tanks have also played a key role in advocating privatization and 
promoting its international spread.”   
14 Rationalist principles are constitutive of think tanks. While the distinction between scientific knowledge and 
political argument gradually blurred with the proliferation of “advocacy” tanks, I argue that as an organizational 
field, think tank workers have always been political, exercising power whether it is their motivation or not. Indeed, 
they may exercise it without knowing it. Social scientific research issues from bodies of concepts, theories, and data 
within specialized fields, but it is also a form of political practice intertwined with power. The fact that partisans 
with competing values and interests routinely use policy research means that state-oriented social scientists are not 
dispassionate, disinterested observers of facts in the world (an assumption made in the rationalist and enlightenment 
models), but people with normative and cultural assumptions who prepare arguments of potentially strategic 
importance.   
15 Kingdon 1984  
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 Besides the fact that tank workers continue to understand their daily practice in such 
terms today, the rationalist propositions are useful insofar as they direct scholarly attention to 
both the precise interactions that comprise policy discourse, and think tanks’ long term, strategic 
impact on the context within which publics identify problems and propose alternatives. This 
encourages consideration of both the mechanisms influencing the range of legislative 
possibilities at any given moment, and the culling of knowledge over the long term into a 
“common wisdom.” Whatever their precise impact, tanks do contribute to a vast political 
conversation marked by continuity and change, accumulation of knowledge and testing new data 
against received wisdom.16 However the abstraction of rationality from the conditions and 
processes that structure it fails to recognize how what counts as rational discourse shifts 
depending on its inscription in broad patterns of ideas, the balance and activity of social forces, 
modes of production, state-society relations, world politics etc. The historical approach of this 
dissertation is in part an attempt to capture the discursive construction of “rational” policy in 
interaction with such structures.  
Second, pluralists view think tanks as elements and evidence of a robust civil society that 
includes trade unions, interest groups, and other nongovernmental actors who jockey for position 
and help inform decision makers of diverse views in a relatively open system of argumentation.17 
From this perspective, modern democratic states guarantee a relatively open civil society of 
argumentation, acting as neutral arbiters of competing interests. Direct elections, checks and 
balances in the political system, and the fragmentation of American state structures, including 
the division and separation of powers, extensive bureaucracies, and relatively weak political 
parties, operate to disperse power and create multiple power centers and opportunities for citizen 
                                                 
16 See Billig 1987; Ricci 1993 
17 This is “interest group pluralism” (McGann 1992:738; Dahl 1961; Wildavsky 1984; Polsby 1983) 
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 influence and organizational survival.18 The 501(c)(3) I.R.S. section in particular creates 
incentives for all types of interests to participate in public discussion by forming think tanks.  
Pluralists see think tanks as possessing modest influence in such a system, thriving more 
or less as independent consultants contributing to democratic debate and public enlightenment in 
a free marketplace of ideas. As Steven Brint argues, a large bureaucracy or fragmented political 
system may induce a buzz of technocratic activism often mistaken “for an unusual level of expert 
power or influence”,19 but the expert class are actually “relatively minor players…within the 
American political structure…. They support competing elites or competing interest groups with 
data, information, and proposals, or they analyze and champion policy in a framework set by 
others.”20 Pluralists believe no single type of actor dominates the policy process, but if anybody 
does, it is the state (elected officials), not corporations or interest groups.21 Some pluralist 
accounts recognize the limits that the power of money places on competition in the field of 
policy expertise, but most tend to downplay how deficits in the ability of certain groups in 
society to fund think tanks limits their access to the policy process.22 Instead, they focus on the 
number and diversity of American think tanks as evidence of competition within a marketplace 
of ideas in which almost anybody can play and nobody is dominant. 
1.2. The elite framework 
In contrast to the pluralist framework, the elite framework understands civil society as an 
uneven field of competing elements, and sees think tanks as mechanisms that elites use to 
translate their interests into state action. Encompassing Marxist and “power structure” research, 
                                                 
18 Weaver 1989:570; Polsby, 1983:58 
19 Brint 1994:4 
20 Brint p. 135-7 
21 Kingdon 1984; Skocpol 1992 
22 Parsons, 1995; Lindblom, 1990:237 
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 elite theorists23 argue that while social scientists operate within professional norms of neutral 
observation, their role in the context of broad policy and class struggles between capital and 
people resisting exploitation is not neutral. These studies specify how think tanks help drive state 
initiatives by mobilizing elites to become involved policy debates and providing ideas to protect 
major sources of economic power. Elite theories explain the ability of certain organizations to 
generate more funding, visibility, and power in terms of interlocks with business and government 
elites.  
Elite theorists, operating mostly within the disciplines of sociology and political science, 
argue for the centrality of planning organizations in the policy process.24 Dye argues that think 
tanks are “central coordinating mechanisms for the power elite,”25  and that expert policy 
planning is such a dominant force as to render the White House, Congress, and bureaucracy 
“proximate policy-makers...the final, public phase of policy-making which focus on the means 
rather than the ends of policy.”26 In this view, think tanks (and experts generally) are a product of 
capitalist development: capitalist processes produce alienation and exploitation, which create the 
demand for a specific stratum of functionaries—subordinate to the ruling class—to propagate 
and monitor social norms as well as control and direct collective labor. With every advance in 
social and technological complexity, the ruling class of necessity devolves additional power to 
experts.  
Domhoff girds this analysis with elaborate sociological data that combines institutional 
and class vectors to argue tanks like Council on Foreign Relations constitute a “power elite” 
                                                 
23 Mills 1959; Eakins 1972; Silk and Silk 1980; Shoup and Minter 1977; Domhoff 1978, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 
1998; Steinfels 1979; Useem 1984; Dye 1978, 1987; Peschek 1987; Desai 1994; Stefancic and Delgado 1996. Most 
organizations in my study are regarded as prestigious according to broadly accepted standards, and therefore qualify 
as “elite” according to the definition used by these writers. 
24 Dye, et al. 1973: 8-29 
251987:169 
26 Dye 1976:241 
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 group that formulates “general guidelines for American foreign policy and provide the personnel 
to carry out this policy.” He identifies an interacting and intermarrying elite social stratum (the 
“upper class”) that is able to shape public opinion and U.S. economic and social policy via “a set 
of interlocking policy discussion groups, foundations, think tanks, and university institutes.” By 
serving also as a recruiting ground for government, these groups secure the continuing power of 
the upper class, making it the “ruling class.”27  
While the analysis of corporate power constituted through interlocking directorates 
provides valuable insight into the structure of national and transnational class formation, it barely 
touches on the discursive elements of hegemonic projects, or the specific ways in which tanks 
articulate interests, share concerns, and strategize action. Further, the approach does not account 
for heterogeneity in policy recommendations, or as Brookings Institution Michael Armacost put 
it, the lack of “institutional positions” emanating from major think tanks.  
Less reductive forms of elite analysis dispute the view of the state as merely an effect or 
“superstructure” of a monolithic dominant class, and recognize its frequent ability to operate 
apart from the narrow short term interests of the competing capital sectors and nation-states in 
order to coordinate and protect the stability of the system.28 In this view, the state can draw on 
the “enlightened” long-term and general orientating function tanks as mechanism to unite diverse 
fractions of capital29 around common strategies for rationalized capitalist development. 
Ideological variety among think tanks offers elasticity in adjusting to new situations, but restricts 
the range of acceptable opinion to the functional bottom line of imposing capital discipline and 
                                                 
27 Domhoff 1983: 82, 116-56 
28 Poulantzas 1978; Mandel, 1975:Ch. 15; Jessop 1982, 1988; Skocpol 1985; Domhoff, 1983:83; van der Pijl 1998. 
For example, the ability of capital fractions to extract a greater share of total profits may undercut systemic stability. 
29 Marx defines fractions of capital as functional divisions within capital, e.g. money (bank and insurance capital), 
commodity (wholesale, retail, export, import), productive (transportation).  Van der Pijl (1998: 52) constructs 
hypothetical collective orientations of the ruling class, arguing that fractions “crystallize to which we can ascribe a 
certain ideal-typical perspective which will make itself felt in the formulation of a class strategy.”  
 8
 overcoming resistance and limits to it. Whatever dissent exists among relevant think tanks is 
narrowly “polyarchic” rather than broadly pluralistic.  
An example of such a theory is the work of Antonio Gramsci, which rejected the notion 
that dominant ideologies flow inevitably from the requirements of capitalism, or that power 
emanates from a single sovereign source like the state. Gramsci’s re-reading of Marx took 
politics and class formation (the “superstructure”) as autonomous forces that discursively 
mediate and structure capital accumulation as much as capital accumulation structures them. He 
regards civil society as a field of interest articulation and social struggles that grows within 
capitalism but often operates distinct from processes of production and the state, and adjusts over 
time to material and rhetorical exigencies.30  
Instead of using static categories, this perspective approaches capitalists “as a social class 
to which social movement activities pertain as an attribute, just as with any other social class…; 
that is, to think of changes in the economy proper as a function of social movements.” From this 
perspective, we can see the transition from one phase of capitalism to another “not simply a 
matter of submission to ‘objective’ laws of economic evolution,” but “an integral component of 
the social-political movements” of the time. 31 In rejecting a causal line from economic base to 
ideological superstructure, Gramsci32 presaged modern sociological explanations of historical 
change as a “duality of structure”33 (or as neo-Marxists might phrase it, the dialectic totality of 
structure and agency)—a recursive process uniting agency and structure. In section 1.4 below, I 
discuss such “structuration” theory as a way of integrating the various frameworks presented 
here.
                                                 
30 Urry 1981:31 
31 Sklar 1988:12 
32 Gramsci 1971:190 
33 Giddens 1984 
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 1.3. The epistemic framework 
Many conceptualize tanks as members of “epistemic communities,”34 “policy 
communities,”35 “issue networks,”36 and “discourse coalitions.”37 I group these approaches under 
the epistemic rubric because they all focus on groupings that share common norms, causal 
beliefs, vocabularies, proximity to government, and goals of integrating their beliefs into public 
consciousness and policy outcomes.38 In addition to think tanks, these groupings include 
members of government agencies, commissions, committees, and interest groups that organize 
around particular policy areas.  
Like pluralism, the epistemic perspective highlights the role of direct contact in the 
transfer of knowledge. Focusing on the specific level of networks and actors who share norms 
and causal beliefs, the epistemic perspective views the diffusion of knowledge into public policy 
primarily as a matter of “social learning” on the part of policymakers and relevant 
bureaucracies.39 This level of analysis can be useful in tracing the innovation and translation of 
policy ideas across time and space through the interpersonal connections and discourse shared by 
experts in a policy area and public officials who oversee that area. While a focus on the micro-
interactions of idea diffusion may sidestep larger questions of class and state, if we consider 
                                                 
34 Stone 1996; Haas 1997. Stone (1996:37) defines epistemic communities as “knowledge based networks who 
articulate the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems…[and] help decision-makers without expert 
knowledge to clarify state interests regarding complex technical problems.” 
35 Policy communities are stable networks bound by common interests in a particular policy area that restrict access 
to participants and are insulated from other networks. The network can include interest groups, government officials, 
journalists, and think tanks (Sabatier, 1987:660). 
36 See Walker 1977; Kingdon 1984; Heclo 1978. An issue network is a group that shares knowledge to reduce 
contradictions inherent in diverse organizational participation. 
37A discourse coalition is “a group of actors who share a social construct” (Hajer 1993:45); or “alliances or 
coalitions… struck between scholars and policy makers…[that] lead to a restructuring of the terms of discourse in 
both politics and social science” (Wagner 1991:76). See also Dryzek 1996:ch.6 “Democracy Versus Ideology,” for 
discussion of discourse coalitions. 
38 Stone 1996:36 
39 Rose 1991; Hall 1993  
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 institutional approaches in cultural studies,40 organizational sociology,41 and political science,42 
as part of this framework, then we can say that the epistemic framework resists a pure micro 
focus. 
An advantage of the epistemic approach is that it understands discourse as an important 
and autonomous source of influence. Discourse in this view provides policy elites with a 
repertoire of symbols and other rhetorical forms that can make policy ideas persuasive; agents 
frame policy ideas to convince elites and the public that certain solutions to common problems 
are plausible. The epistemic accounts help to correct the neglect of discourse as a force in 
policymaking,43 but they still tend to present discourse as simple instrumental persuasion, and 
ideas as simple representations of preexisting interests. They fail to account for the ways in 
which discourse can shape and define interests, rather than simply reflect them.  
In the following section, I develop a level of analysis between individual agents and 
political economic structures, and propose a framework of discourse structuration that integrates 
the analytic grasp of each, but also goes further in incorporating discourse as a constitutive 
element of historical change. The approach accounts for structural variables while avoiding both 
the functional determinism of structural analyses like world systems theory, and the voluntarism 
characteristic of micro-analysis and journalistic work. 
1.4. Discourse structuration 
In modern social theory, “structuration” is an ontology44 that holds political and social 
institutions are neither structurally determined nor utterly contingent. They are not natural or 
inevitable, and could and would be different had different events happened at critical junctures; 
                                                 
40 See Foucault 1991, 1970; Ricouer 1983; Bennett 1998; Hunter 1988; Rabinow 1989 
41 Powell and DiMaggio 1991; March and Olson 1989; Fligstein 1999 
42 See Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Gagnon 1990; Pal 1990 
43 See Peter Hall 1993 
44 Giddens 1984 
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 at the same time, they do not just appear due to mere chance or charismatic leadership. 
Structuration integrates both “macro” theories of power that explain policy outcomes in terms of 
grand historical variables like Capital and the State, and the “micro” approaches that prefigure 
social and symbolic interaction into a middle-range “mezzo” or “meso” level of analysis of how 
institutions mediate the interpenetration of structure and action. Shifts in the distribution of 
power across society occur at this meso or “conjunctural” level as much as they do at the grand 
historical level.  If we fix our gaze on this level, and consider discourse as a fundamental 
mediating institution, then we can analyze discourse structuration as “the way in which scholars 
and policy makers have tried to use whatever knowledge and competence they had felt called up 
and enabled to draw upon when faced with societal transformations.”45 Understanding how 
people draw on structures to manage or alter state-market-civil society relations requires 
historical analysis because over broad sweeps of time one can appreciate the cohesion and 
discontinuity underlying such interaction. Therefore, in addition to the think tanks themselves, 
the analytical units of my study are agents, structures, and discourse. 
1.4.1. Agents 
 
Scholars, policymakers, and philanthropists consciously link knowledge and policy 
through mechanisms and institutions that draw upon and refashion existing rules and resources. 
For my purposes, the key strata are those in the role of organizing and supervising the social 
whole, called sometimes the “new petty bourgeoisie,”46 “professional elites,”47 “professional-
managerial class,”48 “cadre,”49 or simply “experts.”50 This stratum populates most Washington-
                                                 
45 Wagner et al 1991:75  
46 Poulantzas 1974 
47 Perkin 1996 
48 Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979; Ohmann 1996 
49 Gérard Dumenil 1975 
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 based think tanks. It has proliferated as administrative and technological interfaces have 
accelerated in the “information society,” but its lineaments are discernible clearly in the mid-late 
19th century.  
Potential fallacies arise from a focus on those groups networked closely in and around 
various elites and government, namely, ascribing unwarranted importance to the subject in a way 
that disregards other influential factors in the policy process and gives the impression that think 
tanks stitch policy at whim. Looking at elite organizations, one is likely to find elite influence. I 
try to avoid this by considering a number of cases representative of the breadth of activity in the 
TT field, and by looking across broad structural contexts of socio-political-economic forces over 
long waves of historical change. 
1.4.2. Structures 
 
Giddens51 defines structures as the rules and resources that knowledgeable human beings 
draw upon and reshape everyday to make and remake everyday social reality. Expanding this 
concept to macro institutions again, we see that economic conditions and government demands 
for knowledge create the parameters within which think tanks set agendas and define solutions. 
The relevant “exogenous conditions” or “paths” that structure the rhetorical opportunities for 
think tanks are: 
A. Social and economic crises, such as widespread poverty and unemployment, war or the threat of 
war, and group conflicts. Such crises may mark major transformations that create opportunities 
to challenge or confirm the shared experience and reality of political subjects.  
B. The forms of state and political institutions. The forms of a particular country (e.g. large 
bureaucracies, philanthropic law, and political parties) structure the interaction of policymakers 
and social research in that country 
C. Established traditions, both in political culture broadly speaking (ideologies, social problems, 
popular attitudes) and in think tanks and the social sciences themselves (professional norms, 
organizational cultures and identities, intellectual and disciplinary trends). When coupled with 
                                                                                                                                                             
50 Benveniste 1972 
51 1984 
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 perceptions of social and economic crisis, the presence of alternative discourses allows actors to 
define and interpret the crisis and propose new solutions. 
D. Forms and tendencies of capital accumulation (labor processes, industrial expansion, 
technological advance, elimination of particular industrial modes, etc.). Particular modes of 
economic development may strengthen certain capital fractions and corresponding elites. 
Successive configurations of capital or “regimes” may empower different actors in relation to 
others. 
E. The transnational setting, including military and economic superiority of “core” capitalist states 
over the “contender” and “periphery” states,52 and global networks and alliances such as cross-
national  interlocking directorates among  policy planning and research communities.53  
 
These pressures and constraints define the field of opportunities within which think tanks vie for 
intellectual leadership. I discuss the relevant aspects of each in the substantive chapters; 
however, I do not present structures as a self-sustaining total system or functional teleology. 
Structures do not determine outcomes, but place limits on the possible. Structures are themselves 
contingent, defined by contradiction, unanticipated obstacles and outcomes, human striving, the 
possibility of their own reversal and undoing, and the autonomous role of discourse.  
1.4.3. Discourse 
 
The pluralist, elite, and epistemic approaches are all handicapped to a degree by a lack of 
attention to the role of discourse. To remedy this, I conceptualize tanks as networks of 
institutional power centers held together by discourse (collective goals, values, ideas, principles, 
and interests). Thus, discourse 
A. Is a property that emerges from previously existing structures, but that can have autonomous 
effects on those structures. It shapes the very structures that make it viable and give rise to its 
particular form. 
B. Builds and deconstructs political coalitions by creating identification or conflict between social 
groups. It mediates and masks contradictions in way that reveal identification with new coalitions 
and conserve old ones. It is the “glue that agents use to fuse “historic blocs” and the “hammer” 
used to drive them apart.  
                                                 
52 Wallerstein 1984:49 
53 However, where realist thought in IR and world systems thinking takes the system of states and the global 
division of labor as ontologically prior units, my perspective, following Gill (1993:9) understands them to be 
products of specific social discursive practices.  
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 My use of discourse analysis as a method to investigate policy analysis and planning54 
derives from the social constructionist critique of linguistic realism in the social and human 
sciences.55 These studies understand discourse as more than a repository of referential symbols 
(language) or a reflection of unyielding structure. It is a contingent and contested system of 
meaning and social order that is constitutive of interests and identities, not just reflective of them.  
My approach to discourse also draws on rhetorical studies of identification in socio-
political coalitions and conflict.56 These studies apply the ancient study of rhetoric, or, the 
competent discovery and application of rhetorical tropes and figures as a form of practical 
wisdom, to trace the roots of social constructs over time in individual acts, agents, and events. 
The key rhetorical method I analyze is that of “framing.” Rein and Schoen define framing as the 
process of “selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide 
guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting.”57 My study examines two basic 
mechanisms think tanks use to frame social problems and categories in ways that imply 
particular legislative solutions. 
A key recurrent framing technique by think tankers is the representation of particular 
interests as general interests. Gramsci’s signature concept of “hegemony” captures how this 
discursive strategy 1) serves to transcend/unify particular interests (e.g. fractions of capital, 
labor) by socializing elites into the conduct of ideological struggle, 2) mobilizes the beliefs and 
actions of the population at large, and 3) co-opts radical ideas into a framework that does not 
                                                 
54 Fischer 1980; McCloskey 1985; Forester 1981; Majone 1989; Stone 1988; Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey 1987 
55 I.e. the critique of “language as a mirror of nature” and the “linguistic turn” in twentieth-century social theory and 
philosophy: Richard Rorty, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jurgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Khun, Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann, Clifford Geertz, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. 
56 See Aune 1996, 1994; McGee 1990; Burke 1969; Perelman and Olbyrechts-Tyteca 1969.  
57 p.263-5 in Wagner, Weiss, Wittrock, Wollman (eds.) 1991. 
 15
 disrupt fundamental power relations. The case studies suggest this mechanism is a primary 
“intellectual function”58 of think tanks.  
A second key framing technique is the development of “paradigm ideas.”59 These 
cognitive frameworks are generative metaphors and causal stories that form baseline 
assumptions about the national interest and general attitudes towards capitalism. They articulate 
the interests of historically specific configurations of classes and states, and spread through the 
dominance of particular groups that constitute the “core” field of policy action. Ideas become 
paradigmatic when they saturate broad aspects of mass and elite consciousness, “crowding out” 
other ideas and congealing into seemingly natural institutions until challenged by a conjuncture 
of crisis and active opposition. My concern is precisely how certain paradigm ideas come to 
dominate intellectual and political discourse at particular moments and periods. As we shall see 
in the case studies, tanks use paradigm ideas to either bridge or bypass the gap between practical 
politics and the technocratic language of policymaking. A paradigm idea is thus a mechanism 
that can both bring elite and popular opinion into alignment, and manage contradictions between 
the two.  
By structuring popular, government, expert, and corporate discourse around particular 
interpretations of public problems and policy solutions, successful paradigm ideas manifest as 
relatively stable political coalitions and major policy outcomes, what I call a “policy regimes.” I 
have adapted the “regime” concept from international relations (IR) literature and its 
international political economy (IPE) sub-field, where it refers to agreements between states or 
                                                 
58 “intellectuals…function…is that of mediating the extremes, of ‘socialising’ the technical discoveries which 
provide the impetus for all activities of leadership, of devising compromises between, and ways out of extreme 
solutions” (Gramsci 1971: 182n) 
59 Khun 1962 
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 one state’s hegemony,60 to refer to stable patterns of cooperation between key elements in 
national society that produce longstanding and far-reaching policy outcomes. Each policy regime 
produces and rests on paradigm ideas that shape how elites and the public define the nature of 
public problems and the actions required to solve them. One can thus analyze paradigm ideas 
like “efficiency” or “Keynesianism” and the cluster of ideas that surround them (full 
employment, demand management, welfare state) as rival political projects among multiple elites 
in a “war of position.”61  
1.5. Chapter summaries 
Whatever influence tanks have in such hegemonic projects depends largely on their 
ability to present themselves as legitimate possessors of special competencies at certain times 
and places to discrete coalitions of multiple elites. Thus, we would expect changes in TT practice 
to vary between periods of hegemonic stability and periods of crisis. I focus on the nexus of TT 
rhetoric and organizational activity. The cases in the substantive chapters (2-8) show 
transformations in the field of think tanks in the context of major socio-economic 
transformations. Each chapter develops representative case studies of particular think tanks that 
embody the role of experts in the development, redefinition, and maintenance of public policy 
paradigm ideas. Through both continuity and change, we witness a striking correlation between 
the shape of the TT field and the shape of the global political economy.  
Authors have widely diverging views on how much and whether think tanks affect public 
policy, as the three frameworks detailed above show. Some simply concede that Washington 
                                                 
60 International Organization 1971 “Transnational Relations and World Politics”; see also Keohane and Nye 1973.  
61 Gramsci defined the war of position as encompassing piecemeal progress and a strong ideological element (as 
opposed to a “war of movement” or insurrection). This “passive revolution” (1971: 114) allows progressive or 
bourgeois elements to gain power without a dramatic upheaval. The policy processes I describe draw on both the 
war of position and movement through the concept of “punctuated equilibrium,” borrowed from geology, which 
identifies long periods of relative equilibrium (stability, a “regime”) punctuated by sudden shifts in opportunity 
structures and capacities that make for rapid change (at times, revolutionary) (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
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 think tank practitioners “work in…an unpredictable enterprise [and] wield a degree of power that 
is impossible to measure,”62 or that it “is impossible to establish a causal link between the 
activities of think-tanks and policy outcomes.”63 Polanyi might ask whether think tanks are not 
merely  
…pushing that which is falling and holding onto that which, under its own stream, is moving 
their way. It may then seem as if they had originated the process of social change, while actually they 
were merely its beneficiaries, and may even be perverting the trend to make it serve their own aims.64
 
I propose that the search for a covering law explaining whether think tanks bring about or merely 
reflect underlying political economies is the wrong question, since structuration presupposes 
both processes. I do draw on quantitative analyses of funding sources, media citations, television 
appearances, op-ed articles,65 perceptions of reliability and objectivity in policy circles,66 
testimony before Congress,67 and historical ratios between policy ideas and policy results68 to 
inform my analytic narratives. Such statistical data help explain when think tanks affect rather 
than reflect policy outputs. Key moments and trends in the historical development of think tanks 
have critically affected their relevance today. Textual analysis, interviews, and secondary 
material produce thick historical descriptions and explanations of empirical cases, not causal 
theories in a conventional sense.69 Throughout the cases, I argue the coherence between think 
tank discourse and major policy outcomes is evidence for the capacity of relatively stable 
coalitions of multiple elites to preside over the reorganization of both the market and politics into 
two relatively stable regimes. 
                                                 
62 Ricci 1993:ix 
63 Stone 1996:4 
64 1957: 28 
65 FAIR 
66 Rich and Weaver 1998 
67 Rich and Weaver 1998 
68 Domhoff 1996 
69 Bourdieu 1998; Foucault 1991, 1969 
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 Chapters 2-5 discuss the emergence of policy institutes in the transition to and 
consolidation of a modern corporate liberal regime. I show how TTs facilitated cooperation 
between functional units in the US and global political economy by mobilizing multiple elites 
around ideas of technocratic governance, business-labor cooperation, and social melioration. 
Their rhetoric evolved in this period from a late 19th century emphasis on “ameliorating” the 
hardships of competitive capitalism, towards a corporate capitalism based on “efficient” social 
thought, to Keynesian macroeconomic and militarist notions in the New Deal and post-WWII 
eras.  
Chapter 2 establishes corporate liberalism as a promising analytic concept for 
understanding the emergence and evolution of think tanks. It describes TT roles in structuring a 
shift from competitive laissez-faire to a more centralized and rationalized regime around the turn 
of the century (1880-1921). Upper classes and a rising professional managerial class who 
favored industrialization and significant social reforms drove policy-oriented social science, 
simultaneously responding to and creating a fundamental variation in the form and dynamic of 
the economy and government activity. To regulate competition and rising rates of profit between 
corporations, and mitigate the negative effects of industrialization these groups gradually 
embraced a paradigm of scientific management and systematic empirical analysis of the 
economy and underlying social problems.70 The involvement of tank personnel in planning the 
WW I mobilization legitimized the corporate liberal ideal domestically.  
Chapter 3 shows strong discursive and institutional continuities between Progressive 
think tanks and an expanding network of business executives, philanthropists, academics, public 
officials, and labor representatives who through the 1920s and 1930s sought to stabilize, 
rationalize, concentrate and protect the new capitalism by nurturing corporatist ideas. 
                                                 
70 Progressivism embodied this thought in the US 
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 Researchers continued to act at the intersection of public and private spheres in ways that did not 
appear overtly political or interest bound, shaping discourse on abiding concerns with economic 
crises and the effective distribution of the social product. Through decades of both stability and 
of widespread social unrest, tanks participated in government agencies, landmark legislation, and 
public advocacy. They developed Keynesian economics and adapted its potentially radical 
elements to a consensus framework that did not fundamentally disrupt relations of power in the 
American political economy. A regime consolidated around a “demand-led” industrial labor 
process of mass-produced consumer goods.  
The cases in chapters 4 and 5 examine TT provided ideological cohesion to multiple 
elites in the New Deal and WW II, further institutionalizing the right wing of the Keynesian 
spectrum, and extrapolating it internationally. Chapter 4 shows how the Committee for 
Economic Development (CED) and related TTs constructed a military Keynesian consensus71 
that contained the corporate liberal vision within relatively conservative channels through the 
crisis-ridden 1930s. These tanks had a direct role in the structuration of U.S. politics around a 
synthesis of corporatist and liberalizing principles. As with the earlier turn of the century 
conjuncture of crisis and scientific hubris, this policy network resolved crises according to the 
needs of concentrated interests.  
Chapter 5 shows how Council on Foreign Relations, drawing on tank work dating back to 
the First World War, exported this vision abroad by synthesizing right wing Keynesianism with 
the lessons, coalitions, and economic outcomes of World War II. Its role in shaping the Bretton-
Woods system (Marshall Plan, World Bank, IMF), and Cold War strategy demonstrates a 
growing strategic role in a corporatist restructuring of foreign policy. The Brookings Institution 
and Urban Institute roles in the “welfare state” represent another historical high point for the 
                                                 
71 Cox 1981, 1987; Gill 1993 
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 social interventionist impulse within corporate liberalism. Continued popular and elite support 
for this combination of activist and laissez-faire federal government continued through the 1950s 
and 1960s, justifying its status as a “regime.”  
Chapters 6-8 describe the evolution of tanks in the transition to a neoliberal regime that 
undermines the maximal welfare state, constrains transnational challenges to neoliberal 
governance, and consolidates conservative gains through the Global War on Terrorism. The 
chapters explain how conservative tanks constructed a series of domestic and international 
threats to Judeo-Christian civilization, creating a chain of equivalence between domestic culture 
wars and the war on terrorism. Chapter 6 establishes “neoliberalism” as a promising analytic 
concept for understanding the development of think tanks since the 1970s. It shows how policy 
entrepreneurs mobilized business and a network of key philanthropists to invest heavily in tanks, 
legitimized new political actors in the struggle over the role of the state, and filled the void of the 
rapidly collapsing Keynesian welfare state consensus. Disillusionment with the idea of a society 
perfectible through technocratic management made government and economic elites receptive to 
the argument that policy research could be harmful because it raised the expectations of the 
masses, and produced dangerously unfeasible burdens on the budget.72 Economic theories kept 
barely alive for decades in US and British tanks found unprecedented support in elite circles.73  
Like the late 1890s, the rhetoric of policy research institutes during this era projected a fear of 
democracy run amok. Unlike their 19th century forebears, the New Right tanks sloughed off the 
neutral rhetoric of the Progressives. A twin emphasis on political commitment and public 
relations replaced the veneer of neutrality that proved so useful in constructing a corporate liberal 
                                                 
72 cf. Crozier et al in the 1975 Trilateral Commission report discussed in chapter 5. 
73 Drawing on men such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Michael Oakeshott, conservatives took up the 
antistatist tradition (‘classical liberalism’) that had preceded the late 19th century reforms.  See Cockett 1994; Desai, 
1994; Gill 1990 
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 regime. The marketing of research on the failure of “Big Government” pushed the whole field of 
think tanks toward the right. Both New Right and “third way” think tanks armed governments in 
the U.S. and Europe armed with theoretical criticisms of bureaucratic intervention and plans for 
reducing the welfare state. The corporate liberal Brookings Institution embraced “deregulation” 
and other critiques of the Great Society programs it once championed, while the Progressive 
Policy Institute helped US President Bill Clinton to develop a politics that capitulated to 
neoliberalism while keeping a semblance of the corporate liberal compromise alive. Such “New 
Democrat” institutes are a crowning achievement of the conservative movement, insofar as they 
give conservative ideas prominence even when conservatives are not in power, and exacerbate 
divisions in the Democratic Party.  
Chapter 7 analyzes the simultaneous proliferation of both business and social justice 
tanks at the transnational level through the 1990s, and compares their efforts in global 
governance debates over financial, investment, trade, and development policy. The cases show 
that tanks affiliated with the “Global Justice Movement” (GJM) appear to be more influential 
than ever, but are constrained by the superior capacity of transnational neoliberal tanks like the 
World Economic Forum, and the abiding functions of intergovernmental institutions and treaties 
in the world system. The sharp GJM criticism have had limited impact on prescriptions for 
financial and investment liberalization, and even less on trade liberalization. As a “Post-
Washington consensus” takes hold, fundamental changes such as total debt cancellation, or 
equalized voting procedures in the WB recede from the agenda, and market piety remains intact 
among transnational tanks.  
Finally, chapter 8 argues that the potential for GJM tanks to emerge as a new professional 
managerial class is constrained by “neoconservative” tanks operating in a “Global War on 
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 Terrorism.” The influence of a foreign policy brain trust nurtured by Reagan but somewhat 
marginalized by Bush Sr. and Clinton is legible in the total and permanent war footing 
characterizing the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Groups like the Project for a New 
American Century (PNAC), Center for Security Policy (CSP), and American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI) have provided the administration with expert advice and personnel to conduct a hard right 
shift in foreign policy, further consolidating neoliberal gains in economic and social policy.  
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2. The Invention of American Policy Expertise, 1865-1921 
Antecedents for public policy expertise, like most human practices, stretch far into human 
history. We see applied social knowledge in twenty-first century BC in Ur, Mesopotamia, 
Confucian China, classical Greece, the Middle-Ages, the Italian and English Renaissances 
(Vico’s New Science; More’s Utopia, 1516; Bacon’s New Atlantis, 1624; Jonathan Swift),74 the 
Enlightenment political philosophies (Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke, Hobbes, Mill, Burke, 
Bentham, Hume), and early Modern thinkers like Comte, Saint-Simon, Pareto and Mosca.  
The late 19th century empirical human sciences adopted the ambitious Enlightenment 
project of understanding and technically mastering society as a whole system. Increasingly 
professional researchers, imbued with what Rabinow calls a “missionary and didactic pathos,”75 
thought of society as an object of programmatic understanding and control in the same way that 
natural scientists thought of the physical world.76 The human sciences reorganized to discover 
and elaborate a system of representation that would order all things on a common table, and 
through which Man could grasp his own being as both “an object of knowledge and as a subject 
that knows.”77  
                                                 
74 DeLeon 1988:14-15 
75In the French case, Paul Rabinow locates the epistemic break of “the modern” somewhat earlier, in the late 18th 
and early 19th century, when social technicians developed scientific, spatial, and stylistic representations in order to 
efficiently and productively regulate society, and justified such efforts in terms of the welfare of the population.  
Following Georges Canguilhem, Rabinow finds that from 1759 to 1834, “a normative class conquered the power to 
identify the function of social norms with its own uses and its own determination of content.” Other useful studies of 
this aspect of modernity include Schorske 1980, Habermas 1987, Calinescu 1987. If we think of the Modern in 
terms of the Enlightenment, then the history of tanks exemplifies to some degree the familiar ‘Dialectic of 
Enlightenment,’ described by Horkheimer and Adorno as the tendency for the emancipatory motives of social 
analysis to get turned into their opposite.  
76 As DeLeon points out, “the principal intellectual motif of the late nineteenth century was that social laws akin to 
physical and natural counterparts could be discovered and applied” (1988:17). He points to the social Darwinism of 
Herbert Spencer and T. H. Huxley, the pragmatic and positivist philosophies of William James and John Dewey, the 
dialectics of Marx, and sociology of Weber, as examples. 
77 The effort to understand society in order to reform it represents a rupture specific to the western episteme. See 
Foucault 1970:322.  
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 Modern democracies created new demands for policy research and new opportunities for 
social science. From “its early origins in the modern period” social science has “been a 
constitutive aspect of the vast monitoring of social reproduction that is an integral feature of the 
state.”78 For Gagnon social science, “as well as being an intellectual activity dedicated to the 
understanding of society, is also a mode of discourse that empowers and legitimates the political-
economic practices of the modern state.”79 In Europe, applied empirical research in the form of 
“statistics,” “police science” and “Staatswissenschaft” coincided with public awareness of acute 
social problems. In America, multiple elites sensed the dawn of a new era in new intense modes 
of capital accumulation, and drew on “social science” as a method of scholarly inquiry and social 
improvement. James Allen Smith notes that “attitudes toward social science, an infrastructure for 
graduate training and professional careers, well-organized large-scale philanthropy, and an 
expansive conception of the state and its functions” all shaped the expert’s role in the decades 
after the U.S. Civil War.80 Smith points to the American Social Science Association (ASSA) as 
an early expression of these dynamics. It began in October 1865 in Boston when close to a 
hundred reformers (abolitionists, public health advocates, prison, asylum, orphanage, and school 
reformers) met at the Massachusetts State House in an enthusiastic embrace of avenues of 
research later known as distinct disciplines (history, political science, economics, sociology), but 
then considered as part of a general “Social Science.” Convinced that the scientific/technical 
methods that had wrought far-reaching transformations in transportation, communication, 
manufacturing, energy, and medicine could be applied to social and economic problems, they set 
up an umbrella organization for reformers, professors, and public officials devoted as its 
                                                 
78 Giddens 1985:1 
79 Gagnon 1990:5 
80 Smith 1991:24 
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 founding document says, to the discovery of “the real elements of Truth.”81 The American 
Association for the Promotion of Social Science (later the ASSA) mandated that social problems 
can be discerned and solved (ameliorated and prevented) through social science.  
The ASSA faded out in genteel decline,82 but provided the impetus for professional social 
science research, and legitimized its applicability to public problems. National professional 
organizations such as the American Economics Association (AEA) and the American Political 
Science Association grew out of the ASSA, and shared the epistemological principle that an 
objective social reality was amenable to rational scientific analysis—that “facts,” as Emile 
Durkheim argued, “must be studied as things, as realities external to the individual.”83  
The AEA in particular, through the leadership of Richard T. Ely, encouraged professional 
academic economists to collaborate with government in order to aid human progress. The AEA 
questioned the scientific foundation of traditional laissez-faire economics and its use as a guide 
for policy. Borrowing from the German “historical economists” whom they studied at the 
Universities of Halle and Heidelberg, Ely and other “new political economists” in America 
rejected the notion of timeless natural economic laws, and instead held that social evolution was 
the product of purposeful human intervention.84 Many social reforms of the twentieth century 
trace their origins to the ameliorative impulses in the German model of state planning derived 
from this thought.  
However, it was not until relatively late in the century that leaders in politics, business, 
and organized labor cohered around the idea of a scientifically knowable general interest, and 
created innovative organizational forms at the municipal and federal level to promote such 
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 knowledge. Municipal reform organizations modeled on the National Municipal League and 
New York Bureau for Municipal Research forged a nexus between experts, politicians, 
capitalists, and labor in the 1880s and 1890s. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
these connections expanded and solidified into the forms that most people today identify as 
“think tanks.” A novel American institution, the philanthropic foundation, provided a stronger 
link between government and an emergent expert elite group of university-trained social 
scientists. The National Civic Federation (1900), The Russell Sage Foundation (1907), and 
Institute for Government Research (1916) were among the first U.S. policy groups to combine a 
philanthropic base, national purview, and a permanent body of researchers into self-contained 
entities. Formed to encourage scholarly investigation of social, economic and political issues, a 
comparison of these cases illustrates the discursive shift from amelioration to efficiency in public 
policy expertise.85  These federally focused organizations pushed administrative reforms similar 
to those pushed by NML and NYBMR at the municipal level, although the reforms enacted at 
the federal level were not as extensive. 
2.1. The gospel of scientific efficiency 
The paradigm idea around which Progressive modifications to the political system 
revolved was efficiency.  Samuel Haber contends that the cult of efficiency in early twentieth 
century America was “a secular Great Awakening” that infiltrated all levels of society.86  The 
incipient ideal of efficiency in Franklin’s vision of moral virtue and charitable organizations 
received scientific grounding from physics and the newly discovered laws of thermodynamics in 
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 steam engines, and became a metaphor that inspired philanthropic support for the use of experts 
in policymaking.  
The path from thermodynamic to political efficiency was tread by Frederick Winslow 
Taylor’s philosophy of corporate efficiency, which held that the adoption of scientific methods 
of management could organize work relationships more productively and harmonize the interests 
of labor and capital.87 Taylor’s theory integrated all of the public meanings that efficiency had at 
the time: hard and disciplined work, the input output ratio of thermodynamics, the relation 
between costs and profits in business, and the leadership of “scientific expertise.”88 In a context 
of violent labor confrontations (such as Ludlow, Colorado and Lowell, Massachusetts), an 
answer to class conflict that turned on the application of scientific principles rather than class 
struggle appealed to many middle-class reformers.89  Progressive reformers sought a partnership 
of business and expertise, and saw the economy as a sphere of problems and solutions like any 
other.90   
The cases show how applying the concept efficiency to society expanded government use 
of social science research, and how in a short time, the idea of administrative structures of expert 
decision-making became common sense among government officials. As authority came to rest 
on appeals to the rationality of science as a method and worldview, scientifically oriented experts 
charged with managing public life staked their identity on nonpartisan expertise. Under the 
rubric of nonpartisanship, proto-tanks played a mediating role in the realignment of political 
power in urban and national governance, appealing to both the corporate class and to the broader 
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 public interest. The expert would act to legitimate the system that produced him by developing 
language to accommodate “forces outside the business community to political trends within 
business and professional life.”91 This incipient “political capitalism” represented the 
incorporation of industrial/corporate interests into the structure of government machinery.  
2.1.1. Case 1: National Municipal League 
The early ASSA impetus to apply social science to public affairs congealed in the 1880s 
and 1890s when coalitions of experts, politicians, philanthropists, and business leaders in large 
cities around the country sought to coordinate responses to rapid urban growth, industrialization, 
and immigration by reorganizing municipal governments. “Enlightened” business executives 
supported expert analysis in municipal reform in order to replace local decision-making 
institutions (wards) with a system based on the rationalization of society and the centralization of 
authority. The centralization of bureaucratic functions and decisions in the executive branch 
would aid the expert in the efficient administration of economic processes. 
A seminal case was the model program produced by the National Municipal League 
(NML). Formed in 1897 by five lawyers, two professors of political science, a journalist, and a 
retired industrialist, NML researched local governments extensively in the United States and 
Europe for two years, and submitted a final report prescribing structural changes for city 
governance. Its draft corporation act called for a strong mayor, but also checks on this power via 
civil service regulations. More generally, they outlined an “elite realm of officials who would 
resist the machine and continue to rationalize the functions and organization of administrative 
offices.”92 Outgrowths and copies of the League in New York, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Jersey 
City (PA), Cincinnati, Milwaukee and Toledo took a lead role in formulating progressive 
platforms comprised of executive centralization and programs of civic improvement that 
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 performed formidably at the polls. NML and its offshoots were singularly influential in the 
campaign for uniform accounting budget reform in city governments via the office of a 
comptroller.  By 1903, Chicago, New York, Boston, Providence, and Baltimore all had adopted a 
centralized accounting procedure in a comptroller’s office, reports from departments and 
approval of contracts, and requisitions for supplies by the comptroller.93
2.1.2. Case 2: New York Bureau of Municipal Research 
The emerging professions of accounting, administration, and social work were also key 
participants in municipal finance reform. Impressed with the methods of accounting controls in 
the business system, they moved to adopt “unit cost accounting.” This movement found its most 
cogent institutional expression in a collection of engineers, accountants, trained administrators, 
and social workers known as the New York Bureau of Municipal Research (NYBMR). The 
Bureau was the brainchild of William H. Allen, a social worker who had come to New York City 
in 1903 in connection with the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor. With money 
from Carnegie and Rockefeller, Allen, socialist lawyer Henry Bruere, and accounting specialist 
Frederick Cleveland set up the organization in 1907 to apply “the disinterestedness of research, 
and the techniques of business management, to public affairs and civic problems.”94 The group 
claimed that gaps and imprecision in revenue and expenditure data “prevented effective control 
over expenditures and perpetuated a pattern of discretionary authority.”95 To gauge the efficiency 
(inputs and outputs) of government operations accurately, the NYBMR developed a budget that 
classified department activities and standardized their functions. The result was that department 
heads could spend money freely within the parameters of departmental functions, but could not 
divert funds to purposes designated to other departments.   
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 By 1913, the inundated NYBMR had helped create a similar operation in Philadelphia,96 
and conducted its own studies in more than fifteen municipalities.97  Cincinnati’s Bureau of 
Municipal Research (1909), Chicago’s Bureau of Public Efficiency (1910), and the Milwaukee 
Bureau of Economy and Efficiency (1910),98 each took their inspiration from New York. 
 The impulse to maintain efficient discipline in municipal affairs reflected a desire to 
preserve older, elite social values. Hays observes that municipal reform “was used to destroy the 
political institutions of the lower and middle classes and the political power which those 
institutions gave rise to.”99 Waves of European immigrants usually voted the straight party ticket 
and ignored obvious corruption in the machine system in exchange for the boss’s favors. Middle-
class groups frightened by the growing influence of immigrants and workers in the patronage 
system targeted national party “machines” and the “bosses” who ran them through bonds of 
loyalty.  
The reformers expressed their dissatisfaction with this form of political representation by 
redefining democracy to incorporate administrative expertise as a principle. As Martin J. Schiesl 
writes 
Most reformers realized that any serious effort to discredit the principles of popular government 
in a culture long accustomed to the democratic process could invite intense, if not violent, 
resistance from the urban masses.100
 
The research agencies that rationalized government functions in city after city measured civic 
morality in efficient, scientific, professional, businesslike public administration, regulations and 
social welfare services. The presumption of a tight interrelationship between capitalist values and 
administrative methods challenged the legitimacy of mass politics in municipal affairs. Put 
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 simply, reformers thought business and expertise should run cities. They preferred to see city 
governments as business operations removed from popular control. Their model for political 
reform was the corporation, with elements of the middle classes101 acting as a city’s board of 
directors whose task was to eliminate party politics from local government and replace them with 
middle class values through structural reform.102   
 However, the drive for governmental efficiency was not simply a program to insulate the 
power of cosmopolitan elites from democratic pressures under machine politics. The 
centralization of administrative authority also allowed groups more or less accurately to monitor 
government activities and hence hold public officials and administrators more accountable for 
social service provision. Where fiscal reform would control corruption, “research” would expand 
and improve public services.103  The generation of budgetary knowledge would not produce 
smaller budget and lower taxes, but advance in the welfare of all residents. Efficiency would 
defined more broadly than was not strictly equated with economy but defined more broadly to 
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 32
 mean the maximum use of all city resources.104 The NYBMR philosophy of scientific 
management saw specialization, planning, quantitative measurement, and standardization as the 
key concepts included under the heading “efficiency” that would be used to maximize 
output/input ratios. This ethic coincided with the modern self-image of reformers as value-free 
analysts applying scientific methods to unearth “hard data” in the name of a general interest.   
These early TTs also inculcated an ethic of public education. Marketing its findings to the 
broad public was integral to fulfillment of the NYBMR mission. It took steps to publicize the 
budget and its connection to the well being of New York residents.105 Allen said in 1908 that the 
bureau was “not to stop graft, not to head off the politician, and not to get good men into office, 
but rather to keep the public informed of what public officials are doing.”106As with the Russell 
Sage Foundation (see below), its use of the survey method107 to generate facts regarding 
community services was a “crucial link between reform-minded officials and upper-middle-class 
elites outside local government. When party-minded personnel were unwilling to implement the 
proposals, the Bureau often released its findings to the public in the hope that popular pressure 
would bring about more competent government.”  By 1911, through a series of bulletins 
describing economic and social conditions, the NYBMR had lobbied free medical inspection in 
schools, the establishment of the bureau of child hygiene, centralization of health inspection 
procedures, the elimination of unsanitary slaughterhouse practices, and enforcement of housing 
regulations.  
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 The various bureaus of municipal research produced tons of information on budget and 
accounting systems and public services that articulated efficiency in terms of both sound fiscal 
policy as well as more and better social services. Reformers thought that fiscal reform would 
enhance the satisfaction of the needs of all urban residents. Civil service reform replaced 
nineteenth century notions of limited government and laissez-faire with a concept of public 
responsibility. The notion of the public interest produced by the efficiency movement would 
reverberate in later years as debates around welfare capitalism came to dominate political life 
throughout the 20th century.   
The municipal reform movement was therefore not just a medium to transform public 
administration into a lean businesslike operation. Social efficiency was as big a concern as fiscal 
efficiency. The movement contained professionals dedicated to the philosophy that information 
experts gathered on city life directly applied to social welfare services could provide residents 
with new and better services.  
 Still, the net effect of efficiency reforms was to produce more elite control. In municipal 
reforms around the turn of the twentieth century, the tendency towards social control supersedes 
social amelioration.108   The metaphor of efficiency functioned to assimilate and attenuate the 
idea of using social science to cure social ills. Citizens, Bruere claimed, would need to recognize 
that the complexity of modern government demanded specialized knowledge, or “professional 
service in behalf of citizen interests”, and that citizenship now turned on making informed 
decisions in the voting booth based on an evaluation of governmental efficiency.109   As a 
component of what Ohmann calls a rising “professional managerial class” (PMC), proto-TTs 
tamped down the more radical elements of reform. While some reforms may have  
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 looked and felt more like opposition to the untrammeled workings of big business: social 
work, urban reform, muckraking, the regulatory legislation of the 1900s... in none of 
these projects did the anti-union, anti-populist PMC support working class self-
organization; indeed, in retrospect, all of them tended to strengthen the rule of capital by 
making it less abrasive and coercive, more reasonable, more ‘natural,’ more 
hegemonic.110
 
The PMC seized on the metaphor of efficiency to manage a perceived threat to growth, property, 
and profits. The metaphor, which encompassed notions of executive power,111 the separation of 
politics from administration, the businesslike administration of city government, and expansion 
of welfare services, led reformers to place authority in the hands of a small group of people 
drawn mostly from the middle classes. As Ohmann explains, 
In going after the Tammany Halls of the big cities, reformers were, after all, seeking to 
replace (corrupt) working class organizations with rational management by businessmen and 
their PMC allies, even if their plans called for some gas-and-sewer socialism.  Progressives 
had sympathy for workers as residents of the city, looking after them with sanitary measures 
and settlement houses, but no solidarity with workers at work.  Their contribution in that 
sphere was scientific management.  They saw in organized labor at least as dangerous a threat 
as in organized capital; they lamented, and had since before Bellamy, American society’s 
unfortunate tendency to divide into antagonistic classes.112  
2.2. The rise of national think tanks 
2.2.1. Case 3: National Civic Federation 
Arguments about the absorption and displacement of competitive capitalism crystallized 
in the New York Reform Club, the Chicago Civic Federation, the National Civic Federation 
(NCF), and other big city economic clubs and reform associations. In these venues, the major 
constituents in the corporate reconstruction of the market (railways, industry, commerce, 
agriculture, labor, professionals, and politicians), sought to define their roles in the new economy 
and adapt the law and public policy to these new roles. These groups articulated powerful ideas 
conducive to the transition to a large-scale economy, and incubated a new breed of multiple 
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 elites committed to rational economic management. The NCF in particular represents the clearest 
articulation of the paradigm ideas for which Fordism would later provide an economic basis 
(scientific management, some state intervention, and integration of the working classes into an 
imperialist project).  
Founded in 1900 by business leaders and some labor representatives, NCF was arguably 
the most important of the national Progressive organizations. Focused mainly on the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Act, NCF amalgamated prominent people in economic, political, intellectual, 
religious spheres to hash out policy and law reforms congruent with corporate administered 
markets and government regulation. The NCF conference in 1907 and the Chicago Civic 
Federation Conference on Trusts in 1899 both served as a platform for criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act, and emphasized the need to accept and regulate large 
corporations. The Chicago conference was more diverse, including laissez-faire, populist, and 
Marxian opinions, and spawned a splinter group of more radically leftist opinion. The members 
carefully selected for the 1907 NCF conference on the other hand came precisely to depoliticize 
the trust question, presenting it as a product of nonpartisan expertise. They fleshed the agenda 
out beforehand to ensure a predetermined outcome that defined the general welfare in terms of 
revising the antitrust law. Despite some conflict between small-manufacturers and labor unions 
over union strikes and boycotts, a consensus emerged affirming an administered rather than 
competitive market, and the compatibility of large corporations with democracy.113 NCF 
sponsored workmen’s compensation laws, federal price setting, and played a major role in 
writing the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. 
The first NCF chair, prominent Cleveland industrialist and Republican senator Mark 
Hanna, described the federation’s mission of cooperation between capital and labor thusly:  
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 We must get right down to the belief that life is a matter of mutual interest between labor 
and capital…. There will always be neutral ground where conflicting interests can meet 
and confer and adjust themselves—a sort of Hague tribunal, if you please, in the 
everyday affairs of life.114   
 
Participants forged an identity opposed to “cutthroat” and “irresponsible” business competitors 
that did not support “cooperation” in commerce and industry, or distinguish a conservative social 
welfare program from socialism. They also sought cooperation with conservative labor leaders 
like Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) who did not question the basic 
structure of the economy and were content with a larger share of the economic output.115 The 
concept of “safe” unionists and the “right kind” of regulations were favorite themes of NCF 
leaders, and motives for their promotion of a welfare state, collective bargaining, child labor and 
public utility regulations, and federal partnerships with corporations. For these reasons, 
Weinstein identifies NCF as “the leading organization of politically conscious corporation 
leaders at least until the United States entered the First World War … [which] established the 
principle of tripartite (business-labor-public) representation in public affairs.”116  
Hanna expressed the principle of such a cooperative capitalism in a 1920 statement 
confirming the necessity of organized labor: 
I believe in it because it is a demonstrated fact that where the concerns and interests of 
labor are entrusted to able and honest leadership, it is much easier for those who represent 
the employers to come into close contract with the laborer, and, by dealing with fewer 
persons, to accomplish results quicker and better. 
The trusts have come to stay. Organized labor and organized capital are but forward steps 
in the great industrial evolution that is taking place….and it is our duty, those of us who 
represent the employers, from this time on to make up our minds that this question is one 
that must be heard…. 
There is nothing in the organization of society in this country that can afford to permit the 
growth of socialistic ideas. They are un-American and unnatural to us as a people…. 
…I received great encouragement from… [AFL President] Samuel Gompers…when he 
took the broad ground that in the interests of labor there was no room for the socialist or 
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 the anarchist, no room for men who undertook to disturb the principles of our society and 
government. When such words come from a man leading the largest labor organization in 
the world…I know that…now is the time to proclaim to the American people that in the 
consideration of this question, which sooner or later must be forced upon us, we must 
consider what is for the best interest of society as well as for our material development.117
 
The original NCF purpose faded as most of its original ideas—the creation of a Federal Trade 
Commission, industrial accident insurance, and welfare benefits in corporations—passed into 
law.118 Through the 1920s, it still served as a meeting group between AFL leaders, executives, 
and academic experts, but its influence waned as its executive director and leadership lost 
interest in discussing policy. With AFL president Samuel Gompers, the organization condemned 
liberals as communists, and was irrelevant in the 1930s.119 Despite NCF’s drift, the Wagner Act 
and Social Security Act (see chapter 4) were a working out of ideas concerning labor relations 
and social insurance initiated by NCF. The ability of others in the policy network to adapt its 
policy agenda to the new Keynesian consensus partly explains the growing irrelevance of NCF in 
the 1930s, and is evidence for the regime status of corporate liberalism.  
2.2.2. Case 4: Russell Sage Foundation: The Apex of Ameliorative Expertise 
With an initial endowment of $10 million dollars, the Russell Sage Foundation did policy 
research in the waning Progressive Era years.120 Like most of the other seminal organizations in 
the early 1900s, public education was part of its raison d’être.  Its stated goal of applying 
research to social ills oriented it to public education on issues like tuberculosis, the working 
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 conditions of women, health concerns, and extensive studies like Paul U. Kellogg’s study of 
Pittsburgh industrial conditions.121  
The Pittsburgh study of 1906-09 was the first major study of a burgeoning Social Survey 
movement, and became the prototype for most of the social research used by during the first 
three decades of the century.122 Kellogg’s main method was the survey, a tool that combined 
research and public education to effect political change. He believed social workers could 
analyze social problems and work with local leaders to solve them. Convinced that publicized 
facts could energize social transformation, Progressive social scientists produced many surveys 
to record social facts and garner publicity for them as an argument for reform. In linking 
research, publicity, and action, the surveys resembled what we might call today investigative 
journalism or interest group advocacy. “These people sought,” according to Ewen,  
through surveys and writings…to activate a public outcry on behalf of social order and 
reform [and] ... accountability to the concerns of middle-class Americans, particularly 
their worries about ‘urban problems -- labor and social welfare, municipal reform, the 
interests of the consumer.123  
 
Yet, the radical implications of this vision were short-lived.  The gradual eclipse of the metaphor 
of prevention embodied in Bellamy’s utopian Looking Backward, where social scientists saw 
themselves as doctors seeking to prevent and cure social ills, by the metaphor of the scientist of 
efficiency, whose job was the expert management of society, rearticulated the Enlightenment 
ideal of rationality to the needs of capital.  
Ewen argues that Progressivism was at a fateful juncture in 1914, exemplified by Walter 
Lippmann’s abandonment of his socialist hostility toward big business, and conciliation towards 
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 hierarchical social relations. A conservative quest for order began to displace the ideals of 
popular democracy.   
For the first generation of twentieth-century reformers, the scientific gathering of empirical 
data -- social surveys -- had been seen as a mighty instrument of social improvement.  Social 
surveys, they had believed would provide the public with a social agenda for the future.  To 
Lippmann and a growing number of others, however, the social sciences appealed less in 
their ability to create an informed public and more in their promise to help establish social 
control....  Social engineers, social scientists, armed with their emerging expertise, would 
provide the modern state with a foundation upon which a new stability might be realized....  
Accompanying a democratic current of social analysis that sought to educate the public at 
large, another -- more cabalistic -- tradition of social-scientific thought was emerging, one 
that saw the study of society as a tool by which a technocratic elite could help serve the 
interests of vested power.124
Ewen’s narrative mostly focuses on the emerging profession of public relations, but we find the 
bifurcated nature of Progressivism also in the interplay between the self-identity and function of 
professional reformers in the political economy:  
It thought of its initiates as possessing a broad capability for development, to be 
specialized and deepened through a mastery of a discipline.  So educated, the individual 
could claim certain privileges -- control over work, limited autonomy from market forces 
and bosses, affluence, respect -- guaranteed formally in the most successful professions, 
informally in the ranks of specialized management and the new government 
bureaucracies.  In exchange, the PMC offered to ‘society (in its view) expertise, 
efficiency, the ability to regulate and rationalize capitalist development, disinterested 
leadership into modernity.  On another analysis, it offered to the dominant class scientific 
management, conversion of knowledge into profit, and moderation of open class conflict; 
to the working class, schooling, sanitation, better housing, city planning, social work, 
endless advice on how to be more like the middle class, and in all these ways a modest 
bulwark against capital’s unlimited drive toward exploitation.125
 
The formation of RSF was thus a high water mark for the social justice oriented diagnosis of 
social ills and solutions. Although business and philanthropy-funded research organizations 
continued to investigate the roots of social problems and publicize them in order to arouse an 
enlightened public in the cause of reform, the efficiency movement, which structured research 
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 initiatives first at the city and then national level, would supersede, incorporate, and nullify the 
more radical vision of reform.  
In the case of the efficiency movement in municipal and national reform, we see a 
dynamic in which dominant interests in society take the potentially radical elements and 
interpretations of modernity and employ them to contrary purposes. Subsequent chapters argue 
this dialect of Enlightenment126 is a recurring dynamic within think tank history, and suggest that 
an understanding of modernity as a process by which the tools of emancipation become their 
opposite has some merit.  
2.2.3. Case 5: The Institute for Government Research 
Soon after cities began to enact fiscal reforms, the federal budget became an increasingly 
important focal point for reformers.127  President Taft’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency 
(1910), led by Frederick Cleveland of the NYBMR, issued a six-hundred page research effort in 
1912—The Need for a National Budget—calling for an executive Budget Bureau to be used by 
the president to generate a comprehensive budget.  Although supportive of the idea, neither Taft 
nor his successor Wilson were able to act on the proposal while Democrats controlled the 
Congress, and so experts on budgetary reform including Cleveland, banker and Taft’s special 
assistant Charles D. Norton, and lawyer and secretary of the new Rockefeller Foundation, set out 
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committee came under attack for exercising control over other committee’s programs, so members of Congress gave 
spending bills concerning constituency-oriented legislation and other items including army, navy, diplomacy, post 
office, and Indian affairs, to substantive legislative committees. This 1885 act became a symbol of mismanagement 
and parochialism in Congress (Meyers 1994:52-3). The emerging pattern of budgeting was what political scientists 
called “iron triangles.” Dissatisfaction with this pattern of interaction between heads of governmental bureaus, their 
clientele, and the chairpersons and ranking members of appropriations committees fomented support for the creation 
of an executive budget. 
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 to establish an organization to promote the legislation. The Institute for Government Research 
(IGR) incorporated in 1916. 128   
Like the Russell Sage Foundation, newly created philanthropic foundations supported 
IGR, in this case the Rockefeller Foundation.129 Coming on the heels of Rockefeller’s 
involvement in the massacre of striking workers in Ludlow, Colorado, IGR sought to dispel the 
impression of it as merely a forum to develop responses to the glaring scrutiny the family had 
come under. IGR deflected political controversy and charges of subterfuge by focusing on the 
narrow problem of efficiency in federal agencies, and creating a prestigious board of trustees 
intended to represent liberal, conservative, business, and academic segments of society that set 
the standard for corporate foundations involvement in public policy.130  
After World War I, as congressional representatives attempted to reduce spending 
quickly and painlessly, reformers took the lead in a movement to suppress the power of party 
bosses and chairs of permanent congressional committees by shifting power to a Chief Executive 
served by experts dedicated to the general welfare. Reformers like IGR’s first president William 
Willoughby thought that the deep separation between executive and legislative branches was 
inefficient given the size and complexity of national government. They also objected to the 
budgetary practices of piecemeal construction and itemization, which they argued were wasteful, 
lacked executive discretion, and gave little attention to total spending.  Supporters like Woodrow 
                                                 
128 The IGR expanded and was renamed the Brookings Institution in 1927 (Thompson 1956; Saunders 1966). 
Critchlow (1984) looks at the relationship between the New York Bureau of Municipal Research and the Institute 
for Government Relations. Noting the anti-statism of Brookings’ institutions did not change until after World War II 
and then during Kennedy-Johnson years, Critchlow disputes that Brookings was corporate liberal.  I would reply 
that while corporate liberalism sought fit to accede to new regulatory and administrative powers for the government, 
it helped to contain efforts to maximize the social welfare aspects of statism, and so was a sort of anti-statism. 
129 Unlike Russell Sage, which was set up to conduct its own research, the IGR functioned as an intermediary 
between business elites and government.   
130 Critchlow  1984: 32-33, Smith 1991a: 11 
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 Wilson pointed out that the form of the budget had no standard method of recording data131 and 
called for executive leadership as a remedy. Working closely with Wilson’s successor, Warren 
G. Harding, IGR celebrated the long-desired passage of the Budget and Accounting Bill in 1921.   
By placing budgets under the management of a single body comprised of the executive 
and expert advice, reformers hoped to make budget recommendations based on scientific 
principles thus developing what historian Beard called a “science of budget making.”132 
Transferring the corporate model of economic organization from Taylor to the urban and federal 
polity allowed bureaucratic centralization to flourish in all arenas, and provided “structural 
support for the diffusion of the ideology of efficiency.”133 Throughout the 1920s, IGR helped 
small and large government agencies incorporate modern business accounting methods and 
evaluated inefficient duplication and waste across agencies some sixty administrative 
monographs.134  
The policy outcomes achieved under the paradigm of efficiency marked a triumph of 
technocratic management over social emancipation. Though enmeshed in the politics of budget 
reform (the IGR lobbied long and hard for its passage, and even hired a public relations man to 
saturate newspapers with sympathetic stories and editorials), it maintained an explicit stance of 
nonpartisanship. For co-founder Jerome D. Greene, there was “no difference of opinion among 
good citizens as to the urgent necessity for efficiency and intelligent economy in 
administration.”135 Yet the first IGR director—Princeton University professor, Labor Department 
statistician, and member of both the U.S. Bureau of the Census and Taft’s Commission on 
                                                 
131 William Franklin Willoughby, The Problem of a National Budget (New York: Appleton, 1918), p.56-7. 
132 Beard 1917: iii 
133 Larson 1977: 43 
134 Smith 1991a: 13 
135  Institute for Government Research, Prospectus, May 1, 1915, Brookings Institution Archives, cited in Smith 
1991a: 11 
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 Economy and Efficiency William Willoughby—was outspoken in his denunciation of the “mob 
rule” of majority government. Furthermore, Meyers observes that budget reformers were  
Not radicals; those who left their imprint upon American budgeting between the Civil 
War and 1920 were not opposed to American social structure or to competitive markets, 
nor were they proponents of income redistribution.  
 
As Haber points out, 
For those top officials who interpreted efficiency in terms of social control, this 
precocious image of a welfare state was not the main factor attracting them to municipal 
research.  They looked with approval upon the [NY] Bureau [of Municipal Research] 
because it invariably recommended increasing the power of administrative authorities.136   
 
2.3. Conclusion: Class, crisis, and restructuration 
 The difficulty in talking about Progressivism is that so many generic explanations of the 
movement and its significance are possible. From “the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill 
its destiny by bureaucratic means” (Wiebe); the waning of old institutions of social cohesion and 
change in the face of industrialism (Schiesl); a broader diffusion of wealth, status, and power 
(see Hofstadter 1955), historians refer variously to the period 1890-1910 as 
a continuation of agrarian radicalism, as an essentially urban movement led by a 
declining middle class, as a movement led by a rising middle class, as an efficiency 
movement led by professionals and bureaucrats, as a democratic movement of lower-
class immigrant groups, as a conservative, upper-class movement against popular 
democracy, and as a class struggle over moral or cultural hegemony.137  
 
To these we could add delineations of an emergent “professional managerial class” by 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1979) and Ohmann (1996), Gouldner’s “new class,” Sklar’s “shift 
from proprietary- to competitive-capitalism,” Rabinow’s “middling modernism,” Weber’s 
“bureaucratization,” Durkheim’s “rationalization,” etc.   
                                                 
136 Haber 1964: 112 
137 Nord 1981:6 
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 While it is impossible to account for the sweep of Progressivism through a single 
ideology or constituency, the coherence between proto-think tank discourse and major policy 
outcomes suggests a process by which a new and relatively coherent ruling class came to preside 
over the reorganization of both the market and politics.138 In 1880, the wealth and status of the 
upper classes did not mean easy admission to the machinery of urban government. The 
hegemony over politics “that businessmen later managed to achieve... had barely begun to take 
shape in 1890, with timid regulation of railroads. Before the end of the century, capitalists took 
little interest in the political process except as a source of giveaways and a target for bribes.”139 
By 1918, the collaborative efforts of corporate leaders, politicians, and experts achieved a 
consensus that rested on the ideology of efficiency.  
This accomplishment was not the result simply of changing winds within disciplinary 
research, great thinkers, or even the preeminence of particular organizations. To understand why 
late nineteenth century capitalists used policy expertise to access and centralize the public 
sphere, we also need to understand the structural causes underlying their recognition of the need 
for “broad controls over their world, in order to continue to amassing wealth peacefully.”140 
Deep transformations in the relationship between society and the state in the transition from 
proprietary-competitive to corporate-administered capitalism demanded new types of expertise. 
Fundamentally, labor unrest and overproduction were the conditions for the emergence of a more 
activist crisis management role in the part of upper classes. The class strife of the 1880s and 
depression of the 1890s led the advanced sectors of business to the conclusion that regulation 
and coordination of economic activity depended on “the utilization of political outlets to attain 
                                                 
138 This is consistent with G. William Domhoff’s response (1996) to Theda Skocpol and other “state autonomy” 
theorists. Domhoff argues that the policy-planning network is “the programmatic political party for the upper class 
and the corporate community” (1996: 29).  
139 Sklar 1988:.57 
140 Perkin 1996:57 
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 conditions of stability, predictability, and security -- to attain rationalization in the economy.”141  
As the rate of capital accumulation outstripped the ability of consumers to consume 
(overproduction), the value of products grew slower than the capacity of industry to make 
things.142 Breakneck capital formation consolidated productive resources in the hands of very 
few, while worker unrest over wages and conditions threatened the legitimacy of the dominant 
class. Faced with increased  cutthroat competition, declining profits, and labor unrest, the giant 
corporations and financial institutions turned to the federal government in the early 1900s to 
stabilize the economy in a way they could not for themselves.143  
Hofstadter (1955) shows that the strongest impetus for “the combination movement” and 
for the efficient rationalization of industry was the fear of anarchy and the risks of competition. 
Harold Perkin concurs: 
What Americans discovered in the Progressive Era was that the burgeoning free market 
together with industrialism and the rise of an urban civilization threatened to reduce the old 
social order to chaos....  Corporate capitalists came to understand that unregulated 
competition was wasteful, inefficient and, above all, insecure.  Profitability depended on 
controlling the vagaries of the market and ensuring that it operated in the most predictable 
and effective manner.  The investment of vast capital in mass production and cheap products 
of high quality could only be justified if sales and profits could be guaranteed, which meant 
bringing them under the control of a large, single, bureaucratic enterprise.144
The health of capitalism demanded a more comprehensive vision on the part of executives, one 
centered on scientific management and public engagement. To create a modern public of 
consumers and transcend the previous economic order of industrial barons, multiple elites 
created new professions, institutional and managerial functions, and corresponding planes of 
values, beliefs, and ideological supports. As pragmatic technicians seeking scientific solutions to 
                                                 
141 Ohmann 1996:3 
142 Ohmann 1996:51 
143 Kolko 1988 
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 public problems, think tankers were “specific intellectuals.”145 However, they also functioned as 
“organic intellectuals”146 of the ruling class. Business leaders and professional reformers united 
on the virtues of corporate power, the free market, science, and efficiency.  
Through a conscious involvement in the reorganization of the marketplace and class 
relations, proto-think tanks helped to generate “modes of thought suited to creating the necessary 
governmental, legal, intellectual, and cultural conditions” for the deep transformations of 
economic life around the turn of the century to succeed.147 In their quest to transform the legal 
order and larger system of political power, the corporate-reconstruction movement 
proceeded in several spheres at once -- in market and property relations, in the law and 
jurisprudence, in party politics, in government policy and legislation, in foreign-policy 
making, and in scholarly and popular modes of thought.  Their efforts assumed the 
organization forms of trade and civic associations, single-issue groups and committees, 
reform clubs, electoral party politics, lobbying, publications ranging from newsletters and 
newspapers to periodicals and books, and conferences and conventions -- in short, 
organizational forms usually associated with social movements.148
 
In other words, the professional managerial class was able to organize only because of this shift 
from competitive to monopoly capital. Ohmann’s description encompasses the rise of the big 
corporations with their complex internal structure, rationalization of the labor process, turn to 
quasi-professional management, assumption of control over sales, and reliance on the 
consciousness industry.149 In Ohmann’s focus on advertising150, Ewen’s focus on corporate 
image, and my focus on public policy expertise, we see different facets of a broad crisis 
management strategy at the turn of the century. Sklar writes, 
                                                 
145 Foucault (1980) refers to specific intellectuals as those who work in technical fields like medicine, psychiatry, 
and penal systems, and raises the possibility that resistance at this micro level is more effective than global 
theorizations. 
146 Gramsci 1971 
147 Sklar 1988:11 
148 Ohmann 1996: 15 
149 Ohmann 1996: 163 
150 The development of market research, salesmanship, product differentiation, integration, rational management, 
and collaborative pricing were intended to rationalize the marketplace and provide for increasing rates of profit 
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 The movement for corporate capitalism..., [i]n effecting a reorganization of property 
ownership and the market, and in attaining a revision of law and of government-market 
relations… established the fundamental conditions of what many historians regard as the 
mass-culture society and also as the organizational or bureaucratic society with its 
concomitant rise of a professional, managerial, and technical middle class.  Corporate 
capitalism... in renouncing statism... pacified agrarian populism, transcended proprietary 
capitalism, and, in the inclusive as well as the exclusive sense, contained socialism.151
Think tanks reoriented expertise and state action towards the mediation of occasionally explosive 
class conflict by both redistributing the fruits of labor and by justifying hierarchical social 
relations, but the latter direction “winning out.”152 By displacing the original ameliorative goals 
of applied social research with a paradigm of “efficiency,” they structured an emergent social-
political order by deferring to a cluster of ideas surrounding the paradigm of “efficiency” as 
nonpolitical sources of judgment. This discursive strategy accommodated a political culture of 
representative government, and redefined that tradition to fit the perceived needs of a society 
confronting this rapid change.153 To mitigate the negative effects of “cutthroat competition” on 
established interests, think tanks cultivated businesslike, nonpartisan, approaches to public 
administration, and developed a notion of the state as a coordinating mechanism to aid 
“cooperation” within a system of large economic blocs. The deployment of social science toward 
social welfare as well as technocratic management and control paradoxically reinforced class 
segmentation by softening it. The net effect was to insulate decision-making from public access. 
The invention of policy expertise in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a 
strategic response to major economic and social disruptions. Progressive research and planning 
organizations grew from political activism by multiple elites who promoted social science as an 
                                                 
151 Sklar 1998: 441 
152 Kolko’s (1976:24) data indicates that the period saw “a significantly higher economic mobility into the elite, but 
in a manner which in no way alters the economic and social structure of capitalism or the distribution of income and 
wealth.”  
153I call this rapid change “massification,” or the transition to a mass society through technological advances in 
productive capacity, the rail system, nationally distributed periodicals oriented to national readerships, urbanization 
and immigration. These changes revolutionized American economic and social life at a time when the state was 
relatively limited in its activity and left most social action to the market or civil society. Since state action in the 
U.S. was subordinate to private enterprise, think tanks arose mostly under the auspices of capital. 
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 instrument for managing crises and class divisions in the transition to a mass American society. 
These groups created and advocated social scientific justification of the new economy to the 
wider public. They constituted a network that defined policy-focused social science at the 
municipal and national level through a cluster of concepts related to “efficient” administrative 
and economic practices.154 The paradigm of efficiency thus bound together “a hierarchic but 
pluralistic web of class and political relations engaged in reconstructing American capitalism.”155 
In proto-tanks, the road towards a new social order was paved with discourse that decoupled 
policy expertise from ameliorative concerns, and used it for rationalization and control.    
It will now be clear why the concept of corporate liberalism promises to be the best tool 
to analyze the emergence and subsequent evolution of think tanks. Developed by New Left 
historians William Appleman Williams (1959), Gabriel Kolko (1963) and James Weinstein 
(1968), the corporate liberal interpretation of modern American history challenged the 
“consensus school”156 view of Progressive and New Deal policies. Instead of increasing 
democracy and justice, these scholars proposed that liberal reforms had enhanced the power of 
private corporations over government and individuals.  
The concept recognizes a system of multiple elites, rather than a single power elite, ruling 
class, or collection of “opinion leaders.” As an ideal type, a corporate liberal social order  
…is one whose basic units consist of officially recognized, non-competitive, role 
ordered occupational or functional groupings … one with coordinating machinery 
designed to integrate these units into an interdependent whole and one where the state 
properly functions as coordinator, assistant, and midwife rather than director or 
regulator.157  
                                                 
154 Especially economic tools like statistics, demographics, and accounting were especially important. The paradigm 
ideas were efficiency, objectivity, facts, nonpartisanship, social responsibility, cooperation, science, and education.  
155 Sklar 1988: 35 
156 See Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Hofstadter, and Louis Hartz 
157 Ellis Hawley 1978: 312. Variations on the corporate liberal state are referred to as syndicalism, state capitalism, 
monopoly capitalism, liberal corporatism, interest-group liberalism, and corporate syndicalism. A typically cited 
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 The coordination of different “corporate units,” including labor, agriculture, and industry, 
maintains a privileged position for the business corporation based on a view of the corporation as 
the natural successor of the old individual entrepreneur in the inevitable march of dominant 
forms of property in the modern economy.158  Large organizational bodies (business, labor, 
agriculture, single-issue groups, public opinion embodied in elections, government agencies) are 
constitutive components of the modern policy process. These functional elites pursue what they 
view as societal interests through a strategy of communicating those interests among each other 
through a collaborative process. A “pattern of interpenetration and power sharing” facilitates 
collaboration between corporate actors and “often makes it difficult to determine where one 
sector leaves off and the other begins.”159 Business and government sectors play the most 
important roles, sharing as much with one another as the constituency they represent.160  
The concept also captures elegantly the dual meanings of “liberalism” as either state or 
society centric. As we have seen in the above cases, proto-tanks promised to expand social 
benefits and empower of private capital. They accepted a  
…growing role for positive government in both regulative and distributive functions, 
but by and large in a manner consistent with the greatest possible preservation of 
private initiative and private-property ownership as against state direction and state 
ownership.161  
The usefulness of corporate liberalism as an analytic tool is thus its understanding of the 
interactive relations between agents (multiple elites), structures (economic transformations and 
                                                                                                                                                             
example of corporatism is the keiretsu system in Japan, in which the government works very closely with large 
businesses to enhance their competitive position in the world market. 
158 Sklar analyzes the “Trust Question” as “the preeminent set of issues in national politics in the years between the 
great depression of the 1890s and United States entry into World War 1” (1988:2). He distinguishes three variants of 
corporate liberal ideology according to their understanding of relations between society and the state, “natural 
monopolies” and the economy, and property rights and human rights (1988:36).  The T. Roosevelt (left), Taft 
(right), and Wilson (center) variants advocated different degrees of public control of large scale enterprises, and 
accepted different degrees of socioeconomic inequality.   
159 Hogan 1986: 154; Hawley 1978: 309-320  
160 See Gaddis 1983, Gaddis 1986, McCormick 1981, Hogan 1986 
 
161 Sklar 1988: 38-9 
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 crises, political traditions), and discourse (paradigm ideas), and the paradoxical evolution of 
American capitalism as a system of planning within a fundamentally unplanned system.  
In the next three chapters, we will see how the expansion and consolidation of a corporate 
liberal regime proceeded during periods of both crisis and stability. I show how an expanding 
field of tank activity kept together the network of business executives, philanthropists, 
academics, public officials, and labor representatives dedicated to creating a domestic regime in 
which capitalism could be further concentrated, stabilized, rationalized, and protected. I find 
strong links between tanks, landmark government planning agencies and commissions, and 
major legislative outcomes. Think tanks developed sophisticated social scientific ideas as a way 
of shaping public discourse on abiding concerns with economic crises and the efficient 
distribution of wealth in ways that did not appear overtly political or interest bound. The 
coherence between their rhetorical innovations and major policy outcomes shows a repeated 
adaptation of potentially radical proto-Keynesian and Keynesian economic ideas to a framework 
that did not fundamentally disrupt the relations of power in the American political economy. 
Through a “demand-led” industrial labor process of mass-produced consumer goods, this 
coalition consolidated this regime through periods of war, prosperous peace, and widespread 
social unrest.  
 
3. The Domestic Consolidation of Corporate Liberalism, 1918-1929 
Much historiography presents 1920s political culture as a laissez-faire interregnum 
between the interventionism of the Progressive era on the one side and the New Deal on the 
other. However, this ignores the role of think tanks through the decade in laying the rhetorical 
and institutional groundwork for New Deal recovery and reform policies. Think tanks elaborated 
a corporate liberal paradigm to coordinate social sectors in a way that avoided both the socialist 
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 tendencies of regimented statism, and the competitive waste and social unrest of laissez-faire. In 
particular, many politicians, business leaders, social scientists162 and professionals163 embraced a 
belief in strengthening federal planning through partnerships with experts in academia and 
business. The belief that government and industry could use economic statistics to foster national 
economic health and business-labor-government “cooperation” is visible in TT roles in WW I 
governance structures, and the numerous commissions initiated by Herbert Hoover in the 
1920s.164  
3.1. The National Resource Council and War Industries Board 
Scientific and industrial research collaboration was strongest at the National Resource 
Council (NRC) and the War Industries Board (WIB). NRC applied the Progressive model of 
efficiency to scientific research. As NRC director (and later IGR trustee) Vernon Kellogg put it, 
“The application of the same principles of organization which have made a success of our 
business and industry will make a success of our science.”165 Under the threat of impending war, 
President Woodrow Wilson directed the National Academy of Sciences166 to centralize the 
country’s scientific resources in 1916. With private167 and federal support, the NRC acted under 
presidential authority to “secure the cooperation of all agencies, governmental, educational, and 
industrial, in which research facilities are available.”168  
                                                 
162 Economists, psychologists, statisticians, sociologists, geographers, linguists, historians 
163 Journalists, lawyers, social workers 
164 Metzer 1985 
165 1919:1 
166 The Academy was a prestigious collection of scientists that could be called on to advise the government, but did 
not function as a central research organization.   
167 As in the Progressive era, corporate businessmen often subsidized government efforts in scientific development. 
NRC Money came primarily from foundations and corporations, first from The Engineering Foundation (comprised 
of major engineering societies with support from Cleveland industrialist Ambrose Swasey), and later from the 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Rockefeller Foundation, Bell Telephone, GE, Du Pont, and GM (Eakins 
1966:118-19).  
168 Council of National Defense 1917:2, cited in Eakins 1966:117 
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 Wilson created the War Industries Board in 1917 to coordinate business, labor, and 
government in mobilizing production for the war, but comprehensive data for regulating 
economic processes like shipping and “manpower,” prices and production, and the allocation of 
raw materials was lacking. WIB tapped Progressive era institutes known for expertise in 
“administrative efficiency” to direct many of the ad hoc bureaus, commissions, and boards 
established in the mobilization for WW I. Wall Street Mogul and WIB chair Bernard Baruch 
recalled, “The greatest deterrent to effective action was the lack of facts.”169 Baruch charged 
Columbia University economist and WIB Price Section chief Wesley Clair Mitchell,170 Boston 
department store magnate Edward A. Filene, and Harvard School of Business dean Edwin F. 
Gay with the task of coordinating the nation’s economic research. The three spearheaded the 
board’s Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics in early summer 1918 to collate statistics from 
all government agencies into a usable form for policymakers. For a brief but intense period, they 
coordinated the country’s productive and scientific resources through a strict corporatist 
arrangement of labor, business, and government.171  
The war victory ratified the movement for voluntary industrial trade associations to 
regulate competition and prices. By requiring industries to encourage workers to organize and 
collectively bargain, WIB set a precedent for cooperative arrangements between labor and 
industry later institutionalized by section 7a of the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 and the Wagner Act of 1935. For Baruch the experience “forced a shelving of the old 
laissez-faire tradition and thrust the government into a wholly new role. What was done in those 
                                                 
169 Figures were also unavailable for employment, retail trade, credit, construction, and countless other indices. Mark 
C. Smith 1994: 24, 61; Dorfman 1949: 477.   
170 The Price Section produced research that allowed policymakers and businesspersons to plan production and 
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 war years was never to be completely forgotten.”172 To many who served in research and 
planning agencies, the intensified prestige and funding for applied research methods confirmed a 
“cooperative” system of industry, labor, and government could avoid the “inefficiency” of 
competition.173  When the war ended, researchers, administrators and businesspersons flush with 
victory and a faith in directing centralized industrial and scientific research functions towards 
intelligent social planning pressed hard for a peacetime expansion of NRC and WIB duties.174  
When peace came, NRC supporters argued that applying the same pure research to 
industry would achieve the broader goal of enhancing American competitiveness.  NRC 
chairman George E. Hale wrote to the New York Times as early as 1916 that all fields of research 
“whether for the advancement of knowledge or for direct industrial…application [will] relate to 
public welfare in times of peace even more truly than to national security in the event of war” 
(8). Former Secretary of State and NRC Foreign Relations Department member Elihu Root 
reiterated the theme in 1918:  
Under the international competitions of peace…the same power of science which has so 
amazingly increased the productive capacity of mankind during the past century will be 
applied again, and the prizes of industrial and commercial leadership will fall to the 
nation which organizes its scientific forces most effectively.175
 
President Wilson agreed that tight connections between government agencies, corporate heads, 
and scientific experts would help industrial efficiency and therefore competitiveness abroad, and 
sanctioned the continuation of the NRC.  
WIB advocates did not have the same success as their NRC counterparts, even though 
Americans were increasingly defining their identity in terms of collective blocs in the political 
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 economy. The effort to incorporate the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics into the 
Department of Commerce reflected a growing feeling among certain business executives and 
intellectuals that quantitative research could help in “organizing, balancing, and coordinating 
different functional groups.” Such language was common in political debate by the end of the 
war.176 Mitchell, Gay, Baruch and others lobbied Wilson for a corporatist peacetime 
arrangement,177 but Wilson saw extending the structure of cooperation between industry and 
labor beyond the war as unnecessary government interference in business, and disbanded the 
board along with other temporary agencies. 
Wilson’s refusal to prolong WIB functions was a significant factor in the steady growth 
in think tank numbers and activity through the 1920s.178 The growing policy network saw a 
scarcity of economic information and thought wartime research could and should continue 
during the peace. The primary interest of the major private research institutions created in the 
immediate aftermath of WW I179 was thus in collecting statistical data on the economy that could 
provide policy makers with reliable information upon which to act. Acting on the assumption 
that technical solutions to major social problems were feasible, TTs increased the interaction 
between academic experts, especially in economics, and government officials.  
The war planning efforts had also convinced the major foundations that social science 
was a non-controversial and practical investment. While “businessmen,” “institutionalist” 
economists, and moderate labor leaders performed most of the work done in think tanks, the 
                                                 
176 Williams 1966:358. For Weinstein (1968) the American political economy after World War I was one in which 
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 presidents of foundations drove social science research through financial contributions. It is 
reasonable to suggest that foundations promoted particular approaches to social sciences, and 
that the growth and direction of think tanks in the interwar period is due in large part to the 
coherence between their mandates and the preferences of foundations.180 Foundation heads were 
intellectual elites that circulated  
Among the professorate, leadership of philanthropic institutions, and government 
service… [and facilitating] an extraordinarily high degree of common cause between the 
foundations, academic social science, and government…in creating a science of society 
able to guide the foundations and government toward better democratic social reforms 
and ameliorative public policies181   
 
Where the Russell Sage Foundation was the main social science financier before the war, most 
money for social science research in universities, think tanks, and government in the interwar 
period came from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.182 Carnegie 
Institute board chair and former Secretary of State Elihu Root urged America to learn from the 
power of Germany’s sponsorship of social research, or perish.183 The Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial Fund under Beardsley Ruml’s direction became one of the first national foundations to 
encourage the systematic application of the social sciences towards pressing social problems, 
including public policy. Between 1923 and 1929, Ruml directed some $40 million of the 
$80,000,000 to research grants, far from the good works favored by the fund’s namesake, John 
D. Rockefeller’s wife.184  
Throughout the decade, the federal government tapped the new (and old) think tanks for 
projects and increased its reliance on the statistical data they produced. Tanks continued to serve 
as locations where multiple elites converged to discuss and develop the knowledge necessary for 
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 a unified policy vision, and evaluate people suitable for government bureaucracy. The emergent 
agenda-setting mechanisms of Progressive years had grown by the end of the 1920s into an 
integrated network of several hundred people drawn from a professional managerial class who 
met routinely (daily, weekly, monthly, and annually) to seek a consensus based on rational and 
scientific knowledge. People like Wesley Mitchell, Robert S. Brookings, Herbert Hoover, 
Magnus Alexander, Harold Moulton, and many other executives, politicians, labor leaders, 
philanthropists and social scientists continued to promote the accumulation of economic facts as 
the basis of rational and nonpartisan reform efforts. They centralized practices like issuing 
studies and statements, sponsoring conferences, and performing government contract research.  
Their language—consistent with Progressive forebears—reflected a distrust of partisan 
politics and democracy, a haughty sense that researchers in independent organizations were 
public servants at the center of national policy decisions, and the notion that economic expertise 
could be used to restructure the capitalist economic system without radically restructuring class 
relations. However many of the newer activists modified the idea of efficiency from its limited 
usage in the “efficiency and economy” movement into much broader areas of public policy. 
Where earlier reformers had seen efficiency in terms of administrative and managerial functions, 
economists in the newer think tanks began to apply efficiency in a proto-Keynesian fashion to 
the whole economy, for example through studies of national income. This dynamic would 
accelerate in the social ethos of the New Deal, in which the whole nation replaced urban centers 
as the locus of political imagination and policy experimentation.  
3.2. The containment of radical political economic ideas 
3.2.1. Case 6: The Brookings Institution 
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 The organizational innovations and outcomes in policy groups funded by self-made 
businessman Robert S Brookings embody the struggle between institutional and neoclassical 
economics during the interwar years, and show how corporate liberals contained the more radical 
elements in their own ranks. Robert S. Brookings’ role in the creation and direction of the 
Institute for Government Relations (IGR) was discussed in chapter one. The founding IGR grant 
came primarily from the Rockefellers, but Brookings himself raised the funds for the other two 
organizations that merged with IGR to form the Brookings Institution (BI).185 Appointed by 
President Wilson to the Price-Fixing Committee of the WIB during World War I,186 Brookings 
saw first hand the lack of economic data administrators used to assess sources of inefficiency in 
the economy, and learned there was a future in economic research. Along with other 
“enlightened” businesspersons like Owen Young and Gerard Swope of General Electric, 
Brookings wanted to increase worker participation in an economy that would remain dominated 
by corporations. He opposed any form of socialism but embraced the notion, liberal at the time 
and rejected by most industrialists in the Harding-Coolidge years, that workers should have 
representatives on the boards of major corporations. With other Wilsonians, he envisioned some 
kind of economic democracy in America and was somewhat of an internationalist on trade. 
Brookings believed that objective policy research would help bring order to post-WWI 
capitalist America. His distrust of partisan politics and belief in the value of reform as a way to 
make capitalism more stable for the benefit of business and the whole nation led him to pursue 
post-war economic research outside of official government channels.187 After becoming IGR 
chair in 1919, he traveled the country at age 70 to shore up its resources, and took it upon 
                                                 
185 Saunders 1966; Eakins 1966; Critchlow 1985 
186 Smith 1990:57-8, Eakins 1966:170 
187 This trait emerged in his prewar campaign for a national budget system as an original board member of the 
Institute for Government Research (see chapter 1).  
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 himself to raise startup money for two new institutes. The Institute for Economics (IE) and the 
Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government (RBGS) would cultivate 
experts who could collect and analyze objective economic data in order to improve economic 
policy by eliminating waste and other inefficiencies.  
Brookings founded IE in 1922 with a five-year, two hundred thousand dollar 
commitment from the Carnegie Corporation to gather “the economic data which form the bases 
of national and international policies.”188 IE studied inefficiencies in production and 
management, sharing staff and board members (especially bankers) with IGR. It produced a 
series of studies on tariffs relating to commodities such as sugar, wool, cattle, iron and steel.189 It 
was also the first think tank to focus on international commerce. Germany’s Capacity to Pay was 
an analysis of the obstacle Germany’s war debt posed to the reconstruction of a stable world 
economy.190 Exuding a feeling of excitement that came from a feeling of participating in national 
policy, early IE member and first chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (see section III) 
Edwin G. Nourse observed that page proofs of IE’s first book on Germany’s Capacity to Pay 
were rushed to a government delegation on their return from Europe. For Nourse the Institute 
“lived dangerously” by analyzing hot issues in a rigorous yet timely manner.191
The consensus at IGR and IE that politics and policy could be separated was undermined 
by the third Brookings-led organization—the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics 
and Government at Washington University (St. Louis, MO). Brookings endowed RBGS in 1923 
to train “efficient workers” in civil service by emphasizing practical concerns over formal 
                                                 
188 IE, Pamphlet, Washington, D.C., 1922:5, cited in Eakins 1966:171 
189 Eakins, 1966:172 
190 Eakins 1966:171 
191 Eakins, 1966:182 
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 disciplinary procedures.192 He hoped the program would “teach the art of handling problems … 
[and] turn out craftsmen who can make contributions toward an intelligent direction of social 
change.” Academic training “to impart accumulated knowledge,” was to be at the periphery of 
the curriculum.193  
Brookings came to see this mission as compromised by the faculty under the direction of 
the school’s first appointed chair, Washington University Dean Walton H. Hamilton. Along with 
Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, and Wesley Mitchell, Hamilton was a founder of 
“institutional” economics, a sub-field they imported from their studies of the “historical” 
economic school in Germany.  Institutional economists challenged the laissez-faire orthodox 
assumption that the economic order was natural. Though they distanced themselves from 
Veblen’s speculative aspects and discussed his empirical failings, Hamilton194 and Mitchell195 
took their central inspiration from his notion that the economic order was based on a set of 
“business” institutions (firms, markets) and “pecuniary” institutions (norms, laws) that may at 
times come conflict with industrial productivity. As Veblen explained, 
The institution (habit of thought) of ownership or property is a conventional fact; and the 
logic of pecuniary thinking - that is to say, of thinking on matters of ownership - is a 
working out of the implications of this postulate, this concept of ownership or property. 
The characteristic habits of thought given by such work are habits of recourse to 
conventional grounds of finality or validity, to anthropomorphism, to explanations of 
phenomena in terms of human relation, discretion, authenticity, and choice. The final 
ground of certainty in inquiries on this natural-rights plane is always a ground of 
authenticity, of precedent, or accepted decision. ... The end of such reasoning is the 
interpretation of new facts in terms of accredited precedents, rather than a revision of the 
knowledge drawn from past experience in the matter-of-fact light of new phenomena. 
The endeavor is to make facts conform to law, not to make the law or general rule 
conform to facts. The bent so given favors the acceptance of the general, abstract, 
custom-made rule as something real with a reality superior to the reality of impersonal, 
non-conventional facts. Such training gives reach and subtlety in metaphysical argument 
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 and in what is known as the "practical" management of affairs; it gives executive or 
administrative efficiency, so-called, as distinguished from mechanical work. "Practical" 
efficiency means the ability to turn facts to account for the purposes of the accepted 
conventions, to give a large effect to the situation in terms of the pecuniary conventions 
in force.196 
 
This view that institutions and values underlay the choices of policymakers whether 
acknowledged or not, was in direct contrast with the consensus at IGR and IE. Furthermore, if 
firms, markets, laws, and norms were “instituted” rather than natural, then they could be 
empirically researched with methods modeled on the natural sciences.  Following the dominant 
philosophy of science at the time,197 institutionalists turned the field of economics into an 
inductive and quantitative science by applying Veblen’s ideas to business cycles, labor relations, 
utilities, monopolies and business regulation. In business cycle research especially (see below), 
institutionalists presaged the Keynesian notion that government intervention could modulate its 
activity.198 These positions led Hamilton to push the RBGS curriculum towards liberal arts like 
history, political theory, and philosophy, rather than administrative techniques like accounting 
and public finance.  
Brookings sought to rein in the experimental direction of the graduate school and 
appointed IE head Harold Moulton in 1926 to study the possibility of merging RBGS with IGR 
and IE. Brookings was successful in replacing the experimentalism of IE and RBGS with a 
narrower methodological and political outlook by merging his three organizations into the 
                                                 
196 Veblen 1904: chapter 9   
197 Positivist approaches to society flourished in the 1920s as “strict induction replaced earlier efforts to specify and 
prove laws such as natural selection. Questions concerning the nature of reality and ultimate causality were set aside 
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Susman 1984 and Orvell 1987.  
198 Institutional economics was officially founded at the 1918 AEA convention where Hamilton claimed that a 
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 Brookings Institution in 1927.199 Despite its brief existence, RBGS produced many civil servants 
who went to work in government.  
The case illustrates a gate-keeping function that corporate wealth can have on policy 
expertise, namely, the ability to exclude or replace dissident experts from the main arenas of 
legitimate discussion. Brookings’ ability to co-opt institutional economics’ more philosophical 
and value-laden approaches by simply eliminating their funding source is similar to the dynamic 
seen in tanks’ ability to contain the “ameliorative” goals of Progressive social research, and later, 
the radical impulses in Keynesian New Deal legislation. As we shall see in the next case, TT 
participation in Herbert Hoover’s various government commissions also reflected the narrow 
focus on eliminating sources of economic inefficiency that framed the basic problems and 
relevant topics of the 1920s.  
3.2.2. Case 7: National Bureau of Economic Research  
As a singular force behind the federal government’s use of social science in coordinating 
American social life, Herbert Hoover is the figure in government that best encapsulates the 
decade’s trend towards corporate liberalism. Hoover established a reputation as an advocate for 
the scientific management of government during World War I, and maintained a strong faith in 
applied expertise and cooperative capitalism throughout his government career.200 Hoover’s deep 
                                                 
199 Financed with private funds from Brookings himself and the Carnegie, Rockefeller, and George Eastman 
foundations, the Brookings Institution staff never exceeded thirty economists and political scientists during its first 
twenty-five years of existence.  
200 According to James Allen Smith (1991:68-9), “Hoover believed that an enlightened individualism, less selfish 
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projects (Hoover was a shrewd and adept fund-raiser), and most of the experts conducted their research through 
private research institutions and universities…. Hoover relied on his commissions to mobilize the experts’ 
intelligence and publicized the commissions’ findings with the hope that voluntary cooperation could be won so the 
government would not have to legislate solutions. As long as the experts could fashion a consensus, he believed, the 
American economy would regulate itself and the scope of governmental activity would not widen.”  
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 conviction that harmony between business, government and labor could be achieved through a 
nonpartisan process of persuasion and voluntary cooperation produced a systematic effort to link 
social science research and industrial development during his tenure as Commerce Secretary for 
Harding and Coolidge (1921-1929) and then as president.201 He moved the core staff of the WIB 
into his Department of Commerce and relied a great deal on the members of new and existing 
research institutes who shared his assumption that the accumulation of social facts would itself 
lead to sensible solutions. From the Conference on Unemployment during the 1921 recession to 
the report of the Research Committee on Social Trends report of 1933, Hoover called on think 
tanks and other public-minded elites in social science, government, business, and labor experts to 
staff over 30 committees, commissions, and conferences—often personally securing foundation 
money to fund the research. The organization that best illustrates the role of elite think tanks in 
Hooverian “voluntarism” is the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).  
NBER formed in 1920 after WIB veterans Wesley Mitchell and Edwin F. Gay, and 
AT&T engineer and statistician Malcolm Rorty failed to persuade Wilson to retain wartime 
coordinating mechanisms. Fearing that a return to the relative anarchy of prewar economic data 
collection would replace the fragile wartime coordination of capital and labor, they set to work. 
The new Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover was instrumental in raising initial funds from 
the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Commonwealth Fund and the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial.202 Members elected Mitchell NBER Research Director at the first annual 
                                                 
201 His aggressive promotion of trade associations and the integration of organized labor within them as a way of 
rationalizing economic cartels laid the groundwork for the corporatist assumptions in the New Deal’s National 
Recovery Administration. With Franklin D. Roosevelt he established the American Construction Council in 1922 as 
a trade association to enforce a “fair practices” code on the industry. This was done under the aegis of the FTC in 
industries such as coal, oil, and rubber. As President (1929-1933), he pushed the states to restrict the production of 
oil, and established a tariff on oil imports in 1932 that resulted in a virtual cartel of the oil industry (Rothbard, 
1968:167-8; 1970)  
202 Rorty was chiefly involved with assembling a prestigious board of trustees, and obtaining a startup fund of 
$20,000 from the Commonwealth Fund. Other founding members were John Commons, Allyn Young (Harvard), 
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 meeting in February 1920. He was its leading figure until he died in 1948. From his work on 
business cycles beginning in the late 1800s, to his service in WW I, through the 1920s and the 
Great Depression, Mitchell grew increasingly convinced that empirical, quantitative economics 
was the key to unlocking the discipline’s utility. Considered the most exceptional American 
economist of his generation,203 Mitchell ran the organization from his office at Columbia 
University with a small staff, frequently contracting out to economists at major universities. His 
goal was "to organize the bureau's research program around questions that were, first, of primary 
social importance, and second, capable of the statistical resolution needed to surmount social 
science's internal crisis of scientific legitimacy.”204 Focusing its early activity on aggregate data 
such as business cycles and long-term growth, NBER was first to develop certain methods and 
ideas eventually adopted by the federal government such as measurements of national income205 
and the modulation of business cycles through government action.  
Like Brookings’ short-lived graduate program at Washington University, the 
methodological and sociological origins of NBER are traceable to the generation of political 
economists influenced by the German historical school of economics.206  Mitchell was a reformer 
in the tradition of the “new political economists” who had challenged laissez-faire orthodoxy and 
                                                                                                                                                             
N.I. Stone and T.S. Adams (Yale), John P. Frey (AFL editor), Elwood Mead (Bureau of Reclamation 
Commissioner), and J.E. Sterrett (Eakins, 1966:128ff; NBER, 1945:6-8; Alchon, 1985:ch. 4; Smith 1991:63). 
203 Burns 1953:23, 51. Mitchell took from his undergraduate mentors at the University of Chicago John Dewey and 
Thorstein Veblen the willingness to challenge received orthodoxies. He thought the key to understanding economic 
systems was money and the pecuniary institutions it creates: “From the use of money is derived not only the whole 
set of pecuniary concepts which the theorists and his subjects employ, but also the whole countinghouse attitude 
toward economic activities” (Mitchell 1916:158)  
204 Alchon 1985: 59.  
205 NBER’s first released study, Income in the United States: Its Amount and Distribution 1909-1914, sold a 
surprising number of copies (somewhere in the thousands). Income statistics became the bread and butter topic for 
NBER studies for its first twenty years. See Heaton 1952: 197.  
206 Institutional economists like Mitchell used what they called an “inductivist” approach to analyzing business 
cycles. This approach was favored by the German Historical School and the American Institutionalists, but only at 
Mitchell’s NBER was very much “inductivist” analysis of business cycles conducted. Chapter one explains how the 
origins of efforts to develop a rigorous statistical basis for rationally reforming industrial societies were in the 
German historical school. 
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 established the American Economics Association.207 He often expressed beliefs to the left of his 
colleagues such as support for redistributing income,208 and chose to study business cycles out of 
an aversion to the suffering brought by periodic depressions, but Mitchell was loath to link 
prescriptions to economic studies. Perhaps when “all the facts were in” a recommendation could 
be made, but not until that vague and distant moment. The near fetishistic attachment to 
statistical facts common to empiricist economists led NBER to leave behind the values and moral 
judgments of the “new political economists” in favor of the scientific and value free status of 
statistical research. Writing to his fiancé, Mitchell asserted, 
I want to prove things as nearly may be and proof means usually an appeal to the facts—
facts recorded in the best cases in statistical form. To write books of assertion or books of 
shrewd observation won’t convince people who have been in the habit of asserting other 
things or seeing things in a different perspective. But when one can point to quantitative 
determinators then others must close their eyes or accept one’s results.209
 
He had come to believe that classes should not “leave others to do [their] social thinking for 
[them since]… dissatisfaction with the present social organization pervades all classes” and the 
“influence of desires upon the statement of facts and the search for causes” was bound to 
produce “an inharmonious end.”210   
Mitchell and company maintained their wartime connections via government-sponsored 
studies. Most early NBER projects were government contracts that grew out of President 
Harding’s Conference on Unemployment (1921-1924). Hoover chaired the Conference on 
Unemployment and staffed it with the same coalition of efficiency experts, executives, labor 
leaders, and social welfare workers common in the Progressive years. Indeed many of the same 
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 individuals were involved, including AALL, AFL, and AEA members, Mary Van Kleeck of the 
Russell Sage Foundation, and IE Director Harold G. Moulton. Mitchell, Gay, Wolman and Owen 
D. Young represented NBER. The Carnegie Corporation, which placed a premium on economic 
research, provided $50,000 for the work.211 Hoover charged NBER with studying the subject of 
business cycles, a subject in which Mitchell was a pioneering thinker.  
Chaired by Young, the Subcommittee on Business Cycles and Unemployment took a lead 
role studying the depression and evaluating ways to reduce unemployment. Its 1923 report was 
the most widely publicized discussion of business cycles (or “the business cycle” as journalists 
soon popularized the term) to date.212 Using the new type of data generated by NBER, the 
conference recommended government, business and labor work cooperatively towards a more 
efficient economy, and advocated proto-Keynesian policy ideas about regulating business cycles. 
Business Cycles and Unemployment213 recommended that industries regulate themselves by 
timing their own expansion to counter balance peaks and valleys in the business cycle. Public 
and private construction spending and the expansion of credit by bankers should be timed in the 
same manner. Government should help by collecting a “common fund” of economic statistics on 
“production, stocks, orders, consumption, employment, and other pertinent questions….” There 
was also a “need for investigations by financially disinterested and impartial research 
organizations….” Government action—in the form of counter-inflationary credit management by 
the Federal Reserve System—was “a problem worthy of most careful and thorough study by 
bankers and associations of bankers.” A federal unemployment reserve fund “to help sustain the 
worker when unemployed in periods of depression, and to equalize and stabilize his purchasing 
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 capacity, merits consideration,” and public works spending in depressed periods was strongly 
endorsed.214  
The language shows their central concern was still eliminating social, economic, and 
political inefficiencies, only now a greater emphasis on voluntary cooperation between business, 
labor and government emerged. The commission recommendations were consistent with 
Hoover’s vision of an “associational state.”215 Hoover after all did not want to use social science 
to rationalize society through “European-style” state planning. As Herbert Stein notes, Hoover 
relied more on discussion and exhortation than governmental directives to conduct economic 
policy.216  
Nonetheless, the recommendations did presage a growing acceptance by mainstream 
economists that national spending could be used to modulate business cycles, and in this sense 
they resemble the interventionism of the New Deal. As Eakins notes, 
This was no modern program of government compensatory spending. But it did represent 
an extension of some rudimentary economic ideas of the late Progressive Years… It was 
an attempt to organize national economic information to be used by both government and 
industry to sustain national economic health217
 
The 1930s Keynesian assumption that government is responsible for counter-cyclical spending 
during ebbs in the business cycle had become somewhat widely accepted by American 
“institutional” economists through the 1920s. Mitchell, among the institutionalists, took a firmer 
stance on the need for compulsory unemployment insurance than Hoover or the Unemployment 
Conference committees. Nevertheless, the mainstream institutionalist position was also 
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 consistent with most businesspersons of the time, who agreed that public works expenditures 
were appropriate during periods of depression.  
Despite the amount of government work obtained by NBER, its colleagues believed 
Hoover’s zeal for timely analysis came into conflict with the scientific standards held out by 
Mitchell and others. They found the ad hoc studies compromised the nascent standards of 
economic research, and preferred conducting broader and more systematic studies. Its report for 
the Unemployment Conference finished in six months as Hoover requested but Mitchell saw the 
deadline as an artificial end to what should have been a more in depth study.218  
The organizational identity created by Mitchell at NBER extended the dynamic described 
in chapter one whereby metaphors of efficiency displace those of amelioration. NBER 
researchers acknowledged class conflict and sought its mediation by wise use of accurate 
economic data, but did not view the collection of such data as a first step towards “curing” social 
ills. Mitchell distanced himself from the metaphor of cure, and was dismissive of charity and 
social reform that did not proceed from scientific knowledge of the causal relationship between 
economic phenomena:  
Reform by agitation or class struggle is jerky way of moving forward, uncomfortable and 
wasteful of energy. Are we not intelligent enough to devise a more certain method of 
progress…some way of carrying on the infinitely complicated processes of modern 
industry….219
 
His modest goal was to provide a sound factual basis for the discussion of policy alternatives.  
The technocratic pathos of Progressive reformers informed NBER operations, fund 
raising, and identity, but NBER was less exuberant than the Brookings organizations about the 
solutions such research could provide. NBER held that scientific knowledge and economic 
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 research in particular could have the practical use of enhancing government’s capacity’ to help 
economic productivity and distribution. Like the German Historical School, the tank’s emphasis 
on theory and method embraced the decades-old separation of facts and values. However, unlike 
the new political economists who studied in Germany and drove Progressive economics, NBER 
refused to make specific policy recommendations. Mitchell enforced a ban on policy 
prescriptions in NBER reports with a stringent review process that screened out everything but 
the factual basis of any study,220 in part to cultivate a reputation as bias-free to attract foundation 
money.221 The refusal to advocate solutions was also largely a function of the tentativeness with 
which NBER founders ascribed scientific status to economics. They thought the social sciences 
had simply not developed enough to offer solutions to specific problems, and could only help 
officials make better decisions by describing the connections between phenomena.222 The role 
taken by NBER in Hoover’s Committee on Recent Economic Changes, and his Committee on 
Recent Social Trends exemplifies the caution with which Mitchell and colleagues regarded the 
scientific applications and aspirations of economics.  
3.2.2.1. NBER and Hoover’s Committees  
In response to a minor recession in 1927, Hoover persuaded the New York foundations223 
to finance a Committee on Recent Economic Changes “to observe and describe the American 
economy as a whole.”224 The committee published its final two-volume report, Recent Economic 
Changes in the United States in early 1929, before the stock market crash. It praised a decade of 
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 apparent advances in managing the economy using statistical knowledge and cooperation 
between social groups. In his summary section, however, research director Mitchell moderated 
optimistic claims about economic growth in the period 1922-1927, and noted the continued lack 
of statistical data:  
The problem of what happened in the short period 1922-1927, then, is to find how many 
wage earners were displaced in that time, how many of the displaced found new jobs 
promptly, and what these new jobs were. To answer these questions accurately would 
require far better data than are to be had. There are few branches of statistics in which the 
United States lags further behind the leaders that in statistics of employment (426)  
 
Mitchell’s summary emphasized the near impossible difficulty of attributing causal properties to 
economic facts: 
So one might go on indefinitely, tracing the fashion in which each of the prosperity-
producing factors in the situation has increased the activity out of which it grew, and thus 
promoted conditions which heightened its own efficiency. The broad facts, however, are 
patent. And no elaboration would lead to a convincing evaluation of what credit belongs 
to any single factor taken by itself. Drop out any of the developments recalled in the 
previous paragraph, and the process as a whole would be altered. It is just as impossible 
to say what high wages, large construction, skillful marketing, railroad efficiency, or 
abundant credit contributed to prosperity, as it is to say how much agricultural 
depression, technological unemployment, or the lingering troubles of Europe have 
diminished the prosperity which might have attained but for these drawbacks” (439) 
 
Though modern society accepts the principle of individual responsibility, each individual 
gets his money income wholly by serving others, and gets his real income mainly by 
consuming goods other people have made. Thus everyone depends both on the buying 
power of other consumers and on the efficiency of other producers. And what is true of 
every individual is true, mutates mutandis, of every business enterprise. These intricate 
relations of interdependence tangle the skein of economic causes and effects beyond the 
present power of main to unravel. Every development is the net resultant of numerous 
causes and also the cause of numerous effects (436-437) 
 
The stock market crash in October 1929 relegated whatever optimism existed in the report to an 
ironic footnote, but did not diminish the idea of rational economic policy in Hoover’s estimation. 
He continued to enlist NBER in his projects, most notably his President’s Committee on Recent 
Social Trends (1929-1933). Hoover established the committee shortly after becoming president 
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 in an ambitious effort to measure scientifically a vast number of social conditions across 
America. Chaired by Wesley Mitchell of NBER and University of Chicago political scientist 
Charles Merriam, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, and staffed by the private Social 
Science Research Council (SSRC),225 the committee was organized “consistent with the ideology 
of the associative state.”226
The report culminated Hoover’s abiding quest for facts. It reflected 1) the convergent 
interests of philanthropists, social scientists, and state actors in creating methodologies modeled 
on the natural sciences to collect data on social change, and 2) their belief that American society 
was an interdependent and largely self-regulating system of sectors and groups whose “stresses” 
associational networks of public and private institutions could assess. 
In contrast to the “ameliorative” surveys modeled on the Russell-Sage Pittsburgh surveys, 
Recent Social Trends in the United States227 took a detached perspective on the totality of 
American society. The report reflected the ideology of both positivist American social science 
and the Herbert Hoover associative state, going no further than depicting a functional society 
composed of interdependent units linked by social processes. Research director and Chicago 
sociologist William F. Ogburn insisted that chapter submissions be just collections of empirical 
facts for policymakers to use, not recommendations of action. The belief that measuring precise 
facts and trends in households, towns, and institutions alone would allow rational policymakers 
to advance the general interest left tone of the report bereft of normative content. Many chapters 
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 were little more than lists of statistics concerning the use of railroads, spending patterns, and so 
on.  
The crisis of the Great Depression colored the report somewhat; but the chapters did not 
emphasize a particularly tumultuous economy. Where Recent Economic Changes had 
emphasized “elements of…stabilization in our social structure” and was optimistic about the 
promise of voluntary cooperation between business, government and labor, 228 the 1933 Recent 
Social Trends emphasized sources of instability, and modified the voluntarism of the earlier 
report. It also took issues like “technological unemployment” more seriously than before, and 
considered ideas like racial discrimination, housing problems, redistribution of income to 
increase laborers’ purchasing power, a shorter work week, unemployment insurance, national 
planning, government ownership, social insurance, consumer interests, and progressive tax 
rates.229 Nevertheless, the report remained almost silent on the subject of the depression, ignoring 
the most salient social fact of the time. Edwin Gay and Leo Wolmann’s “Trends in Economic 
Organization” forecasted, “The future will probably see a continuation of the existing strong 
movement toward increased stability and social security.”230  
The report also revealed a still large gap between knowledge and policymaking, and a 
growing tension between the idea of scientific objectivity and policy relevance. Decision makers 
never fully utilized the immense 1,500-page collection of social conditions in the United States, 
mostly due to its lack of usability: the report did not offer any way of diagnosing or prescribing 
solutions for the crisis, or interpretations of the massive amounts of data. Mitchell’s introductory 
“Review of Findings” invoked vague notions about using the combined intelligence of the 
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 nation, social and technical innovations, and controls over social and economic life that would 
allow “conscious control over the interrelated changes that are going forward in such 
bewildering variety at such varying speeds…. The means of social control is social discovery 
and the wider adoption of knowledge.”231 However, its only specific recommendation was for 
more permanent research bodies to gather yet more facts. The participants found the “primary 
value” of the report instead 
…in the effort to interrelate the disjointed factors and elements in the social life of America in 
the attempt to view the situation as a whole rather than a cluster of parts…. Scientific 
discoveries and inventions instigate changes, first in the economy in economic 
organizations, and social habits…next…in organizations – schools and churches. 
Somewhat later, as a rule, come changes in social philosophy and behavior.232  
 
Politicians pressed to take action in the face of severe economic downturn did not find that such 
agglomerations of facts could speak for themselves, and found little use for the study.233 By the 
time of its release in January 1933, depression had discredited the idea of “voluntary” business-
labor-government cooperation, and Hoover had fallen from power. 
None of the TTs launched basic criticisms of the economic system or called for structural 
reforms, partially because an abiding dedication to statistical data collection above other 
methodologies precluded such criticisms. Couched in the language of objective scientific 
methods, Hoover’s Recent Social Trends revealed a differentiated, not stratified world. Most of 
the leadership at BI, and the institutional economists at NBER such as Mitchell, limited 
themselves to making capitalism more “efficient.” Mitchell’s career is emblematic of 
institutionalist economists who, despite their reformist pedigree and theoretical sophistication, 
came to see facts and quantification as ends unto themselves, unable to provide critical or ethical 
judgments of the status quo. Thus, despite significant variations, similarity marks the language 
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 and outlook of think tanks more than difference. None of the corporate liberal researchers 
advocated radically redistributive solutions. Nor did they suggest purely voluntary industrial self-
regulation was the appropriate response (despite Hoover’s desire to use their findings in this 
way). Instead, they agreed that some form of government regulation was inevitable and 
desirable, though the form of that intervention was debatable. 
 
 74
  
4. Think Tanks and New Deal Social and Fiscal Reforms  
 
Before the mid-1930s, the federal role in policymaking was smaller than that of 
municipal and state governments. The federal state familiar to us today only emerged with the 
policy breakthroughs of FDR’s New Deal agenda.234 Yet these major innovations were largely 
reworked ideas of efficient cooperation proposed by corporate liberal think tanks over the 
previous several decades. The New Deal thus marks a culmination rather than a radical break 
with previous ideas and agendas. The five cases of this chapter (the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, FDR’s fiscal policies of 1937-8, the 1946 
Employment Act) show TT success in advocating recommendations in state intervention in 
national planning, social insurance, collective bargaining, and counter-cyclical spending 
consistent with class stratification and the position of concentrated wealth. Think tanks 
responded to the deep crisis of the 1930s by containing potentially radical Keynesian ideas in 
these key policy outcomes. This represents an extension of the proto-think tank strategy of 
containing potentially explosive social conditions with a corporatist solution suited to a new 
regime of accumulation. 
4.1. Structural context: crisis and new opportunities for policy research 
When Roosevelt took office in 1933, the American economic system was in the midst of 
a deep crisis. About one-third of the work force were unemployed; begging and breadlines were 
common in most large cities; bank failures were accelerating, and farm incomes in the 
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 agriculture and manufacturing sectors were falling rapidly.235 Widespread misery gave rise to 
mob looting of food stores, numerous protest marches, armed resistance to farm foreclosures and 
urban evictions, and riots,236 and support for radical solutions. Conditions clearly called for a 
comprehensive policy promoting recovery, and the New Deal promised just that. Constructed 
primarily by a political coalition dominated by liberal Democratic Party politicians and 
strategically far-sighted business leaders, the New Deal drew on think tank experts and a small 
group of several dozen economists to develop and legitimize a framework for peaceful labor-
management negotiations, social insurance for the destitute and elderly.  
The 1930s was thus a watershed for policy-oriented social science. New government 
agencies drew experts into a much more active role, swelling the federal bureaucracy with 
ambitious young researchers eager to join the excitement.237 New York Bureau of Municipal 
research co-founder Henry Bruere noted the 1930s was “the period of greatest employment for 
the social sciences that America had known.”238 Collins argues the proliferation and increasingly 
systematic use of expert knowledge by government, business, and labor through the Roosevelt 
years suggests, “the 1920s were perhaps the last amateur decade” of policy research.239 The 
deluge of emergency measures in FDR’s first 100 days alone was revolutionary in its demand for 
social scientists to help regulate business, agriculture, financial institutions and public works. By 
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 1938 there would be some 7,800 social scientists employed by the federal state, over 5,000 of 
them economists.240  
In the initial New Deal legislative rush Roosevelt contracted think tanks to do things like 
create procedures for collecting economic statistics for the Commerce Department (NBER 
developed a federal system to measure national income) and study the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration, Works Progress Administration, National Recovery Administration, and 
National Labor Relations Board programs (Russell Sage Foundation). Roosevelt supplemented 
Hoover’s deep commitment to scientific fact-finding, which seemed to hamper action by 
demanding evidence and deliberation before doing, with an openness to experimental methods 
and a demand for results. All major think tanks (except vehemently critical ones)241 tightened 
their connections with government and universities in the period, and helped to create consensus 
on broad reforms such as further regulating and rationalizing the economy, institutionalizing the 
role of labor in political life, and expanding the welfare functions of government. The integration 
of policy analysis led to a qualitative increase in state action, embodied in the Keynesianism of 
the late New Deal.  
Images of cooperation and experimentation in the rhetoric surrounding the recovery 
programs of the early New Deal justified a new role for the federal government in a largely 
antistatist political culture. FDR called on people to put aside their selfish individualism in the 
name of cross class solidarity and cooperation, and promised the government would “roll up its 
sleeves” and act boldly to unify the nation during the emergency.242  
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 This early New Deal rhetoric evolved into a reformist form after 1935, becoming 
simultaneously more conflict oriented, class conscious and individualistic. The class conflict 
strand was mostly a response to ideological pressure from the right beginning in 1934. Hoping to 
counter the influence of increasingly vocal conservatives in Congress and both parties, New 
Dealers claimed that the welfare state promoted traditional American values of avoiding anarchy, 
curbing the privileges of “economic royalists” and “economic autocrats,” and providing 
economic relief so citizens could exercise their freedom and rights.243 The role of think tanks in 
shaping landmark New Deal social legislation—the Wagner Act of 1935 and Social Security Act 
of 1935—are representative cases of a complex dynamic in which an individualist rhetoric 
superseded the paradigm idea of collective solidarity as an appropriate response to competitive 
individualism. Reformers justified policies in terms of their contribution to individual liberty. To 
deflect rightist attacks New Dealers appropriated the word “liberal” from the American political 
tradition to legitimate new state prerogatives.  
4.2. Ratifying corporate liberalism: collective bargaining and social insurance 
4.2.1. Case 8: National Industrial Recovery Act 
 
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and its administrative arm, the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) ratified corporate liberal ideas, institutions, individuals and 
accomplishments. It embodied a political economy in which rhetorical appeals to a society based 
on cooperation and scientific efficiency justified government support for major corporations.244  
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 The business leaders who endorsed FDR in the election of 1932 embraced a form of state 
capitalism more centralized than the coordination espoused by Hoover.245 Interested in using 
government to stabilize and rationalize the economic system, business placed a good deal of trust 
in FDR during the first hundred days of his administration, and played a primary role in 
designing the NIRA. The act did not afford labor even a symbolic seat on the NRA directing 
board (as had the War Industries Board). United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis and 
other labor leaders played a limited role formulating NIRA collective bargaining provisions. 
However, the primary researchers and drafters were tank executives like laissez-faire Brookings 
economist Harold G. Moulton,246 NICB president Virgil D. Jordan, NAM and Remington Rand 
president James H. Rand, NBER co-founder and AT&T electrical engineer and statistician 
Malcolm C. Rorty, and members of the Chamber of Commerce.  
NIRA established the NRA in 1933 to combat what it identified as the main causes of the 
depression: cutthroat competition, overproduction, and low prices. NRA suspended the Sherman 
and Clayton antitrust acts to gather owners in each business sector to be “code authorities” that 
would establish fair “competition” by setting minimum prices and wages, and maximum hours 
and productive output. The NRA made previously voluntary codes of practice enforceable by 
law, and encouraged the creation of new codes, but tended to rely on self-regulation by large 
firms, which ended up writing most of the codes themselves and imposing them on smaller 
competitors.  
The modicum of trust between business and FDR during his first hundred days quickly 
dissipated. Smaller businesses and labor unions claimed exclusion by the domination of code 
writing by industrial behemoths. Big business support diminished when NRA imposed codes 
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 failed to increase profit levels in many industries.247 The labor organizing instruments sanctioned 
by Section 7a of NIRA, which required that businesses permit employees the right to “organize 
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing….”248 opened a major rift 
between the corporate community and FDR (especially after the arrival of the militant Congress 
of Industrial Organizations).249 The provision generated hope and an explosion of union 
membership across the working class. This new level of organization worried business leaders 
who had witnessed a relatively docile labor movement in the 1920s. Weak enforcement 
mechanisms allowed employers to bypass new unions by ignoring collective bargaining rulings 
by the National Labor Board collective bargaining rulings, or simply refusing to appear before 
the board. Militant strikes and factory takeovers proliferated in 1934.250  
In addition to these new social pressures, continuing misery formed the context within 
which think tanks and other experts developed collective bargaining and social security 
legislation. The early New Deal emergency measures seemed to have little effect on people’s 
conditions, as the country witnessed 
shabby men leaning against walls and lamp-posts, and standing on street corners singly or 
in twos or threes, pathetic, silent, middle-aged men in torn, frayed overcoats or even 
without overcoats, broken shoes on their feet.251  
 
These conditions resulted in a wave of industrial chaos verging on a class war across America. 
Employers and local governments responded to frequent and massive strikes with increasingly 
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 violent crackdowns, which were met blow for blow by the strikers.252 By the end of 1934 the 
hostility and violence had reached the point where Secretary of State Cordell Hull publicly 
fretted over the possibility of a crippling national strike.253  
4.2.2. Case 9: The Wagner Act consolidation of AALL and NCF efforts 
The Wagner Act stemmed industrial turmoil by making employer compliance by section 
7a compulsory, thereby bringing labor power into greater balance with business. New York 
Senator Robert Wagner led the legislation to define unfair labor practices, protect the “closed 
shop,” legitimate the right of laborers to organize into unions, and establish the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) with enforcement power over its decisions.  
As with NIRA, the rhetorical and sociological continuity between this innovative New 
Deal policy and an earlier generation of think tanks is remarkable. The Wagner Act was at one 
level a product of brave and bloody sacrifice on the part of American workers in the face of open 
and brutal hostility from much of the business class. But it was also the culmination of corporate 
liberal tendencies in American politics stretching back thirty years. This element of business had 
been operating in public affairs through proto-think tanks like the National Civic Federation 
(NCF) and its offshoot the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) since the turn of 
the century, and was familiar with collective bargaining from their War Industry Board 
experience. They preferred corporatist policies of industrial cooperation to competitive 
capitalism, viewed labor organization and involvement as key to securing peace and stability in 
labor relations, and had long advocated collective bargaining and welfare functions as a way to 
prevent wildcat strikes, standardize labor contracts, and create an identity for labor leaders rooted 
in peaceful responsibility.  
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 Their ready-made analysis was adopted by New Dealers as a palliative to potentially 
revolutionary sentiments. In retrospect it is reasonable to say that the law achieved the industrial 
peace it aimed for, leading to standardized national contracts enforced by unions, bargaining 
instead of wildcat strikes, and a conservative union leadership with a “responsible” and 
“statesmanlike” identity. The Act institutionalized labor’s position within a corporatist system in 
which labor would adapt to the system and be satisfied with their portion of the economic pie.  
4.2.3. Case 10: AALL, TCF, BAC and the Social Security Act 
Social pressures for federal social security matched the popular agitation for reforms in 
labor-management relations. Several movements for economic redistribution were strong. 
Louisiana’s Huey Long threatened FDR’s Democratic Party leadership behind a “share our 
wealth” platform of free homesteads and education, affordable foods, limits on fortunes, and a 
$5,000 guaranteed annual income. “Radio priest” Father Coughlin used his program to engender 
support for currency inflation, guaranteed wages, and nationalized banking and natural resources. 
And California physician Francis Townsend led the largest and most influential movement, 
seeking a $200 per month pension for citizens over 60, conditioned on their not working (to open 
jobs for others) and spending the money within 30 days (to stimulate recovery).254
In this context of misery and agitation, a ready-made agenda of social insurance filled the 
policy void, and became the Social Security Act of 1935. The idea of social insurance had been 
percolating in think tanks and various academic departments for years. Brookings Institution 
economist Isador Lubin, for example, advocated the idea as a member of Robert Wagner’s staff 
and after 1934 as a close administration advisor. Its continuity with progressive forebears is most 
clearly evidenced by its consistency with earlier attempts by business elites, primarily in the 
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 AALL,255 to legislate social insurance in the Progressive era. The AALL “created and sustained 
the organized social insurance movement in the United States” before the New Deal, working 
through the 1920s on its core issues of workmen’s compensation, worker safety legislation, and 
occupational diseases.256 It was a prime mover in the first state unemployment compensation law 
in Wisconsin in 1932, which became the prototype for the federal plans brought forth by New 
Dealers like Francis Perkins, Brandeis, E.A. Filene, and Henry Dennison. As Grace Abbot 
observed, “The [social] insurance crowd has swooped down on [the administration] with a 
program all ready as to what to do to-day, tomorrow, and the day after.”257  
In addition to providing well-formulated policy ideas, think tanks provided a continuity 
of interpersonal networks to staff and advocate social security. To head the legislative planning 
group of his President’s Commission on Economic Security (CES), Roosevelt selected 
University of Wisconsin economist and AALL officer Edwin Witte. Witte consulted AALL, 
NBER, Brookings, and TCF258 associates in preparing a preliminary report to the 
Administration.259 After the preliminary outline was done, Roosevelt selected 23 men from a list 
submitted by Witte and Arthur Altmeyer of the Department of Labor to form an Advisory 
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 Council260 which began by appointing its own committee on Old Age Security in January 1936. 
John B. Andrews of the AALL chaired the group, which included former members of CES. Early 
leaflets released by the committee acknowledged its debt to progressive forebears, indicating the 
idea of social insurance was “not a new idea,” and that “even the small and so-called 
‘backward’” European nations had it. One pamphlet was titled We Pride Ourselves on Being 
Progressive but in Social Security Legislation We are at Least 25 Years Behind the Times.261  
Operating through projects and grants with a particular focus on consumer spending, 
credit, and product distribution, the TCF was arguably the most liberal of the private research 
organizations established after WW I.262 Boston department store owner Edward A. Filene 
founded the TCF in 1919, and soon after received additional support from another Boston 
executive, Henry S. Dennison. Filene dominated TCF (along with John H. Fahey263 and Henry S. 
Dennison264) until his death in 1937.  A social progressive of the late Progressive Era, Filene had 
been a member of the AALL. As quoted in a New York Times article in 1937, “I am for 
capitalism, but not for capitalism of the present order. I believe it must adjust itself to changed 
conditions.” Businessmen should stop thinking in terms of an “age of scarcity” and acknowledge 
                                                 
260 The group had representatives from employers, labor officials, farmers, and social workers (Eakins 1966:251-54). 
261 U.S. Committee on Economic Security, What Is Social Insurance? (Washington, D.C., 1935); U.S. Committee 
on Economic Security, Social Security at Home and Abroad (Washington, D.C., 1935) AQI Rodgers 1998:482.  
262 Its most ambitious project was carried out through grants to the Credit Union National Extension Bureau, created 
by Filene and Dennison in 1921 to promote credit unions around the nation.262 Its largest disbursement until 1935 
was to the Credit Union National Extension Bureau, established by Filene and Dennison in 1921 to promote credit 
unions throughout the states. TCF’s first research publication was also geared to the credit union movement as a 
means to allow Americans to consume the products of modern industry. “Only in recent years,” wrote its author, 
“has it been recognized that consumption must be financed by the extension of reasonable credits” (Evans Clark, 
Financing the Consumer, New York, 1930, p.2-5). 
263 A newspaper publisher who helped organize the Chamber of Commerce and International Chamber of 
Commerce with Filene, Fahey was also on Hoover’s Inter-American High Commission, and chairman of the Federal 
Home Loan Bankn Board and the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation during the New Deal (Eakins 1966:226). 
264 Dennison became a TCF trustee in 1922, served on the Business Advisory and Planning Council of the 
Commerce Department beginning in 1933, the National Labor Board, NRA, and National Resources Planning Board 
(Eakins 1966:226). 
 84
 that the productive capacity of the nation could lead to an “age of plenty” if “waste, not only in 
materials, but in management, men, technique, and distribution” were addressed.”265  
Its language reflected the voluntarism of the 1920s, as well as the concern to eliminate 
waste and inefficiency. TCF studied the problem of efficiency in distribution (transportation, 
merchandising, advertising), and called for voluntary cooperation on the part of business and 
consumers, and new regulative responsibilities for government such as product testing and 
consumer information agencies. 
Like Hoover’s committees, TCF program of research and recommendations reflected the 
contemporary consensus of balance and stability, and anticipated New Deal legislation. Its work 
on labor legislation anticipated the Wagner Act, and its positions cohered tightly with the Social 
Security Act. In three of its debt studies (1933, 1937, 1938), the researchers appointed by the 
Fund accepted the same counter-cyclical policy in emergencies that the Roosevelt 
Administration proposed. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulating the stock market also 
embodied the recommendations of a Fund study on the issue266 that had been widely circulated 
in a “concerted effort” to influence Congress. Despite some differences, TCF officials called the 
Act a “worthy substitute” for their recommendations.267  
TCF came into its own during the 1930s as it quickly adapted to the changing demands 
on policy research flowing from New Deal projects.268 Its shift away from the voluntarism it 
advocated in the early 1930s indicates that the organization was evolving with the New Deal 
requirements for government intervention. In response to the Great Depression, the Fund halted 
its disbursement of funds to outside organizations in 1934, and changed into “an institute 
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 devoted to economic research.”269 Filene himself was one of FDR’s staunchest supporters, and 
often invoked the ameliorative metaphors of illness and cure associated with the social reformers 
of a previous era in defining his own efforts. TCF would lead “a great practical movement in 
scientific social therapeutics” to diagnose and treat the ailments of the “social organism.”270 The 
Fund considered itself “completely free of any special political or commercial interest,” and as 
“in a strategic position to [suggest policies]… in the general interest of the public.”271 To avoid 
the taint of bias, the Fund appointed committees of experts and interest group leaders for policy 
research and recommendations much like the groups initiated by Herbert Hoover.  
Other “forward thinking” businessmen who helped frame the social insurance debate—
Gerard Swope (intellectual father of the NRA), Walter Teagle, Marion Folsom, and Henry 
Harriman—made their institutional home during the New Deal in a think tank that developed 
within the Department of Commerce, and served as a formal link between the business 
community and the administration. The Business Advisory Committee (BAC) was the brainchild 
of Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper, who, at the May 1933 Chamber of Commerce 
Convention, suggested a “President’s council of business” to provide the administration with 
“the most experienced…advice as to proper ways of stimulating and reviving” the economy.272 
The forty-one original members were drawn overwhelmingly from the largest banks and 
corporations, including CEOs from General Electric (Swope), Standard Oil of New Jersey 
(Teagle), U.S. Steel (Myron Taylor), AT&T (Walter Gifford), Sears Roebuck (Robert Wood), 
and General Motors (Alfred Sloan).273  
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 BAC strongly advocated a social security system (as well as cooperative national 
planning and industry regulation through the NRA), going much further than the Chamber of 
Commerce or NAM in criticizing laissez faire political economy and acknowledging the need for 
reform. Four BAC members participated in the advisory committee that helped draft the social 
security bill, and its members were selected to staff the NRA Industrial Advisory Board on a 
rotating basis. (BAC influence reached new heights when war replaced depression as the primary 
concern of the government, see section III below).274  
The willingness of BAC and other think tanks to embrace social insurance legislation 
while contesting particular features was a shrewd rhetorical adaptation to the immense popularity 
of New Deal policies. In granting minimal unemployment and old age benefits, social security 
broke took the edge off calls for more radical solutions. The relatively conservative substance of 
the law belies its reputation as a “radical” break with past assumptions about the welfare 
functions of the state. After all, policymakers had a number of transatlantic models to choose 
from, including compulsory, contributory systems (delineated in 1880s Germany); state 
subsidized mutual assistance organizations (common in France, Belgium, and Scandinavia); and 
universal minimum health and income benefits (debated in Britain eventually enacted in New 
Zealand). The U.S. approach to social insurance, financed through payroll taxes rather than taxes 
on upper-incomes (a possibility debated in the administration), featured a flat tax rate above 
which no income taxes were taken, and excluded property and securities income from being 
taxed. Unlike transatlantic models, general tax funds did not supplement New Deal social 
insurance, as each person’s benefits were pegged to their individual earnings in a discrete 
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 account. These features make it one of the more regressive social insurance systems in the 
Western world.275  
4.3. Business opposition to the New Deal 
The Brookings Institution (BI), National Industrial Conference Board (NICB), National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM), and Chamber of Commerce (CC) at this stage represented 
an orthodox laissez-faire perspective that saw the contract between firm and worker as an 
inviolable contract, and government regulation and collective bargaining as antithetical to the 
American ethos. As the effects of corporate concentration became more evident during the 
Depression, this wing lost influence. These cases show how tank influence depends on both 
structural economic conditions, and the degree to which one’s research coheres with the 
positions emanating from legislative, executive, and judicial officials at a given time. They also 
demonstrate a key function of think tanks is to keep ideas “alive” through difficult times. The 
free market ideology espoused by these organizations did not die with the New Deal. Rather, it 
was kept in reserve, to be rearticulated when conditions allowed. In addition, the disjunction 
between these groups and the New Dealers does not mean their ideas were irrelevant. They still 
constituted an outer limit that framed the policy debates of the era, and in a functional division of 
labor, allowed corporate liberals tanks like BAC to appear more moderate. 
4.3.1. Case 11: Brookings Institution 
 Despite its active preparation of reports and legislative proposals for Congress,276 the 
Brookings Institution did not have near the influence of NBER or TCF during this period 
primarily because its first president, Harold G. Moulton, did not support the New Deal. A 
laissez-faire economist trained at the University of Chicago, Moulton was unwilling to accept the 
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 Keynesianism that so many economists came to consider basic for economic stabilization, and he 
set the tone for the work conducted by researchers at the institution. The stock market crash of 
1929 and Great Depression convinced Robert S. Brookings that the institute he founded should 
focus more on questions of economic inequality and how “the right to aggregate capital through 
incorporation” has “placed capital in a position where it practically dominates labor.”277 The day-
to-day operations of the institute remained in the hands of Harold Moulton. Moulton had to win 
the annual approval of the board members at the annual Washington, D.C. board meeting, but 
such approval was largely a formality,278 suggesting a degree of individual and institutional 
autonomy from funding sources.  
Moulton’s deep aversion to Keynesian economics overwhelmed his initial support of 
Roosevelt’s NRA (which he helped to draft), and he used his position to drive all New Deal 
sympathizers from the institute.279 BI staff helped draft some initial recovery legislation but 
ultimately refused to accept the price-setting provisions in NIRA. BI members who were willing 
to adopt a more liberal approach in order to engage government work found that they were 
welcomed into the administration, and resigned their posts at the think tank. 280  
4.3.2. Case 12: The National Industrial Conference Board 
Even though Brookings became a sanctuary for conservatives under Moulton, it did not 
have as reactionary a reputation or response to the Roosevelt administration as the National 
Industrial Conference Board. A brief history of NICB will show why. Founded with the backing 
of several trade associations to research prices, work hours, and other statistics, NICB intended 
to collect and present facts about conditions relevant to the development of industry. Its website 
documents that 
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 The Conference Board was born out of a crisis in industry in 1916. Declining public 
confidence in business and rising labor unrest had become severe threats to economic 
growth and stability. A group of concerned business leaders, representing a variety of 
major industries, concluded that the time had arrived for an entirely new type of 
organization. Not another trade association. Not a propaganda machine. But a respected, 
not-for-profit, nonpartisan organization that would bring leaders together to find solutions 
to common problems and objectively examine major issues having an impact on business 
and society.281
 
Less officially, NICB was a forum for its businessmen members to discuss and fashion a 
response to a perceived bias towards labor in the Wilson administration. Its backers and 
members sought to stem the impact of what they perceived as a threateningly powerful and 
growing labor movement, as evidenced in Woodrow Wilson’s Industrial Relations Report of 
1915. The original chairman Magnus Alexander expressed the “business outsider” identity of 
most members (reanimated by 1970s free market think tanks) who felt that relative to labor, the 
business community had been “largely inarticulate” on industrial concerns and needed to 
produce its own research.282 An engineer and Assistant to the President of General Electric, 
Alexander embodied the sense at NICB that the emotional urge for humanitarian reform must not 
overshadow the rational approach to social problems. Wilson’s acceptance of all NICB employer 
representative nominees to the War Labor Board is evidence that its defensive posture was 
somewhat effective.283  
Its rhetoric seemed to most narrowly partisan and right wing after WW I, but notable 
members like Alexander and Virgil Jordan were active in the policy elite through the 1920s, and 
found agreement with the other research organizations on voluntary cooperation and scientific 
management as a middle way between laissez faire and class struggle. When Virgil Jordan 
became NICB President upon the death of Magnus Alexander in 1932, he continued to support 
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 voluntarism and even some early New Deal policies like the NRA, but like Moulton at 
Brookings, began to see the accelerating new Deal as direct government control of production 
and trade. He disparaged it as a “Monarchist, Marxist, Stalinist, Fascist, Nazi” type of 
“statism,”284 And reviled the  
parasitic job-holders, dilettante drawing-room dictators, studio radicals, underappreciated 
professors, disappointed academicians, lazy ‘liberals,’ and other familiar fauna of the 
social jungle, along with the commercial revolutionists, professional provocateurs, 
saboteurs, wreckers and riot rousers” who were manipulating the “stream of aggressive 
mass emotion.285   
 
Like Moulton at BI, Jordan exerted strong control over the organization, and his antipathy 
towards liberal academics and the New Deal was reflected in the organization’s research staff 
and output. NICB drew heavily on corporate (rather than academic) statisticians and economists 
to perform its basic work. Jordan organized a number of conferences through the 1930s focused 
on statistics, business, economics, labor, and Keynes. The NICB orientation against government 
control is apparent in the conference reports emphasizing the cost of government and the number 
of people supported by government.286
4.3.3. Case 13: The NAM and Chamber of Commerce 
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) incorporated in 1896 to promote 
overseas markets for American products. Generally directed by medium sized businesses, the 
DuPont clan (General Motors, DuPont Corporation, and U.S. Rubber) took over NAM in 1934 
and employed it as a platform to launch attacks on the New Deal.287 The Chamber of Commerce 
(CC) was less obviously representative of raw business interests than NAM,288 and initially 
supported New Deal proposals, but businessmen opposed to such policies took over in 1935, 
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 after which its relevance was limited to participation in the formation of the Council of 
Economic Advisors in 1946. Both CC and NAM had headquarters in Washington and wide-
ranging memberships.  
In addition to the political flavor and combative image of the anti-New Deal 
organizations, the fact that their ideology conflicted with the corporate liberal impulse toward 
research at the time is a major reason for their marginalization in the policy debates of the 1930s. 
NAM and CC fulfilled their mandate mostly through discussion and lobbying, recalling my 
distinction in chapter one between organizations whose primary modality is discussion,289 and 
those that emphasize research.290 Each added economists to their Washington staffs only 
belatedly (CC founding member Filene in fact resigned over the organization’s lack of research 
capacity). NAM and CC lobbied government through the 1920s and 1930s, operating through 
issue-oriented. However, as the federal bureaucracy mushroomed through the 1930s, interest 
groups that did not induct researchers, analysts, and public relations experts into their ranks were 
left behind in the drive to engage intellectual debates in Washington.  
4.4. Modulating the business cycle  
4.4.1. Case 14: NBER and peacetime deficit spending 
 Before the Great Depression, the thought of using peacetime deficits as a macroeconomic 
management tool did not occur to political leaders. U.S. fiscal policy had always been to borrow 
in time of war, and run surpluses in peace to pay off war debt. FDR continued in this tradition of 
a balanced budget. He campaigned on Hoover’s fiscal irresponsibility in 1932,291 slashed 
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 soldier’s bonuses and government salaries with the Economy Act of March 1933,292 cut funds to 
many of the relief agencies that had helped him gain support from low-income groups in the 
polarized 1936 election,293 and initiated additional spending cuts in 1937 that appeared to move 
the budget near balance. It was not until 1938 when the growing acceptance of Keynesian theory 
in both the economic profession and the administration coincided with an unexpected economic 
shock that the U.S. discarded the principle of peacetime budget surpluses. The resulting policy 
shift institutionalized new component of corporate liberal governance—the idea that large 
deficits could help moderate the business cycle in time of recession. 
Many of the mechanisms by which government rationalizes, regulates, stabilizes the 
modern economy were instituted in the New Deal (e.g. economic forecasting, labor negotiations, 
codes of business practice). During the New Deal the government assumed responsibility for 
gathering and publishing national income statistics, often borrowing NBER economists for the 
task.294  
The Great Depression prompted much research into the causes and diagnosis of the 
business cycle. NBER housed the leading business cycle researchers in Wesley Mitchell, Arthur 
Burns and others who studied hundreds of statistical series in inquiring into the causes and 
diagnosis of the business cycle. They measured series that move in the same direction as 
aggregate economic activity (GDP) such as consumption, industrial production, and 
employment, as well as those that were “counter-cyclical” such as unemployment and 
bankruptcies, and those that appeared to be unrelated to the cycle, such as real interest rates. The 
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 New Deal reinforced the identity of researchers as national public servants. Institutional 
economists were heavily involved in almost all parts of the New Deal administration,295 
innovating in public utility legislation, unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, and 
Social Security. 
Despite this level of influence, institutional economists’ role as heterodox critics of 
neoclassical orthodoxy was eclipsed by the Keynesian or “fiscal” revolution. John Maynard 
Keynes’ 1936 General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was the era’s most influential 
study of the business cycle. Keynesians incorporated institutionalists’ concerns with empirical 
testing and new econometric techniques, aggregate performance, national income, capacity 
utilization, and unemployment, into mainstream economics. The ability of Keynesian economics 
to make such empirical claims as well as offer more interventionist planning ideas, made it 
irresistible to policy makers confronted by the depression. The usefulness of the theory was 
discovered as the austerity required by the government’s traditional commitment to balanced 
budgets became politically untenable.296  
Keynes’ concern with employment was a shift away from classical theory’s focus on 
optimum resource allocation, and the long-standing identification of thrift with virtue. He 
rejected the conventional wisdom that unemployment resulted primarily from wage rigidity,297 
arguing instead that aggregate demand298 was the most important factor. In showing how an 
aggressive use of fiscal policy would work as a tool for recovery instead of merely relief, the 
publication of the General Theory encouraged a growing number of people to consider deficit 
spending as a positive tool, not an occasionally necessary evil. By the late 1930s, 
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 The notion that maintenance of aggregate national spending and demand might be the 
most important task of governance came into the…economic debate as a dazzling 
simplification of social politics. One need not do everything all at once, in the furiously 
eclectic manner of the early New Deal. One need not worry overly about which goods 
were in or outside the market, or even where, in this profoundly mixed system, such a 
line might be drawn. One crucial thing was needed: to keep one’s eye on aggregate 
investment and demand299
 
An unprecedented drop in production, income, and employment from September 1937 to June 
1938 led to a ferocious internal debate between Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who wanted to 
stay the course of fiscal cuts, and a small group of administration economists who used Keynes’ 
new theory to analyze the recession and propose deficit spending as the solution. The new 
economists300 argued that previous cuts in government spending and the new Social Security 
taxes accounted for recent inflation. Concerned with the upcoming fall election, FDR was 
swayed when the Keynesians, in consultation with Beardsley Ruml, presented him with a 
thorough case for increased spending. To combat the unexpected recession and fears of runaway 
inflation, he decided in 1938 to set in motion what he later termed a “compensatory fiscal 
policy” that included provisions for public housing, a transcontinental highway, and renewed 
appropriations for agencies targeted in the previous year’s budget cuts.301 With the enactment of 
planned deficits, Keynesian fiscal programs were reconciled with the social reforms of the New 
Deal. As the 1930s ended, and the crisis years began to recede, the ideas of consensus and 
balance achieved an even greater hegemony in economic policy. The Keynesian revolution had 
begun, forming the basis for extensive government intervention to stabilize the environment for 
corporate development in the post-WW II political economy (see chapter 5).  
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 4.5. Employment policy 
Most historians agree the New Deal collective bargaining, social insurance, relief, and 
agricultural and corporate subsidy programs were insufficient to achieve the economic prosperity 
and social harmony it sought by its advocates, and that it was the Second World War that ended 
the Depression and cast America into a dominant geopolitical role: 
Between 1939 and 1944, the peak of the war effort, the real value of the nations output 
rose over 70 percent. Still more remarkably, private product expanded by over a half at 
the same time that the value of the government’s output more than trebled and its share of 
total output rose from slightly more than 10 percent in 1939 to between a fifth and a 
quarter in 1944…. And suddenly there was no unemployment problem. By 1942 the rate 
was 4.7 percent, but in 1943 it was 1.9 percent and in the succeeding year a wartime low 
of 1.2 percent302   
 
The lesson was apparent to elites and public, and throughout the war they considered economic 
conversion in peace to be the most pressing postwar issue. The main question was how to 
maintain near full employment and avoid a return to the 1930s depression after twelve million 
veterans returned home, and $250 million per day war spending halted. Conservative and 
corporate liberal think tanks answered that question by shifting the mainstream planning debate 
toward a “right” Keynesianism that accepted the language of “compensatory spending” to 
approach “full employment” and high national income, but in practice tilted towards 
unemployment over inflation, stability over redistribution, and demand stimulus in the form of 
tax reductions and military expenditures over social spending.  
This section addresses the failure of “left” Keynesian policy researchers to expand the 
New Deal through the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), and the defeat of the 
proposed Full Employment Act of 1945, and passage of the 1946 Employment Act. The 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) role in the Employment Act of 1946 is the 
culmination and clearest case of a political strategy to institutionalize the right wing of the 
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 Keynesian spectrum. A paradigm of business-government-labor “cooperation” legitimized a 
Keynesian militarist model of domestic “full employment.” CED was able to accommodate the 
consensus view that government could and should engage in some form of planning to avert 
economic dislocations in peacetime, while diluting the institutionalization of this idea in the state 
apparatus. This finally blunted radical elements of the New Deal by absorbing Keynesian 
economic ideas within a framework that did not fundamentally disrupt the relations of power in 
the American political economy. The rhetoric of policy researchers in these ambitious proposals 
highlights the ideological and institutional limits within which think tanks finally defined an elite 
consensus on the issue of postwar domestic economy.  
4.5.1. Case 15: The National Resources Planning Board 
The short life of the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) represents another high 
point and limit case for more radical Keynesian ideas in government. Young Keynesian 
economists were “fairly numerous” at the Treasury Department and spread throughout the 
special wartime agencies (Office of Price Administration, War Production Board).303 Many left 
or “social” Keynesians, led by Harvard economist Alvin Hansen, joined the new National 
Resources Planning Board (NRPB) in 1942. In 1943 they proposed the boldest planning proposal 
to date, calling for “cradle to grave” social security through a national health insurance system, 
full employment through an extensive public works project, and the extension of Social Security 
to the disabled, dependent, and farm and domestic workers. Based on the 1942 Beveridge Plan 
that was the basis for the British welfare state, the proposals reflected the conceptual revolution 
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 occurring around Keynesian macroeconomics.304 Supporters at the Nation magazine thought the 
promise of eliminating the boom-and-bust of the business cycle with a full 
employment/production economy subsidized by public investment in emergency/permanent 
works programs represented “an abrupt break from the defeatist thinking that held us in 
economic thralldom through the thirties.”305   
Congressional Republicans targeted the board as a menace to people’s liberty and the 
American way of life, cutting all appropriations for the NRPB in 1943. Electoral politics had 
been shifting rightwards with Republicans gains beginning in 1938 (by 1946 Republicans would 
control the House and Senate).306 The extinction of NRPB limited the impact of “left” Keynesian 
ideas on federal governance, but could not tarnish the awesome productive power fostered by the 
planned wartime economy. The sudden economic recovery combined with the Allied military 
victory was stark evidence for the success of a larger and more rationalized government. The 
belief that state spending in the form of huge military expenditures had prevented depression and 
vaulted the U.S. position in the global system legitimated the notion that government could and 
should direct the economy. This belief hardened the nation’s resolve to maintain high postwar 
employment when peace came. As the defeat of fascism neared in 1944, the problem of 
sustaining domestic employment and production assumed urgency. Keynesian economics gave 
planners a neat theory of how they could use government expenditure and revenue decisions to 
approach full employment.  
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 4.5.2. Case 16: CED and the Employment Act of 1946 
A sweeping proposal for economic conversion to peace emerged on January 22, 1945 
when Senator James Murray (D-Montana) introduced S.380—the Full Employment Act. The act 
mandated the president to submit a budget that assured full employment in the following fiscal 
year. The central debate over the bill in research organizations was over the proper role of 
government. The bill’s defeat was ensured by a conservative effort to excoriate Keynesian ideas. 
NAM and CC engaged in a vigorous public relations campaign to oppose the bill once it passed 
the Senate and debate in the House had begun in autumn 1945.307 In addition to testifying in the 
House hearings on the bill, NAM widely distributed its views through a large mailing list that 
included its own membership of 16,000, editorialists and columnists across the nation, radio 
speeches, public meetings, news, cartoons, advertising, and movies.308  
One such NAM release, executed in concert with Donaldson Brown of General Motors 
Corporation309 and Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce legislative reporter J.C. Ingbretsen, 
excoriated the sections of S.380, claiming variously that the bill  
Means Government Controls…Destroys Private Enterprise…Will Increase the Powers of 
the Executive…Legalizes a Compensatory Fiscal Policy…Leads to Socialism…Is 
Unworkable, Impractical, and Promises Too Much.310
The arguments enabled Republicans and Southern Democrats to block the bill. Staunchly 
conservative policy groups were able to convince Congress and the electorate that S. 380 was a 
totalitarian bill based on dangerous economic theories that would destroy free enterprise. 
A more moderate position emerged from a new think tank, the Committee for Economic 
Development (CED). Its role in turning the 1945 Full Employment Act into the Employment Act 
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 of 1946 reveals the success of “enlightened” business leaders in exploiting rhetorical ambiguity 
to mediate the translation of Keynesian ideas into state policy.311  
Thick sociological continuities between the CED, Progressive era groups like the NCF 
and AALL, Hoover’s commissions, Roosevelt’s NRA, and conservative Keynesians in BAC 
demonstrate the force behind CED was same network that served in the mobilization for World 
War I, took part in Hoover’s Unemployment and Social Trends conferences, and nurtured 
corporate liberalism through the 1930s.312 And like its predecessors, CED’s advocacy of a 
crucial government role in maintaining a free enterprise system in which the corporation was the 
paramount actor drew criticism from the right and the left.313  
CED emerged under the auspices of the Business Advisory Council (BAC)314 for the 
expressed purpose of stabilizing the postwar economy by bringing together executives and 
economic experts to discuss methods to pursue high employment. BAC had been thinking about 
a “post-armament” economy before America’s entry into the war. Eastman Kodak treasurer 
Marion Folsom led its Committee on Economic Policy in 1941 to conceive a postwar economy 
that preserved the private enterprise system. BAC chairman R.R. Deupree remarked in January 
1942, 
The challenge which business will face when this war is over cannot be met by a laissez-
faire philosophy or by uncontrolled forces of supply and demand. Intelligent planning, 
                                                 
311 Domhoff 1990:Ch.7 
312 Weinstein 1968 
313 Chartered just days after the NRPB was de-funded by Congress, the CED was initially praised by liberals as 
enlightened business for its promise “to promote and aid planning for high level employment and production by 
commerce and industry in the postwar period” (The New Republic, July 26, 1943, p.104). As its postwar planning 
programs were developed, however, liberal criticism increased. Oscar Gass in The New Republic referred to CED’s 
“Postwar federal tax program for high employment” as “an Intelligent Rich Man’s Guide to Profits and Prosperity” 
(October 16, 1944, p.418). 
314 We saw earlier in this chapter how BAC provided formal links between progressive business leaders and the 
Commerce Department. Because of their experience in working closely with the federal government, BAC 
personnel were tapped to staff many of the top positions in mobilization agencies such as the War Production Board. 
Donald Nelson and William Batt, chairman and vice-chairman of the War Production Board respectively, were both 
recruited from the Council (Collins 1978:376). 
 100
 faith in the future and courage will be needed to carry us through the reconstruction 
period.315
 An April 1942 BAC report unveiled the idea for an “Institute of Business Enterprise” that would 
encourage businesses to collect data on projected postwar demand and employment patterns, and 
“attempt to formulate a suggested overall program for business and industry.” When Commerce 
Secretary Jesse Jones began to solicit business involvement in postwar planning, he sought BAC 
input first. After a number of meetings with the Commerce Department through the summer of 
1942, CED legally incorporated on September 3, 1942.  
CED constituted a wholly different type of group than the business lobbies (CC, NICB, 
NAM) that pursued the laissez-faire agenda of their broad-based memberships through 
traditional lobbying and propaganda techniques because its structure and ideology reflected the 
corporate liberal segment of big business. Structurally, CED divided into a Field Development 
Division designed to promote plant-by-plant planning through local and regional committees, 
and a Research Division authorized to make policy recommendations through a Research and 
Policy Committee. The Research Division was headed by University of Chicago vice president 
William Benton and Studebaker Motors president and University of Chicago trustee Paul 
Hoffman.316 The Research and Policy Committee was staffed entirely by businessmen who 
received advice from a Research Advisory Board of six distinguished economists and a political 
scientist, a cadre of hired researchers led by University of Chicago economist Theodore Yntema, 
and outside researchers hired for particular projects. Proto-Keynesians Ralph Flanders317 and 
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 Beardsley Ruml were selected as chair and vice-chair. Ruml came to be known as the 
committee’s “idea man.” 318 CED believed more fervently in expertise than most of its peers in 
business, and perceived a lack of suitable expertise in groups like NAM and CC. CED would 
instead influence public policy by engaging sophisticated economic arguments and defining 
alternative solutions. Unlike NAM, the CED did not initiate contact with legislators, preferring to 
testify only when called upon, which was often enough to be decisive.319  
Like NCF and Brookings, the CED ideology defined a “common good” in the application 
of expertise to modern social problems, and appealed to scientific objectivity to depoliticize the 
definition of problems and solutions in society by turning them into technical questions. It 
eschewed class conflict, and strove for a middle way between pure statism and pure laissez-faire. 
The basic CED philosophy was articulated by its Research Division vice-chairman William 
Benton, who wrote in Fortune Magazine that American capitalism,  
When it functions properly, permits the maximum freedom to the individual consistent 
with the common good. It supports and reinforces political liberty and provides the 
greatest opportunities for the development of all men and the attainment of their 
individual as well as their common aspirations320   
 
Studebaker executive and first CED president Paul Hoffman elaborated the interventionist 
perspective of the organization:  
Private business has little to do with maintaining high levels of employment, and…there 
is little that local government can do. It follows, therefore, that the government must take 
certain steps if we are to achieve high levels of employment321  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic ideas such as the multiplier concept. Their prescriptions were basically Keynesian in their call for a 
compensatory fiscal policy (i.e. government deficit spending during depressions to shift money from savings to 
consumption (Collins 1981:63-7). 
318 Collins 1978:388-9. 
319 Bailey 1950:156,165-6.  
320 Benton, “The Economics of a Free Society: A Declaration of American Economic Policy,” Fortune October 
1943, p.162. 
321 “CED, Joint Meeting of the Research Committee and Research Advisory Board, April 7-8, 1945,” Box 131, 
Flanders MSS, in Collins 1981:86. 
 102
 The ideology implied fiscal and monetary recommendations that called for greater state 
intervention than did Hoover and other advocates of the associative state, but did not suggest full 
government creation of industry cartels a la Gerard Swope and the New Deal’s NRA.  
CED’s central role in formulating postwar economic re-conversion plans, skillfully 
reviewed in Bailey’s Congress Makes a Law, was as a venue to adapt the business community to 
the idea of “compensatory fiscal policy” (FDR’s term), and the idea of mitigating the business 
cycle by spending money even during a budget deficit. The new paradigm idea marked a narrow 
but qualitatively new level of government responsibility.   
The issue erupted in a proposed employment bill that was substantially different from the 
Full Employment bill shot down by Republicans. The CED version incorporated some sort of 
economic planning mechanism in the Executive and legislature, and provided for a moderate 
public works program. This compromise passed as the Employment Act of 1946.322 It marked 
qualitatively new levels of government responsibility, since compensatory policies were not 
explicitly forbidden and for the first time it was assumed to be “the continuing policy and 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means…to promote maximum 
employment, production, and purchasing power.”323  
With no hint of an enforceable “right to a job” and explicit references to short-run 
Keynesian compensatory spending devices effectively expurgated, the law signaled a weaker 
commitment to federal macroeconomic management than the original Full Employment Act. 
Instead of concerning itself with reform measures like social insurance, for example, the act 
relied on “automatic stabilizers,” and restricted government action to the narrower responsibility 
of seeking full employment through mandated spending in deflationary periods (macroeconomic 
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 management). In other words, the left Keynesianism represented by Alvin Hansen and the NRPB 
had been superseded by a right or “commercial” Keynesianism, which focused macro planning 
on the relatively narrow concern of interest rates, rather than public works and spending 
adjustments. 
The law also established the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), a formal advisory 
body of economic experts in a new executive office, however the terms defining CEA role left 
broad room for interpretation.324 CEA would collect economic and business information, and 
advise the President in preparing an economic report and recommend  
…national economic policies to foster and promote free competitive enterprise, to avoid 
economic fluctuations, or to diminish the effects thereof, and to maintain employment, 
production, and purchasing power.325  
 
Eleven of the Council’s first thirteen CEA chairs came from the think tank field, six from the 
CED.326 Spending decisions in these years suggest that these people believed economic stability 
was achievable without significantly increasing spending in the (civilian) public sector. Fred 
Block (1977) details the dramatic increase in military spending during the postwar period.327 
Since the U.S. devoted most monies to huge federal outlays for a Cold War apparatus, it is safe 
to say “defense” was seen by business as more legitimate expenditure than social programs. The 
preference for stimulus in the form of military outlays justifies applying the term “military 
Keynesian” to the postwar regime.  
CED participation in the full employment debate shows how the paradigm of political 
and economic cooperation between functional groups in the U.S. was rooted in a deep belief that 
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 capitalism and democracy are intertwined aspects of a social order congruent with human nature. 
CED co-opted the new economic thought by accepting the idea of government spending in 
deficit in order to stabilize the economy, but repudiating a more liberal Keynesianism embodied 
in the failed NRPB and Full Employment Act. CED preserved a concentrated political economy 
by transcending the negative reputation of business fostered by groups like the NAM, and set up 
a domestic system ready made for extrapolation to the international sphere.  
4.6. Conclusion 
The paradigm ideas and policy outcomes of the interwar period reflect the complexity, 
adaptability, and conservatism of the think tank field. The field kept corporatist ideas alive in the 
1920s, and in response to widespread social unrest in the 1930s enacted those ideas through an 
accommodation of the Keynesian fiscal revolution in economic planning. As Hoover’s rhetoric 
of a “new era” of nearly effortless affluence lost its material purchase, politicians in need of 
quick measures dusted off these ready-made ideas and used the political window of crisis to 
enact them. Policymakers re-conceptualized the 1920s vision of state and society as an 
interdependent system of associational networks by defining social problems in ways that 
legitimated a role for the federal state as a medium to redress harms to subordinate groups, 
broker competing interest groups, and stabilize the business cycle.  
Most Americans rallied to support the president’s steps to stem the most serious 
depression in U.S. history. Given the rising popularity of sweeping reforms, Roosevelt probably 
could have taken the country in any question he wanted. That FDR chose to restore the health of 
the corporate system rather than replace it, that income and wealth disparities were nearly as bad 
in 1939 as 1933, and that giant corporations controlled more of the economy at the end of the 
decade than at the beginning suggests New Deal innovations were a relatively conservative 
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 response to systemic crisis. Williams characterizes the New Deal as “overlooking, if not 
encouraging, combinations, and as pressing for cooperation, efficiency, and a species of 
government regulation that often eliminated competition.”328 
Instead of providing recovery, the New Deal promoted the rationalization of the existing 
syndicalist political economy based on the large corporation [and brought] the main 
functional and syndicalist elements of the political economy into a rough kind of legal 
and practical balance.329
 
As with Progressive reforms, programs preserved the long-term stability of the private property 
system through welfare benefits. As FDR said to the Democratic state convention in Syracuse, 
New York in 1936, 
The true conservative seeks to protect this system of private property and free enterprise 
by correcting such injustices and inequalities as arise from it. The most serious threat to 
our institutions comes from those who refuse to face the need for change. Liberalism 
becomes the protection for the far-sighted conservative.330  
 
In policy outcomes where government assumed responsibility for ensuring the whole national 
economy operates effectively TTs were able to articulate concepts of government responsibility 
in ways that protected concentrated capital accumulation by blunting the most radical aspects of 
reform.  
While Keynesian theory was used by some to counter the main arguments in favor of 
wealth inequality, policy outcomes generally functioned to conserve corporate capitalism by 
charting a middle way between “do-nothing” laissez faire and socialist interference in the free 
decision of what and how much to produce. Discretionary spending through public works, public 
housing, urban renewal, and national resource development offered a degree of programmatic 
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329 Williams 1966:440. The Supreme Court, beginning in April 1937, began to uphold policies like the Wagner Act 
and other policies of the New Deal, essentially legalizing “a system created by the large corporations and the 
Progressive Movement” (p.448). With its decisions, the Court gave the legal authority to ideas and definitions of the 
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 planning through the New Deal, but fiscal policy was set up to rely more on “automatic 
stabilizers” (and military spending come WW II) than federal planning to promote economic 
stability.  
In a nation characterized by a deep-seated belief in the free market system, the new 
economics was a viable alternative to direct economic controls, as automatic stabilizers would 
function as the “invisible hand” of a previous century. As instituted in America, Keynesianism 
was in large part stripped of its reformist elements by corporate liberal members of the business 
community acting through organizational forms capable of translating their political ideology 
into coherent policies. Business-backed think tanks represented a range of opinion, and generally 
supported Roosevelt, but were uncomfortable with Keynesians’ revolutionary-democratic 
tendency. In the end, they managed to deflect the domestic reforms of the New Deal towards a 
corporate liberal paradigm by turning potentially radical economic ideas into a relatively sedate 
monetary tool buttressed by military outlays. The counter cyclical economic policy of 1937-38 
and Employment Act of 1946 culminated this dynamic as working class unrest was constrained 
within a Fordist mode of accumulation.  
The apparent relationship between corporate liberal ideas and the monopoly benefits 
sought by the corporate leadership from 1920-1938 provides empirical support for a “power 
elite”331 or “national upper class”332 comprised of big business and those they chose to admit to 
the state apparatus. The businesspersons and experts who served in government and think tanks 
were familiar with and often drawn from the upper class and corporate community. Referring to 
such informal relationships during WW I, Brookings wrote, “One could not enter this club 
without meeting someone who had something to tell, and in the smoking rooms after dinner, [the 
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 war] offered a never ending source for discussion.”333 As corporate leaders were becoming 
familiar with experts, experts were educating themselves about the needs of business, and in 
many cases adapting themselves to those needs.334 The research and policy recommendations 
that emerged were the result of coalitions between these groups, and policy experts overall 
supported reforms that stabilized the interests of wealth and big business.  
However, the activity of research institutions through these decades is not reducible to 
the economic interests or corporate ideology of their founders and financiers. Think tank 
personnel were not simply big business lackeys. They also supported a degree of growth in a re-
distributive welfare state, labor power, and civil rights. Furthermore, the motives and actions of 
professional social scientists that ran the organizations sometimes proceeded in directions 
counter to their sponsors. Robert Brookings, for example, came to be very critical of the 
government system in his later years, while the Brookings Institution scholars moderated their 
opposition to the New Deal over time.335
One cannot therefore understand the domestic corporate liberal policy regime as solely 
the result of unified capitalists acting in concert with government to enact a state capitalist 
system, since state capitalism never came about. Labor unrest and significant ideological 
differences among think tanks worked against the imposition of a singular business government. 
Think tanks and the academic economists, executives, and others active in the policy network 
defined social insurance and counter-cyclical spending in variegated ways. In addition, the 
language of cooperative capitalism remained strong in certain policy networks, the laissez-faire 
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financial backers, the backers will routinely support those experts they met in seminars. In addition, having the 
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335 Critchlow 1985:42 
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 ideology propagated in think tanks throughout the 1930s served as a reservoir of arguments and 
evidence for a beneficent free market available for use by certain business sectors and the public. 
The Brookings Institution, for example, articulated a conservative stance on these issues and 
would soon work closely with conservative elements in Congress such as the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities. Its president Harold Moulton even discouraged Brookings officers 
from collaborating with the Committee for Economic Development, which along with the TCF 
was much less fearful of planning or hostile to labor. TCF even collaborated with labor on their 
projects.  
The rhetoric of experimentalism pervasive among both social researchers and politicians, 
especially in the early years of the New Deal, also belies the notion of an imposed and singular 
capitalist solution. In the 1930s, for example, people like Isador Lubin of Brookings, George 
Soule from NBER and Robert S. Lynd from TCF were open to whatever solutions would help 
plan the most effective solutions to current problems. The ethos transcended the “just the facts 
approach” used by many policy research advocates to bypass questions of competing values and 
political differences. Approaches became more flexible and diverse as experts were drawn 
deeper into advisory roles. It is more correct to say therefore that the domestic regime resulted 
from a relatively coherent coalition of multiple elites, including an ascendant expert class.  
Tanks adapted to severe working class and agrarian protest, helping restructure America 
around a new mode of accumulation. The Great Crash of 1929 and the continuing 1930s crisis 
began a period in which a new “Fordist”336 mode of accumulation based on labor- and capital-
intensive production, exemplified in the automobile industry. This marked the full emergence of 
a domestic industrial system that heralded a new era.337 Until the New Deal, the U.S. remained 
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 more or less a liberal, as opposed to corporate liberal state. Think tanks helped transform the 
New Deal from its early state monopolist (corporatist) orientation into a synthesis of corporatist 
and (classical) liberal principles. The WW II experience reinforced this synthesis, and the 
nascent, experimental, ad hoc Keynesianism of the New Deal became the full-blown Keynesian 
Militarist consensus around the pursuit of high growth as a way of balancing business and labor 
interests. The extrapolation of this synthesis to Western Europe and Japan through the post-WW 
II accords in a Cold War context is the subject of the next chapter.  
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5. The Keynesian Military System, 1940-1973 
 
I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas. The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both 
when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. 
--John Maynard Keynes338
Tyrannies may require a large amount of living space. But freedom requires and will 
require far greater living space than Tyranny 
--Time editor and CFR member Henry Luce339
 
The hundreds of academics who flocked to Washington during the 1930s economic crisis 
increased greatly in number and activity due to the mobilization and post conflict planning for 
World War II. 340 As in World War I, new agencies employed experts in economics, survey 
research, social and applied psychology, history, and anthropology in large numbers to develop 
new technology and research tools, and organize production, and direct the deployment of 
military and civilian personnel. External funding for the social and behavioral sciences, scientific 
and medical research also ratcheted up.341 The demand for authoritative policy prescriptions 
increased the prestige of policy-oriented research and accelerated faith in technocratic control 
across social sectors. Think tanks were able to capitalize on the newfound opportunities with 
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339 Luce wrote these words in Life magazine, February 17, 1941. Luce described the early postwar as the beginning 
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 ready-made concepts and new institutional arrangements that did not seem overtly political or 
narrowly interested.  
The CED and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) role in designing a U.S.-led global 
system to expand trade and investment, represents the extrapolation of the U.S. domestic 
corporate liberal model abroad. Paradigms of “bipartisan” and “expert” foreign policy and 
balancing national autonomy with the global market342 legitimized doctrines of “free trade” and 
soviet “containment”. Think tanks capitalized a long-term investment in an international project 
by supplying the initiative and personnel for new “policy planning” initiatives in the State and 
Treasury Departments. Working in concert with other policy institutes, the White House, AFL-
CIO leaders, the Rockefeller foundation and multinational firms fostered 1) direct foreign 
investment in war torn countries, 2) a framework of international regulations for trade and the 
negotiated removal of trade barriers, and 3) a Cold War strategy of Soviet containment and an 
ambitiously increasing European military support through NATO.  
CFR worked during the WW II period to create the conditions for new coalitions within 
and between the U.S. and other capitalist democracies. Through study and discussion groups, 
book length monographs, publications in its journal Foreign Affairs, formal and informal work 
for government, and revolving door of government appointments, CFR postwar planning 
strengthened transnational capitalists’ ability to promote their long-term interests. The 
publications and internal communications of CFR and its affiliated propaganda arms, including 
the Non-Partisan Committee, the Committee to Defend America, and the Committee for the 
Marshall Plan, had a strong belief that an international system based on a free market would 
create peace and prosperity, preserve democratic institutions in Europe, and prevent the spread of 
communism.  
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 5.1. Preparing the ground: Internationalist tanks through the interwar period 
To reconstruct TT roles in the Cold War era, it will be helpful understand how CFR kept 
internationalist ideals alive through the relatively “isolationist” interwar period. The fact that it 
took several decades for the CFR vision came to fruition suggests a long-term investment in 
internationalist consciousness among business and government elites took time to mature. CFR’s 
willingness to invest in a long-term process is reflects both its substantive aversion to short-term 
thinking in interstate relations, and its practical methods for persuading people.  
World War I and the subsequent peace talks stimulated investment bankers and other 
internationally minded elites to promote liberal internationalist ideas through private 
organizations like CFR and affiliated British think tanks. The failure of the 1919 Paris Peace 
Conference at Versailles forced internationalists into nonstate venues like CFR and affiliated 
think tanks, laying the groundwork for a post-WW II U.S.-British policy regime.  
The kernel of this regime was an exclusive dinner club begun on 10 June 1918 at the 
invitation of popular Republican lawyer, T. Roosevelt’s secretary of state, and first president of 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Elihu Root. Dubbed the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the club comprised a group of bankers, lawyers, business and government leaders, 
academics and journalists in the New York area, who favored the League of Nations as a 
framework to secure international trade and treaties. A 1919 CFR handbook says the group 
decided to convene monthly dinners at the Metropolitan Club 
…to discuss the most interesting and vital subjects concerned with the United States and its 
relations with the rest of the world. The object of the Council on Foreign Relations is to afford a 
continuous conference on foreign affairs, bringing together at each meeting international thinkers 
so that in the course of a year several hundred expert minds in finance, industry, education, 
statecraft and science will have been brought to bear on international problems. It is a board of 
Initiation – a Board of Invention. It plans to cooperate with the Government and all existing 
agencies and to bring them all into constructive accord.343
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Around the same time, members of the American344 and British delegations to the peace talks 
grew frustrated at the inability of participants to transcend isolationist traditions agitating in their 
own countries.345 They felt the shortsighted nationalism at future peace conferences and the 
League of Nations could be solved with international institutes where experts could 
communicate across national boundaries, and cultivate public opinion in their own countries 
around conceptions of a “universal interest.” Some 30 members of the American and British 
delegations met at the Hotel Majestic to conceive an “Institute for International Affairs.”346 
British Colonial Officer Lionel Curtis argued that 
National policy ought to be shaped by a conception of the interest of society at large; 
for it was in the advancement of that universal interest that the particular interest of 
the several nations would alone be found. It [is] of all importance, therefore, to 
cultivate public opinion in the various countries of the world which [keeps] the 
general interest in view.347
Curtis urged expert delegates to 
Create institutes like the Royal Geographic Society, with libraries where the members 
would study international affairs. The results of their studies could be put in the form 
of papers for discussion by the members. This would keep officials and publicists in 
touch with each other. Officials might often have to abstain from discussion of the 
papers, but there was no reason why they could not listen to them. More important 
still, the institutes would form centers where they could converse on these subjects.348
Organizations on both sides of the Atlantic were established towards this end, however the 
possibility of a joint Anglo-American think tank languished with travel and communication 
difficulties (American participants were scattered about east coast cities), as well as tepid 
congressional and public support in America for European involvement (as evidenced by the 
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 Senate’s refusal to pass the Paris Treaty).349 The concept of such an institute revived, however, 
when the CFR dinner club offered to merge with the American branch of the Institute of 
International Affairs in late summer 1920. CFR shared the lofty goals of the Institute, and had 
much more and solid financial support. Its money did not however ensure prestige or influence, 
and by the summer of 1920 its roughly 150 members agreed that interest in future dinners was 
languishing.  
Members proposed a merger with the expert-laden American Institute, which received the 
offer with wariness. Despite the clear financial deficits it faced (it held almost no funds except 
for the $10 annual dues from its 21 members), its experts were skeptical of the ability of CFR 
bankers and businessmen to encompass a sufficiently broad range of thought. Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong, who would later edit CFR’s flagship Foreign Affairs publication, voted against the 
merger, feeling the Council members were on a “far too ‘sound financial basis’ to care much 
about facts in conflict with their usual outlook.”350 However, after the Council initiated several 
changes, including a more palatable dues system and a broader membership including 
representatives from media, law, publishing, and academia, American Institute members decided 
that joining the refashioned CFR was superior to abandoning their venture altogether, and voted 
to do so. By its incorporation on 29 July 1921 CFR consisted of  
650 members, 400 from New York and 250 from the rest of the country… the 
Council’s roster read like a Who’s Who of American business and professional men. 
Partners from J.P. Morgan and Company mingled with Ivy League professors, 
international lawyers with syndicated columnists, State Department officials with 
Clergymen.351
Invitations to join CFR usually followed an individual’s achievement in business, executive 
branch, academia, and elsewhere. The original 1921 Council merged with the American Institute 
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 largely because members recognized their membership lacked the necessary scholarly and 
government expertise to be anything more than wealthy men interested in foreign affairs. But 
while academics, journalists, editors, and other functional elites added to the Council’s prestige, 
businessmen (including directors of commercial banks, eminent law firm and insurance company 
partners, and members of other business oriented think tanks like CED) still maintained the 
largest representation at about 30 percent. Council members also included a number of 
Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie Corporation trustees, journalists and editors of major 
newspapers, magazines, and eventually television networks. Many had affiliations with 
Brookings, CEIP, TCF, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, and the Foreign Policy Association. This 
overlapping membership shows a high level of interlocks between organizations, and lends 
support to the corporatist approach to studying policymaking.  
By 1945, the Council had only two labor leaders: David Dubinsky and Robert J. Watt of 
the AFL. Most in CFR regarded organized labor as a nuisance, but recognized its growing power 
after WW II and its key role in the attempt to ground American foreign policy in functional elite 
support. The Council Board of Directors decided in May 1946 to invite additional conservative 
union leaders. Few accepted the offer. Isaiah Bowman considered the effort “a waste of time… 
Our Labor leaders are not yet sufficiently mature to engage in an objective and cooperative study 
with other groups.”352   
Some CFR members acceded to powerful posts in the 1920s, notably Stimson who 
became Coolidge’s secretary of state, but CFR had fairly weak ties to government through the 
1920s as recent memories of war, debt, taxation and inflation pushed Harding and Coolidge 
away from Wilsonian internationalism. Still, public attention and estimation of CFR grew 
                                                 
352 Bowman to Arthur W. Page, 20 march 1947, Bowman Papers, cited in Wala 1994:231 
 116
 considerably through the decade as the organization invited a number of foreign dignitaries and 
American politicians to speak at membership meetings and other programs.353  
CFR began to cultivate a relationship with FDR late in the decade, publishing his “Our 
Foreign Policy: A Democratic View” in Foreign Affairs, and launching its headquarters in 1929 
next door to the new Governor’s house on East 45th Street in New York. Numerous Council 
members would eventually serve under President Roosevelt, including Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius, Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles, War Secretary Henry Stimson, Norman 
H. Davis (CFR president, 1936-1944) and James P. Warburg of the “brains trust.”354 Both 
Roosevelt and CFR would draw on this long standing relationship during the crisis of WW II.  
 The crisis of the Great Depression spawned CFR discussion groups and articles in 
Foreign Affairs by Edwin F. Gay,355 Percy W. Bidwell,356 and Walter Lippmann.357 None agreed 
precisely on the causes of the Depression (for Gay it was WW I, for Bidwell a “tariff orgy,” for 
Lippmann Great Britain’s economic nationalism), but all converged on the solution of unfettered 
international trade. CFR generally refrained from explicit legislative positions, but worked hard 
for internationalist measures like the Export-Import Bank of 1933 and the Reciprocal Trade Act 
of 1934.358
5.1.1. Anglo-American ties 
CFR became the model for similar think tanks across the Atlantic (as well as later 
organizations like the Trilateral Commission) devoted to constructing a general interest in 
international capital expansion, first by functioning as a clearinghouse for policy ideas and 
leading elites towards a rhetorical coherence, translating ideas into broad messages and policy, 
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 and incubating future policymakers. CFR developed transnational ties with similar planning 
groups in Western Europe. The Allies, primarily Britain and the U.S., confronted the Axis 
projection of a rival “Grand Area” by forming a “special relationship” that constituted a core to 
which other western states would adjust. Capital-intensive American firms with real or hoped for 
stakes in Western European markets such as Standard Oil, GM, GE, ITT, Pan American Airlines, 
Westinghouse, General Mills, Bristol-Myers, Hilton Hotels, and Chase National Bank, acted 
through CFR and CED to establish the preconditions for a rapid influx of loans and foreign 
direct investment into Western Europe without competing with private capital. These investors, 
who had already established foreign trade and foreign direct investment, and were therefore less 
concerned about conditioning U.S. and multilateral loan guarantees on lowered tariff barriers 
than national firms with only domestic production, formed a bloc dedicated to expanding trade 
and investment in Western Europe.359
Caroll Quigley has documented in detail the parallel and often interlocked projects of 
British and American internationalist think tanks.360 Van der Pijl (1998) argues similarly that 
aspiring bourgeoisie in countries like France and Germany integrated into the hegemonic Anglo-
American capitalist core through informal elastic networks fostered private planning groups like 
the Rhodes-Milner group and CFR in a process of transnational class formation.361 Quigley states 
that 
Milner shifted the emphasis from family connection to ideological conflict. The 
former had become less useful with the rise of a class society based on economic 
conflicts and with the extension of democracy…. Milner had an idea…that…had two 
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 parts: that the extension and integration of the Empire and the development of social 
welfare was essential to the continued existence of the British way of life.362  
This analysis lends evidence to my claim that the ideological consciousness of the field is not 
“new” or specific to the 1970s conservative organizations, but stitched into very fabric of think 
tank history.  
5.1.2. Foreign Affairs: The ideology of “expertise” and “bipartisanship”  
The main CFR goal was to develop and advocate a foreign policy consensus by 
disseminating information and analysis to a select audience of influential people in media, 
business and finance, politics, and academic fields. To achieve that goal it published handbooks, 
monographs and a quarterly foreign policy journal called Foreign Affairs, initiated numerous 
discussion and study groups, and public relations organizations.  
Like most think tanks, CFR maintains its nonpartisan status by remaining silent on 
current US policies. It claims in all of its communications that it “takes no stand, expressed or 
implied, on American foreign policy.” This practice does not preclude significant efforts to 
influence elite and public perceptions and opinions. CFR attempts to broaden consensus beyond 
the group itself to the “interested public”—which included the foreign policy establishment, 
national opinion leaders, and internationalists and their affiliated organizations—primarily 
through the journal Foreign Affairs.  
The idea to publish a quarterly journal came from that stalwart of the think tank network, 
Edwin F. Gay. New York Evening Post Europe correspondent Hamilton Fish Armstrong was the 
first editor.363 Foreign Affairs printed its first issue in 1922. The editors wrote the magazine does 
not  
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 …represent any consensus of belief…but we hold that…Foreign Affairs can do more to guide 
American opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with 
one school.364
 
The lead article by Elihu Root, “A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy,” elucidated 
the paradigm idea of nonpartisan “expertise” that would become a standard rhetorical appeal in 
all CFR practice. Root argued that WW I had inaugurated an internationalist era in which U.S. 
citizens needed to be educated about their new position and responsibilities: “The control of 
foreign relations by democracies creates a new and pressing demand for popular education in 
international affairs.”365 As part of their “ordinary education”, citizens should have access to 
“correct information” about  
their own rights,… the duties to respect the rights of others,….what has happened and 
is happening in international affairs, and… the effects upon national life of the things 
that are done or refused as between nations; so that the people themselves will have 
the means to test misinformation and appeals to prejudice and passion based on 
error.366
The first issue also established its long-standing advocacy of “bipartisanship” in foreign policy 
as a method for securing elite and popular support for international engagement. CFR Democrats 
saw Wilson’s decision to include Elihu Root as the only Republican in the delegation to the 
Peace Conference as a significant factor in the failure to win Congressional approval for the 
League of Nations, and corrected this mistake by inviting eminent Republicans like Henry L. 
Stimson for membership. 
Foreign Affairs thus fused the idea of “expert” policy research with “bipartisan” foreign 
policy. Expertise would transcend short term commercial and nation state interests, as well as 
partisan differences between Democrats and Republicans. However the avoidance of “error” 
through bipartisan, reasoned, pragmatic analysis guided by elite experts was not unbiased or 
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 otherwise non-ideological. It is true that over its 75 years, the quarterly has contained a 
significant diversity of authorship, but the journal set boundaries circumscribing “unprejudiced,” 
“dispassionate,” “rational” thought, by limiting the variety of ideas to an acceptable range of 
basic tenets:  
The U.S., as the most powerful nation, should become more active internationally 
The U.S. should increase trade with all nations 
The U.S. should secure access to raw material and markets worldwide 
 
Since these fundamental premises were beyond debate, they constitute an ideology. Indeed 
CFR’s main concern is commanding heights of the world economy by thinking of ways to 
integrate Western capitalist states and to eliminate rival dominant world power blocs like 
Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, the Soviets, or challenges from blocs of developing countries. 
In the same way that NCF provided the venue for a labor-capital détente around the turn of the 
century, and AALL did the same for social security legislation, CFR developed a blueprint for a 
postwar regime. CFR primarily functioned as an “ideological apparatus” where ideas on global 
change could be theorized and disseminated.  
The suggestion that CFR contains an ideology goes against the grain of contemporary 
interpretations of think tanks as only recently ideological. One of my basic points, however, is to 
show that, insofar as ideological positions are discernable throughout the history of think tanks, 
the more ideologically explicit rhetoric of the recent wave of think tanks is “merely rhetorical.” 
CFR ideology is in fact defined through a rhetoric of disinterestedness.  
Foreign Affairs accumulated a large and influential readership over the years, with some 
17,000 subscribers by 1945. Its reputation for expertise and reasoned argument was and is highly 
regarded by multiple elite sectors and “interested” elements in the population. The rhetorical 
impact of this status is to convince senators and representatives that “experts” are convinced of 
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 the soundness of CFR analysis.  The high minded ideals that suffused its pages however were 
based on a notion of public opinion management found in other, less “rational” CFR propaganda 
activities.  
5.1.3. Managing public consent 
CFR and similar groups367 restricted their notion of relevant opinion to a paternalist 
group of elites with the responsibility to educate and sway the population. They believed that it 
was more important to educate this limited audience of elites in business and finance, prestigious 
academics, and enlightened officials, than it was to rely on the mood of the public in determining 
foreign policy. This was consistent with Walter Lippmann’s concept of public opinion as a 
manageable social fact.368 Only such high-minded elites working for the peoples’ own good, and 
the good of the world could ascertain the “true” general interest. 
To participate in public opinion management techniques in a way that did not threaten its 
reputation as an organization of disinterested experts, CFR introduced a division of labor in the 
policy network, essentially “farming out” advocacy functions by serving as a recruiting base and 
organizational framework for nominally independent organizations.  
One innovation in the realm of public opinion management was the creation over four 
years of 12 regional branches starting in 1938. These “Committees on Foreign Relations” offered 
business, academic, and other “men who occupy positions of leadership in their communities”369 
to both spread internationalist ideas amongst reluctant regions (especially the Midwest), serve as 
“listening posts” to gauge opinion among people “interested” in foreign affairs, and convince 
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 Congress members that CFR positions had a “grassroots” constituency.370 Comprised ostensibly 
of “ad hoc” collections of interested citizens, they were actually created under State Department 
and CFR auspices. As a putatively independent organization urging the need for particular 
policies and pressing the Congress and public to adopt those policies, the committees allowed 
CFR to follow their mandate to remain neutral on U.S. policies. 
Another institutional innovation were outfits established and run by prominent CFR 
members such as Clark Eichelberger in 1939 to gin up Congressional and popular support for the 
forceful projection of American power. The Non-Partisan Committee (NPC), the Fight for 
Freedom group (FFF), and the Committee to Defend America (CDA) were sold as spontaneous 
“citizens groups” intended to sound out public opinion and influence government, but were 
carefully planned outfits that interlocked tightly with CFR and the Roosevelt administration.  
NPC started with 260 prominent citizens who worked through leaflets, telegrams to newspaper 
and magazine editors, radio broadcasts, and other media outlets “for the special purpose of 
educating and mobilizing public opinion throughout the country.”371 Reaching its goal of 
repealing the arms embargo section of the Neutrality Law in October 1939, NPC disbanded.   
The same group established and ran CDA in a similar pattern, inviting notable citizens 
like Harvard president James Conant to conduct press conferences, provide interviews, and speak 
on nationwide radio on the dangers of Nazi victory and importance of assisting Britain. 
Playwright and former pacifist Robert Sherwood, who would later be Roosevelt’s speech writer, 
created the famous “Stop Hitler Now” advertisement for publication in eighteen newspapers 
circulating over seven million copies on 10 June 1940. The ad secured additional donations for 
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 CDA, and a ringing endorsement from President Roosevelt, who displayed it on his desk at a 
June 11 press meeting. FDR said it was “a good thing that Bill White was able to get such 
messages across for the education of the American people.”372  
From 1939 to 1941, the groups gradually became more interventionist, some urging 
belligerence. Their message became redundant on 7 December 1941. Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbor aroused the public more than PR efforts ever could. Still, it is probably safe to say groups 
interlocking with CFR and the administration laid the groundwork for American entry into the 
war. The U.S., as Thomas Lamont wrote to Eichelberger,  
…went to war because war was made upon her and because she came to the belated 
realization that Germany intended to conquer all Europe and Japan all Asia, and 
between them to squeeze the Americas into their own economic pattern. It was just as 
simple as that. That is what we are fighting for today.373
 
NPC and CDA also served as models and recruiting grounds for subsequent CFR operations, 
including its War and Peace Studies (WPS) groups and the Committee for the Marshall Plan 
(CMP, see Selling the Marshall Plan below). Six CMP members worked in WPS, two in the 
CED, four on the President’s Committee on Foreign aid (directed by Averell Harriman), thirteen 
belonged to the NPA, four were CEIP trustees, and three were Twentieth Century Fund 
members.374
The presence and participation of a large number of CFR and other tank members in 
these propaganda organizations indicates the policy network introduced a division of labor into 
their activities, rather than functioning truly separately from them. As Wala notes,  
Membership, internal structure, and financial and organizational planning of the 
above-mentioned setups displayed such remarkable parallels that one must refer to a 
unified undertaking. Although the Council did not directly support these groups, 
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 proponents such as Clark Eichelberger, Henry Stimson, Robert Patterson, and Dean 
Acheson could at least count on the support of most Council members and rely on a 
pool of notables—in the form of the Council membership—as likely activists and 
donors. 
The propaganda practices of the think tank field was extensive in the buildup to war and, as we 
will see below, in the selling of the postwar reconstruction plan. Nevertheless, these activities 
represent a more indirect form of influence than the direct participation in policy planning and 
design CFR enjoyed during the war years through its War and Peace Studies Project (WPS). 
5.2. CFR War and Peace Studies Project 
Before America’s entry into WW II, when the outcome was less than clear and 
communism was not a primary concern, CFR helped frame the basic assumptions of U.S. foreign 
policy around the extension of U.S. capitalism and military power. Through its War and Peace 
Studies Project (1939-1945), it worked closely with the White House and State Department to 
develop ideas for a time when the war ended and European powers would negotiate a peace.375  
Two conditions fostering a CFR role in the extension of US power were state demand 
and preexisting policy networks. The State Department did not possess the funds and personnel 
to investigate the war’s impact on US interests. A world war is obviously an international crisis, 
so it is not surprising that “an administration well aware of its own limitations in long-term 
planning”376 would be responsive to offers for administrative help. CFR already had close ties 
with Secretary of State Cordell Hull (CFR president Normal Davis was his good friend), 
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 Undersecretary Welles, and Leo Pasvolsky, and maintained the long term relationship with FDR 
mentioned above.377  
Besides being a repository of ideas, CFR was a recruiting pool for high-level positions in 
government. John J. McCloy, CFR director, Wall Street lawyer, former chair of Chase 
Manhattan, Ford Foundation trustee, and assistant secretary to Secretary of War Stimson noted, 
the Department of War tapped CFR “whenever… [it]…needed a man”.378 The quote smacks of 
rhetorical excess, but recruitment of Council members by the executive branch of the U.S. 
government at this time is striking. Wala cites a 1945 Council publication in Jacob Viner’s 
papers to establish that 
More than two hundred of its members served in the State Department, OSS [Office 
of Strategic Studies, predecessor to the CIA], Office of War Information, United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, War Production Board, Office of 
Emergency Management, and similar organizations during the war.  
 
Further, Rockefeller foundation head Willits later commented, 
The important thing in this is the series of steps from the initial growth of young men 
through research to the committee discussing research and political problems (in 
CFR) on through the policy committees of the State Dept. to active officials in 
government.379
In this case, the lack of state research capacities does not seem to have produced a lack of state 
autonomy, since the state was fully able to commission the research it needed.  
The existence of a ready-made policy network made state capacity building more 
effective. The idea for direct CFR collaboration with the State Department hatched shortly after 
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 Hitler invaded Poland in August 1939, at a meeting between Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton 
Fish Armstrong, his successor as CFR executive director Walter H. Mallory, and geographer and 
Johns Hopkins University president Isaiah Bowman. They agreed on the need to prepare early 
for any possibility.  
 CFR viewed Hitler’s rise to power with great dismay, and the 1938 Munich Agreement 
incorporating the Sudeten part of Czechoslovakia into Germany as an affront to the principles of 
international law and national self-determination.380 When Foreign Affairs editor Armstrong 
went to Europe in 1933 to assess the situation, he met fellow CFR member and American consul 
general in Germany George S. Messersmith, who, according to Armstrong, 
…could hardly restrain himself when he talked about the nazis, biting his cigar in two 
pieces and tossing them away in disgust as he catalogued his difficulties in trying to 
protect American citizens from molestation.381
In addition to these motives, members did not believe the U.S. could be self-sufficient without 
the markets and raw materials from overseas, and therefore had to enter the war and organize a 
global postwar order.382 CFR thus inventoried America’s interest in a “grand area” of influence, 
or as Shoup and Minter put it, 
the political military, territorial and economic requirements of the United States in its 
potential leadership of the non-German world area including the United Kingdom 
itself as well as the Western Hemisphere and Far East.383
On 10 September 1939, Armstrong called Assistant Secretary of State and longtime CFR 
member George Messersmith to tell him of the idea to set up study groups to provide the 
administration (especially the State Department) with medium- and long-term foreign policy 
concepts and background information. Two days later, Mallory and Armstrong met with 
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 Messersmith at his house to offer Council study groups as expert assistants. They agreed that 
officials in the State Department mired in daily responsibilities could not envision a strategic 
approach to U.S. foreign policy.384 With the blessing of Secretary of State Hull and $44,500 from 
the Rockefeller Foundation, the project officially known as “Studies of American Interests in the 
War and the Peace” was born on December 6.385  
A December 1939 Council Memorandum indicates the purpose of WPS groups was to 
…engage in a continuous study of the courses of the war, to ascertain how the 
hostilities affect the United States and to elaborate concrete proposals designed to 
safeguard American interests in the settlement which will be undertaken when 
hostilities cease.386
The project’s five groups, totaling around 100 elites representing functional sectors, were 
Economic, Financial, Security and Armaments, Territorial, and Future World Organization. The 
first two soon collapsed into an Economic and Financial Group, the Future World Organization 
became the Political Group, and a Peace Aims Group started in 1941. Each group met every 
week in New York to explore the basis for the postwar international order, and sent a research 
secretary to Washington to report to the administration and return with further instructions.387 
Collectively they submitted 682 nonpublic papers to State and the President, and held 362 
private meetings between 1940 and 1945 that explored “the political, military, territorial and 
economic requirements of the United States in its potential leadership of the non-German world 
area including the United Kingdom itself as well as the western Hemisphere and Far East.”388  
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 WPS represented the culmination of a long-term investment in an internationalist project, 
including both ideological supports and institutional affiliations with policymakers. The study 
groups invented precious few new concepts, tending to recycle and revamp the ready-made ideas 
percolating at CFR for two decades, but institutional innovations in consultation and consensus-
building procedures let CFR capitalize on America’s new position in the global economy. By 
structuring a preexisting project into a consensus national interest in the exercise of American 
power across all areas and issues in global affairs and foreign policy, CFR assured America 
stood astride the world like a “colossus,” and had the responsibility to encompass the entire 
world and the wide scope of political and economic issues.  
5.2.1. Case 17: WPS and the Bretton Woods system 
In concert with British counterparts, WPS conceived the two global financial institutions 
established at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire—the World Bank to aid 
postwar reconstruction and development, and International Monetary Fund to “stabilize 
currencies” and international exchange rates. The WPS Economic and Financial Group 
concentrated on world trade. Six months into the war, before U.S. entry, the Economic and 
Financial Group contributed the first memorandum to the State Department, “The Impact of War 
Upon Foreign Trade of the United States,” whose discussions included the necessity of economic 
reconstruction after the war.389 Subsequent memoranda from the group’s reporters Alvin Hansen 
and Jacob Viner outlined a blueprint should Germany overrun Great Britain or, more likely, if 
the Allies won the war in Europe. Both plans rested on unrestricted U.S. access to British and 
French colonies, and German holdings. The Armaments Group looked to long term foreign 
policy issues such as the policing responsibilities of Allied troops should they come to occupy 
Germany.  
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 The group drafted a document during the war that distinguished three types of firms 
according to their potential support of aggressively expanding foreign investment opportunities 
through bilateral and multilateral lending. Capital-intensive firms characterized by foreign direct 
investment would be supportive and willing to tolerate tariff barriers if European bilateral trade 
agreements were broken down. Export-dependent U.S. firms with few foreign direct investments 
would be more concerned about dramatic trade barrier reductions. Business nationalists would be 
opposed to foreign lending programs due to the firms’ relative dependence on the U.S. market 
and in some cases, less developed markets in Latin America and Asia.390  
The group presented the idea for the two institutions in a series of memos to the President 
and State Department from 1941-42, and actively promoted after the Bretton Woods conference 
in Foreign Affairs. CFR and CED both worked closely with the State Department to draft the 
rudiments of the system.391 The group advocated a corporatist arrangement between capital-
intensive firms, high-level policymakers, and labor unions in the U.S. and Europe. Conscious 
that the third group of firms would be set on protecting their access to the U.S. market and would 
oppose foreign aid packages for competing businesses in Western Europe, CFR and CED framed 
aid packages as explicitly anticommunist. (The use of national security rhetoric to secure support 
for the other key postwar institutions—the Marshall Plan, NATO, and UN—is detailed below). 
The key intellectual basis of the new global political economy was a synthesis of open 
international trade expansion and national corporatist commitments to full employment and 
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 stability. This synthesis, termed by John Ruggie “embedded liberalism,392 is the international 
version of domestic corporate liberalism. The postwar regime reserved for nation states a 
significant degree of autonomy in the regulation of domestic labor and industries. As Ikenberry 
shows in relation to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), a key rhetorical 
strategy in the debate was to shift discussions from the contentious issue of trade, to monetary 
issues, on which there was an emergent consensus within Keynesian economics.393 A Keynesian-
inspired international economics thus held together an Anglo-American coalition on a postwar 
settlement.  
Some international commercial and investment banks feared that too easily obtained IMF 
loans would be inflationary. They also objected to the lack of U.S. veto power over loans and the 
broad terms of lending.394 CED acted to quell those fears by laying out a plan to reduce the IMF 
mandate to short-term loans targeted at specific balance-of-payments deficits.  
Its March 1946 founding gave the IMF the power to condition its loans on the adjustment 
of recipient countries’ economic policies to pay the loans back. Keynes opposed conditionality in 
drawing rights on the Fund because it could prevent a national government from pursuing 
expansionary measures for full employment. The unusual circumstances of the Cold War and 
European Recovery, however, delayed the Fund’s operation along these neoliberal lines for three 
decades. Opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to transition to a fully liberalized international 
trade regime did not occur until the Keynesian crisis of the 1970s. “Structural adjustment 
policies” began only in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s (see ch.4). The original IMF thus 
represents a kernel of neoliberalism within the shell of corporate liberalism. 
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 5.3. Victory and Cold War opportunities for think tanks 
The U.S. emerged from war more dominant than ever in the global system. America’s new 
global position propelled CFR to its status as the most influential bridge between internationalist 
elites and the federal government. The enhanced legitimacy and funding of social and scientific 
policy research, bolstered by a society with “the political will and capability to assert dominance 
in world affairs,”395 allowed elites to think in broad terms of structuring the international 
system—including the domestic policies of other countries. CFR activities would be undertaken, 
in the words of its executive director Walter Mallory, in the name of  
…just and lasting peace….The mere enumeration of the crucial questions which must 
be answered by the United States in the next few years makes it evident that those 
with special knowledge and experience should continue to help in any way they can 
to get private expert judgment built into political policy. The Council in peace and in 
war must provide facilities for stimulating such work and for making it available to 
those who formulate our national program of foreign relations.”396
Rockefeller disbursements for WPS ended with the war, prompting members to meet in 
Princeton, New Jersey in the fall of 1945 to discuss its reorientation. The beginning of the Cold 
War relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union was of overarching significance, especially 
in relation to Germany. As the Cold War took shape, and it became clear that the Soviet Union 
was not amenable to liberal overtures, CFR members influence by the liberal approach to the 
Soviet Union during the FDR years receded in significance, as both CFR and the Truman 
administration shifted towards a Cold War stance.  
The central question was how a U.S.-led system for increased world trade could 
assimilate the USSR into international politics. Some CFR members wanted to pull back the 
“iron curtain” of economic, intellectual, and social restrictions imposed by the USSR, without 
provoking it.  
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 Given its role in the war years, it is surprising that CFR did not quickly capitalize on the 
opportunity to help determine American-Soviet relations. Internal conflict in the Study Group on 
American-Russian Relations produced confused results on the ways to reach and preserve peace. 
Was the USSR possessed of considerable goodwill towards other nations that, despite the 
significant difference in social and economic organization, could become the basis of a “modus 
vivendi”? Or was this a naïve hope divorced from the real intentions of the Soviets which may 
include military aggression, and for which the U.S. must prepare? The Council was ambivalent, 
alternatively theorizing USSR progress towards liberal democracy, and recalcitrance towards 
integration with the West. A consensus that could be submitted to policymakers was not reached, 
and the group’s final report reflected the deep (though civil) disagreements within.397  
A consensus would eventually be articulated in one of the most famous Foreign Affairs 
article ever, George Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” provided a national security 
justification for the Marshall Plan and the lynchpin for American Cold War strategy (The lead 
essay in the same Foreign Affairs issue had Hamilton Fish Armstrong urging aid to Europe). The 
article, published anonymously under the byline of “Mr. X,” in July 1947, was based on 
Kennan’s famous 1946 “long telegram” and a January 1947 speech to the Soviet-U.S. group at 
CFR.  
Kennan was a member of the American embassy in Moscow. Following Stalin’s 
confrontational Radio Moscow speech on 9 February 1946, in which he declared the USSR 
under encirclement by hostile and heavily armed capitalist enemies, the State Department asked 
Kennan to analyze Soviet politics. His 22 February 1946 “long telegram” warned of the threat 
posed by the USSR: 
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 In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that 
with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and 
necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of 
life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is 
to be secure398
Washington elites understood the telegram to signal that a trend away from the accommodation 
of the Roosevelt years was afoot. Followed several days later by Churchill’s famous “Iron 
Curtain” speech at Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946, it served to legitimize and accelerate a 
firmer stance towards the Soviet Union.  
This firmer stance also showed in Kennan’s 7 January 1947 speech to the CFR Soviet-
U.S. study group, “The Soviet Way of Thought and Its Effects on Foreign Policy,” where he 
outlined “(1) ‘ideology,’ (2) Russian traditions and national habits of thought, and (3) internal 
circumstances of Soviet power” as the main factors underlying the fanatical attitudes in the 
USSR. Marxist-Leninism provided the linguistic framework for political action, and domestic 
politics conditioned the tendency to identify encroaching enemies everywhere in order to 
maintain regime credibility, but traditional habits of thought were the most important and 
underestimated factors in Soviet foreign policy. His analysis held that irrational psychological 
causes underlay much Soviet behavior, and the U.S. should seek to “contain” rather than engage 
communism. Despite his depiction of a fanatic and neurotic regime, Kennan posited that  
Other Russian traits of character [make]…it perfectly possible for the U.S. and other 
countries to contain Russian power, if it [is]…done courteously and in a non-
provocative way, long enough so that there might come about internal changes in 
Russia399   
The lecture led Armstrong to solicit Kennan for an article contribution to the CFR quarterly, and 
to the publication of one of the most important documents in the Cold War, “Sources of Soviet 
Conduct,” in the July 1947 Foreign Affairs. Published under the pseudonym “X” to conceal 
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 Kennan’s government position, its authorship quickly became an open secret, and it stood as 
more or less an official statement.400  
The article generated considerable discussion and enthusiasm, especially in those who 
already doubted the goodwill of the Soviet Union. The widely popular Life and Reader’s Digest 
magazines reproduced long excerpts, and Walter Lippmann’s negative response in a number of 
his “Today and Tomorrow” columns in the New York Herald Tribune also provided free 
publicity for the article.401    
In an immediate context of Truman’s vague commitment to lend military aid to “free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure,”402 and 
a similarly ambivalent plan for European reconstruction that did not explicitly exclude the Soviet 
Union, the article was interpreted as the first clear articulation of a policy toward the USSR, and 
basis of the American strategy of a limited “cold” war. The point is not that the article itself 
made policy and that therefore the Council directed American foreign policy. After all the 
Truman administration had been moving towards Kennan’s approach all along. Its real 
importance was to broadcast and legitimize the ideas for a larger public.  
When Dean Acheson’s successor as under secretary of state, Robert Lovett, asked Walter 
Mallory to assemble CFR members to outline potential foreign policy strategies, the scope of US 
political interests were defined globally. US objectives were primarily to prevent the extension of 
Soviet influence through Europe. This put Germany as a top priority, and required expanded 
military responsibilities for America, including the defense of Greece, Turkey and the rest of 
Europe, the occupation of Germany and Japan, the strategic positioning of US military bases to 
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 ensure access to the USSR, the continued influence of Britain and America in the oil rich Near 
Eastern sphere, and the supply of United Nations forces. Lovett recounted later that he “came 
away from this session with the firm conviction that it would be our principle task at State to 
awaken the nation to the dangers of Communist aggression.”403
5.3.1. Case 18: CED, CFR and the Marshall Plan 
CFR and CED hatched the actual massive package of U.S. economic assistance to Western 
Europe known as the Marshall Plan, or economic recovery program (ERP). CFR first conceived 
the political and economic reconstruction of Europe while Allied troops were still engaged in 
fighting. As part of its reorganization for the postwar period, CFR created a “Western European 
Affairs” study group chaired by former OSS chief in Germany, Allen W. Dulles, to continue the 
work of the “Economic and Political Reconstruction” group. At close to one hundred members, 
the “Western European Affairs” regional study group was notably large by Council standards.404
Following the end of the war in May 1945, Council members were virtually unanimous in their 
analysis of the dire economic straits in Europe. The war left many industrial plants ruined. 
Domestic and international markets had totally broken down. The collapse of coalmining, severe 
weather conditions in winter and spring 1947 devastated the food supply and led to people 
freezing and starving to death. The CFR consensus that recovery required American help was 
inscribed in two Foreign Affairs articles: Allen W. Dulles’ April 1947 article, and former 
secretary of war Henry Stimson’s “The Challenge to Americans” in the fall issue, which 
cautioned that “close on the heels of victory loomed a new world crisis.”405
Complementing Dulles’ group was one led by lawyer Charles Spofford with David 
Rockefeller as secretary, the “Reconstruction of Western Europe.” The questions posed by the 
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 Council reveals the dialectic between foreign aid and U.S. interests that animated the whole 
postwar regime: “What are the causes of the slow progress…toward political stability and better 
housing conditions? What American policies can help most? How can these policies be framed 
so as to safeguard and advance the interest of the United States.”406 A revived European 
economy was considered essential to national well being.  
President Harry Truman appointed a Committee on Foreign Aid in July 1947 to lay out 
the plan. The chair was Secretary of Commerce Averill Harriman, a CFR member who had also 
chaired BAC from 1937-1939. Of the remaining 27 members, five were businessmen and 
trustees of the CED, six were CED academic advisors, six were CFR members, and one was 
Brookings Institution president Harold G. Moulton. CFR’s 1948 annual report claimed that prior 
to Marshall’s public address, the organization helped to  
Explain the needs for the Marshall Plan and indicated some of the problems it would 
present for American foreign policy. Moreover, a number of members of the…group, 
through their connections with…governmental bodies were in constant touch with the 
course of events.407  
The plan was publicly announced by Truman’s Secretary of State General George Marshall at a 
1947 Harvard commencement speech. In the speech Marshall called for all European nations to 
state their needs, and promised U.S. support conditioned on “the emergence of political and 
social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”408 Marshall’s language was general 
enough to secure the support of most national organizations. Conservative (NAM, CC) and 
corporate liberal (CED) think tanks favored the proposal.409 Only a few business magazines 
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 focused on the narrow interests of particular industries, and with serious doubts about 
government efficiency, opposed the program on the grounds that the American economy should 
take precedence. Most business leaders shared with Business Week the belief that “industry in 
this country can no longer prosper with the non-Communist world suffering post-war 
paralysis.”410 The major agricultural associations, National Grange and the American Farm 
Bureau, favored the plan. Labor organizations—the CIO and more conservative AFL—
approved, while Progressive Citizens of America and the American Labor Party, following 
Henry Wallace, warned the plan would partition Europe and risk a third world war.  
5.3.1.1. Selling the Marshall Plan 
CFR spawned a number of committees and propaganda groups that, in concert with like-minded 
columnists and politicians, were ultimately successful in passing the Economic Recovery Plan 
(ERP). Shortly after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, CFR established a “Propaganda 
and Foreign Policy” study group to consider the contest of ideas between the US and USSR. 
Renamed “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy” to avoid the perception the group was conducting 
propaganda rather than studying it, the group set out to improve the government’s public 
relations work on the Marshall Plan.  
CFR created another group in December 1947 to study the “political problems which 
must be solved concurrently with the operation of the Marshall Plan,”411 including whether non-
democratic countries should receive aid and UN protection in the event of an aggression. The 
group concluded the value of economic aid packages extended beyond the purely humanitarian 
into efforts at gaining Western influence within the Soviet sphere. This meant that the UN would 
defend attacks on even non-democratic countries, and the US would do so should the UN 
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 machinery take too long to mobilize. The final product of the group was a restatement of the 
principles initiated in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall’s Harvard speech.412   
The most explicit and passionate CFR effort to shape opinion during the early Cold War 
was the Committee for the Marshall Plan (CMP). At the urging of the State Department, CFR 
established CMP to sell the ERP to a skeptical Congress (especially the Senate Committee on 
foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which began ERP hearings in 
1948), opinion leaders (newspaper editors, journalists, columnists), and a reluctant general 
public. Assistant secretary of state for public affairs and original CED member William Benton 
recognized that isolationist tendencies in the country and the high cost of aid to Europe meant the 
Marshall Plan would require promotional efforts. But that the State Department faced certain 
barriers in making the case. It was illegal to use public money “for the purpose of influencing 
Congress.”  To avoid accusations of propagandizing, Benton said the task would “fall on 
everyone who takes an intelligent interest in foreign affairs,” preferably an independent 
organization of eminent citizens that would generate public support yet be responsive to State 
Department needs.413  
This initiative found its organizational form in the Committee for the Marshall Plan 
(CMP). CMP had a near identical structure and function as those bodies created in the drive to 
enter the war, NPC and CDA. Funded by members and supporters,414 CMP operated on 
$162,000 in contributions from 7,500 people in the five moths of its existence. The original 
executive committee, which convened at the Harvard Club in New York on 30 October 1947, 
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 was made of almost all CFR men educated at elite institutions and sharing a cosmopolitan 
outlook. CMP chapters led by prominent citizens sprouted up and down the East Coast.415  
At the first gathering Eichelberger proposed a membership of functional sectors in the 
form of a general committee made of “representatives of large occupational sections of the 
population such as farm, labor, business, etc., etc.”416 A roughly equal number of Democrats and 
Republicans participated. The general membership comprised fifty-five percent business, seven 
percent NGO, six percent labor officials, eight percent academic, nine percent media, seven 
percent lawyer, and five percent former and present government officials at all levels. Union 
participants like James B. Carey and Philip Murray of the CIO, George Meany and William 
Green of the AFL, and David Dubinsky of International Ladies Garment Workers Union 
constituted the conservative faction of organized labor, which thought the Marshall Plan 
improved labor’s bargaining power by guaranteeing high consumer demand and low 
unemployment. Their participation helped foster the image of universal Americans support for 
foreign aid.417  
CMP used multiple media outlets to spread its message. It engaged in radio 
programming, put together a Speaker’s Bureau to speak to women’s, merchant, religious and 
other public affairs organizations, and supplied and briefed witnesses for congressional hearings 
on the issue.418 The most pervasive form of CMP influence was a publication system of 
brochures, pamphlets, and leaflets to sway elite and popular audiences. Devised by its 
propaganda committee, CMP publications totaled some 1,250,000 copies in a very short period, 
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 and attracted constant media and congressional attention.419 Often taking the form of a rebuttal, 
listing and dispelling common objections to the ERP, they emphasized the political 
(anticommunist), economic and humanitarian advantages to be gained in aiding Europe.  
CMP reprinted and distributed to citizens and internationalist organizations 200,000 
copies of Stimson’s Foreign Affairs article, and managed to have large portions reprinted in a 
simply-worded, sixteen-page Washington Post insert containing numerous cartoons and charts. 
The title page displayed a large picture of Secretary of State Stimson as “This Generation’s 
Chance for Peace.” The article headings included “Our Mutual Interest Dictated Marshall Plan” 
and “15 Billion is a Small Ante for Such Stakes, Year’s Armament Can Triple That.” One 
cartoon titled “Open Door” depicted a construction fence with “Help Wanted for the 
Reconstruction of Europe” written on it; the open door of the fence was labeled “Marshall Plan,” 
and through the door heavy machinery was visible.420 The clear message was that the plan 
represented an “open door” for European (including Eastern) countries to participate in the 
international system and thus avoid the ambit of Soviet rule. Of Washington Post publisher 
Philip L. Graham, Charles W. Jackson of Truman’s executive office said, “You have done a 
swell job. In fact, I believe the November 23, supplement is the outstanding contribution to our 
educational job on the European Recovery Program.”421 Subsequent CMP publications would 
essentially repeat Stimson’s arguments in different formats, focusing on humanitarian, 
anticommunist, economic, and “peace and prosperity” benefits. Stimson’s fall 1947 Foreign 
Affairs article supplied the slogan appearing on all CMP publications: “I am confident that if the 
issues are clearly presented, the American people will give the right answer.”  
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 Alger Hiss’ CMP contribution, “What about the Marshall Plan,” was published in the 
November 16 New York Times and rebutted five arguments against the plan: 
Won’t American aid to Europe be pouring money down the rat hole? ...Isn’t Europe’s 
trouble simply that the Europeans don’t want to work? … Can we afford to give more 
billions to Europe without wrecking our economy? …Can’t we get along without 
Europe anyway? …Why should we support socialist governments?422
From the political point of view, getting along without Europe would mean the 
jettisoning of our finest and potentially strongest allies [and]… expose 270,000,000 
people and the world’s second-greatest industrial complex to absorption in the vast 
area dominated by communist ideology and by Soviet interests.423  
Another CMP leaflet, 4 Essentials of a European Recovery Program, was based on a 22 
December 1947 CMP press release, and stated bluntly that “European recovery is necessary for 
our own security and prosperity… The reward we seek from our aid program is prosperity, 
peace, and security; that is enough.”424  
All CMP publications, whether written for elite or mass audiences, garnered political 
support for the Marshall Plan with essentially the same arguments, but those written for elites 
(editors, pundits, etc.) tended to play up the anti-Soviet implications of the plan, whereas those 
targeted to the broad public downplayed it. This was a rhetorical adaptation to public opinion 
polls revealing most people had significant apathy toward foreign issues, while elites shared a 
growing consensus that the communist threat to Europe and the globe should be a primary focus 
of American policy.  
Less than half of Americans were aware of the Marshall plan even a month after its 
announcement.425 CMP therefore emphasized the humanitarian and economic benefits to general 
readerships. This, and the colloquial language employed by CMP in its direct appeals to the 
average person, is well illustrated by its publication The Marshall Plan is Up to You. Branded an 
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 “over-the-fence-chat,” the booklet claims to “explode” certain “myths” about ERP. After 
describing the ERP and quoting Henry Stimson and Harry Truman, the authors state “we cannot 
long maintain our high standards of living and national security with Europe reduced to an 
economic void.” Further, the ERP “is not going to make suckers out of us…. It’s not going to 
produce disastrous inflation in this country…. It is not American imperialism…. It is not aimed 
against Russia.” Readers are also encouraged to “talk” among peers and get involved in local 
CMP subcommittees, for  
like atomic energy, conversation has a chain reaction…. Prominent people can open 
doors; they can also smother a program by procrastination and domineering…. Use 
glamour if you can get it; don’t let it use you…. If we all do it, we can make 
tomorrow’s history full of hope, freedom and happiness. If we don’t, chances are 
there won’t be any history for anyone.426
CMP efforts towards the public were not highly successful. No more than 45 percent of the 
American population ever lent support, but following public opinion was not as crucial a 
consideration for CMP as managing it through elite organs. Like the CFR in general, CMP 
operated as if the most important audiences were those who could exert influence at local or 
national levels—so called “opinion leaders.” As State Department adviser Benjamin V. Cohen 
stated of the work at CMP, “Our foreign policy should represent not the polling of an 
uninformed public opinion, but the best thought that an informed public opinion will accept.”427  
With these views predominant, elite opinion polls, especially those gauging the foreign policy 
establishment of internationalist groups and individuals, carried more weight. CFR members saw 
the plan as an opportunity to catalyze an emergent internationalism that foregrounded American 
power in world affairs. In the context of a new Cold War, the plan was viewed as “political 
economy in the literal sense of the term,” as George F. Kennan had defined American aid to 
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 Europe in a letter to Acheson on 23 May 1947.428 Should economic collapse befall Europe, 
communist parties tied to Moscow would eventually take root in France and Italy, after which a 
“domino effect” would make it difficult for other Western European nations to resist similar 
fates.  
Surveys conducted by the Council through its Committees on Foreign Relations showing 
that elite audiences more aware of Marshall’s plan were more likely to support it if they could be 
convinced it helped contain communism.429 The committee polls showed 95 percent support for 
a long-term aid program as a bulwark against communism.430  The perspective is well summed 
by Allen W. Dulles, who wrote that the plan “is based on our view of the requirements of 
American security…this is the only peaceful course now open to us which may answer the 
communist challenge to our way of life and our national security.”431 At a speech to Brown 
University on 16 June 1947 Dulles said 
It is by restoring the economic life of a country, and by this alone, that we can meet 
the threat of dictatorship from a Fascist Right or a Communist Left…. [Aiding] those 
countries with free institutions… [helps the] common cause of democracy and 
peace…. We would thus confront Communism, not with arms or atomic bombs, but 
with a restored economic life for the men and women of Western Europe.432
The anti-Soviet justification for the Marshall Plan was apparently employed in large part because 
it worked on the targeted audience of policy elites. CFR member and World Bank president John 
McCloy later recalled, “People sat up and listened when the Soviet threat was mentioned.” The 
explicit anticommunism in Truman’s March 1947 speech asserting a doctrine of American 
support for democracies against aggression targeted Republican majorities in both Congressional 
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 houses.433 World Bank executive director Pierre Mendes-France observed that Communist 
electoral victories in France were rendering “a great service. Because we have a ‘Communist 
danger,’ the Americans are making a tremendous effort to help us. We must keep up this 
indispensable Communist scare.”434 Adding to fears that Europe might slip into the Soviet sphere 
was a CIA warning since September 1945 that communist party influence throughout Europe 
was growing.435 CMP therefore emphasized the Soviet containment aspect to knowledgeable 
readers, such as congressional delegates who visited Europe to observe the dire conditions 
firsthand in September and October 1947.  
5.3.2. Case 19: The United Nations 
The founding of the United Nations may be the clearest case of direct CFR influence in its long 
struggle to fulfill an internationalist ideology. The architecture of postwar interstate relations 
grew from Anglo-American consultations. Churchill and Roosevelt prepared a vague outline in 
the form of the Atlantic Charter at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, but left it to CFR and 
a new State Department planning agency to fill in the details. In September 1940 the CFR 
Political Group, headed by Whitney Shepardson, pushed for a “decisive defeat of the Axis 
aggressors as rapidly as possible [and an]…effective system of international security.”436 Such a 
system would entail  
The development of world order designed to promote economic progress, social 
justice and cultural freedom for all national groups, races and classes willing to accept 
their proper responsibilities as members of the world community.437  
The CFR group complemented new planning functions developed in the State Department after 
the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Headed by Secretary of State Hull, the 1941 
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 Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy invited WPS rapporteurs to participate in the 
discussions, which concentrated on CFR’s long struggle to create a successor to the League of 
Nations.438 In a manner reminiscent of the sphere of influence system under British imperialism, 
members of the Advisory Committee’s Subcommittee on International Organization evaluated 
the military and economic status of nations to determine their role in the body. They all agreed 
the unchallenged U.S. position in the world meant it should exercise more power in the body. 
They also resolved conflict over whether states should be automatically admitted to the UN in 
favor of Bowman’s suggestion that only “qualified states and dominions” be considered.439  
All CFR study groups focused on the United Nations after 1942. The postwar planning 
was a “second chance” that could not be missed.440 A small group of CFR members convened in 
January 1943 by Hull drafted the original blueprint for the United Nations. Dubbed the Informal 
Agenda Group, Leo Pasvolsky, Isaiah Bowman, Sumner Welles, Norman Davis and Myron 
Taylor submitted the plan to FDR on June 15, 1944, after consulting with CFR-affiliated 
attorneys on its constitutionality. The President publicly announced his approval that same day. 
WPS members filled the U.S. delegation to both the preparatory conference at Dumbarton Oaks 
and the 1945 UN founding conference in San Francisco, including the Secretary-General of the 
conference and secret Soviet agent Alger Hiss.441
5.3.3. Case 20: NATO 
The tight link between the Marshall Plan and the NATO alliance was embodied in a 
study group that CFR established to monitor the administration of the Marshall Plan through the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). Chaired by Dwight D. Eisenhower and funded 
with $55,000 by the Rockefeller Foundation, the “Aid to Europe” study group evaluated the day-
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 to-day concerns of the ECA, including economic and military factors contributing to European 
economic independence. Eisenhower, however, steered the group away from economic concerns 
toward political and military matters, in part due to his trouble understanding technical economic 
issues, in part because the Soviet blockade of Berlin beginning 19 June 1948 shifted attention to 
security issues. Eisenhower felt the Marshall Plan and NATO were both needed for “democracy 
in the enterprise system,” and even outlined a domino theory of Western Europe: 
If Western Europe goes, Africa is in danger, then South America. Much of Asia is 
already lost or in jeopardy…[Economic recovery of Western Europe would] 
strengthen the war potential of these countries against an overt military attack, and 
simultaneously…keep their economies strong enough so that they may not be 
susceptible to communist infiltration from within.   
The Council consensus was to counter Soviet communism through the Marshall Plan and 
NATO: one would prevent communism from within (especially in France and Italy where 
communist electoral strengths were greatest), and the other from without.442 The group’s 
memorandum to the President was practically a call for a general mobilization. This perspective 
gradually displaced the more accommodating attitudes within CFR, and the American 
government as a whole. The old CFR internationalist ideals, dating to the wake of WW I, which 
held that mediated discussion could secure peace and prosperity, was transformed in accordance 
with the new global position of the US after WW II. The idea that a “second chance” for the 
original Council ideas might be had with the defeat of naked inhumane aggression seemed to slip 
away, as American troops were soon engaged abroad, and a Cold War with potentially 
catastrophic Armageddon as its final act was set in motion.  
The key test for the study group was the North Korean incursion into South Korea 
beginning 11 December 1950. Eisenhower, Averell Harriman (then special presidential assistant) 
and other CFR members drafted a letter alarming Truman of the “critical danger” faced by the 
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 U.S. and other free countries: “if our potential enemies choose to attack us in our present posture 
we face disastrous consequences… [and]… run the risk of global war.” It was argued the 
situation necessitated the buildup of “powerful military forces” limited only  
…by the productive capacity of a free economy….Do all things that will produce the 
strength necessary to carry us through the tensions of an indefinite future, without war 
if possible, but prepared to wage it effectively if it thrust upon us.443
The argument forged a consensus between internationalist supporters of BWS and nationalist 
opposition to the system by both increasing economic aid to Europe and extending U.S. military 
objectives into Asia. On the question of whether rearming Europe would hamper its economic 
rehabilitation, Eisenhower was confident Europe could safely rearm, and that this was essential 
to deter Soviet aggression.  
5.4. The stability of the corporate liberal regime 
5.4.1. Case 21: RAND and Urban Institute 
The increase in the federal government’s need for applied social science created 
opportunities for a new type of research organization financed mainly with government 
contracts.444 Two think tanks represent the institutionalization of military and Keynesian 
paradigm ideas characteristic of the corporate liberal regime.  
The Research and Development (RAND) Corporation (1948) grew out of the Douglas 
Aircraft Company’s work on radar, the proximity fuse, and the atomic bomb during the war.445 
Its role in shaping Cold War America includes developing new basing ideas for the Strategic Air 
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 Command, and supporting the notion of a winnable nuclear war and a tremendous buildup of 
nuclear bombs and delivery systems.446  
The social equivalent of RAND was the Urban Institute. Financed in 1968 by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
Office of Economic Opportunity, Ford Foundation, and Department of Labor, Urban was to 
provide government agencies with data and recommendations concerning the rising problems in 
American cities, its research in housing, policing, welfare, transportation, and municipal fiscal 
policy.447 Urban represents efforts in the U.S. and European states to link social science to 
coalitions seeking to implement broad reforms and social planning. The Great Society programs 
drew on “problem-oriented” social science by the Brookings Institution and Urban Institute to 
bolster policy implementation and evaluation in new urban, regional, educational, energy, and 
environmental fields. 
5.4.2. Regime stability 
In the decades after World War II, think tanks applied Keynesian lessons drawn from the 
Great Depression and two World Wars, premised on the idea that industrial cooperation and 
labor compromise could coordinate productivity, profits, and wages while reducing poverty and 
unemployment. They participated in the liberalizing of the international system and the 
empowering business and labor in powerful nation states some capacity to limit the growing 
power of internationally mobile capital by compromising with one another to contain struggles 
for economic redistribution within nationally advantageous channels.  
The legitimacy of the postwar paradigm was due in large part to the relatively durable 
prosperity it appeared to produce. Across states in the U.S.-led western alliance, gross national 
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 products permitted the allocation of benefits to diverse social sectors, from the unfortunate to the 
highly successful. Led by U.S. exports and direct foreign investment in the non-Soviet sphere, a 
period of rapid economic expansion in Western capitalist countries absorbed excess American 
production, allowed war industries to continue indefinitely under a defense moniker, moderated 
the business cycle, tripled US family income (1950 -1970). 
The prosperity founded modern welfare states and reduced European interest in 
socialism. As Donald Winch (1969:349) notes, Keynesian policies were “an effective weapon for 
use against the Marxists on the one hand and the defenders of old style capitalism on the other; a 
real third alternative, the absence of which before the General Theory had driven many into the 
Communist camp.”448
Eisenhower’s inability/unwillingness to dismantle the interventionist state, and the 
defection of business leaders to the Democratic Party in the face of Barry Goldwater’s failed 
anti-New Deal welfare state campaign of 1964, provide additional evidence for regime stability. 
The “end of ideology” social thought that trusted trained technicians to run the social and 
economic system smoothly captures the depth of corporate liberalism’s hegemonic status.449
In America, the compromise solidified into political and industrial relations channels 
resting on non-collectivist welfare policies.  The more radical liberalism, embodied in the old 
NRPB, could never defeat conservatives head-on during the postwar period. In the struggle to 
define what industrial cooperation and labor compromise meant, liberal Democrats managed to 
seize upon the upbeat climate of national expansion and international U.S. hegemony to push 
reformist measures that benefited suburban, middle class, and rich classes as much or more than 
working class and poor people. Indeed, perhaps the only radical think tank to develop in this era, 
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 the Institute for Policy Studies, has never been able to approach the level of influence of its 
intellectual forebears at NRPB. Described by investigative journalist I.F. Stone as “an institute 
for the rest of us,” the relative marginalization of IPS is further evidence for the stability of the 
corporate liberal regime. Its policy successes, to the extent that one can attribute them, have 
come from its interaction with transnational social movements focused mostly on issues of trade 
and development. Its lasting influence on the TT field, however, may be the way in which it 
came to be a bete noir to conservatives, and a model for the brand avowedly ideological policy 
activism that conservatives would later perfect.  
5.4.3. Case 22: The Institute for Policy Studies 
The Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) began in 1963 when two young Kennedy 
administration staffers, Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet, disaffected with a lack of bold truth 
telling in the administration, decided to leave government set up an institute to “speak truth to 
power” in a way that they believed could only be done from outside the halls of authority. The 
IPS on-line historical archive states that the institute was formed by men who 
…had come to Washington believing that the American governing process was mostly 
responsive to public pressure and public needs…[but]…found that the government was 
chiefly responsive to institutional interests that were divorced from public need. They 
wondered whether the major institutions of American life had not become inimical to the 
life and safety of the public.450
 
IPS delved immediately into the anti-Vietnam War movement, environmental issues, civil rights, 
and education. In a tumultuous era when right wing paranoia saw enemies and KGB operatives 
everywhere trying to bring down the U.S. government, IPS’ antiwar activities led the FBI to 
wiretap its phone lines, and landed Barnet on Nixon’s famous “enemies list.”  The outspoken 
idealism of IPS impressed conservative activists. As much as they reviled the apparent influence 
of the Brookings Institution in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and sought to develop 
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 a conservative alternative, IPS represented the discursive approach—one shorn of the pretense of 
neutrality—that conservatives would emulate beginning in the 1970s. I elaborate this part of the 
history in the next chapter.  
5.5. Conclusion: Corporate liberalism as military Keynesianism  
Where the economic crisis of 1929 sent the U.S. on a Fordist/New Deal path towards 
demand-led mass production of consumer durables, Europe did not restructure until the Marshall 
Plan, which along with the European Coal and Steel Community, integrated Europe along the 
lines of the New Deal. The ECSC was the political mechanism through which industries 
producing consumer durables replaced industries producing the means of production (steel and 
coal) as the ascendant industry in Western Europe (nationalization served a similar purpose in 
England).451  
The Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods institutions were a watershed of social 
restructuring that crystallized the corporate liberal regime by reproducing the American model of 
development model in Europe, reinforcing the managerial/technocratic elements in Western 
European social democracies, and setting in motion programmatic reforms through the 1950s 
and 1960s. European societies converged on the “end of ideology” idea in the U.S., largely 
purging anti capitalist rhetoric from their political vocabulary.  Welfare state structures absorbed 
the protests of the radicalized postwar “New Left” student generation into a growing techno-
managerial stratum. By extrapolating the New Deal synthesis to Western Europe, providing an 
“escape route out of the domestic class compromise,” TTs extrapolated financial and monetary 
functions embodied in the U.S. Federal Reserve. Corporations in the U.S. and Western Europe 
could then respond to domestic pressures for social investment, while simultaneously becoming 
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 more mobile and able to operate without concern for a “sealed-off domestic context.”452 Think 
tanks helped to involve the working class in this coalition by combining a Cold War chauvinist 
nationalism with social protection measures.  
The models of the postwar domestic and international political economies are two 
innovations in a long wave of experts defining policy agendas and legitimating of policy 
outcomes. The economic re-conversion, Cold War and European reconstruction debates 
reaffirmed think tanks’ role as facilitators of new state-market configurations, and rearticulated 
the connections and sympathies developed between think tanks and the working class during the 
New Deal and wartime Grand Alliance towards an imperialist project.  
The ad hoc CMP was the most brazen effort in CFR history to press for a particular 
policy. CFR itself would not undertake such an effort again. However, the model of 
organizational innovation, marked by a clear ideological position and advocacy techniques, 
repeats earlier Progressive organizations (ch.2) and later conservative ones (ch.6). Flexible 
capacities for adjusting, mediating, and mobilizing multiple elites are therefore a constitutive 
feature of think tanks, not simply a recent development. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the think tanks that defined the postwar era 
constitute a conspiracy of global traders exercising undue influence in the government. The 
imperialist, class compromise route out of domestic class conflict that defined the synthesis 
underlying corporate liberalism did not grow from the inevitable constraints of development, or 
the dogmatic imposition of a pure capitalist logic regardless of the shifting grounds of politics. 
Since the basic CFR concepts shaped and reflected a common Weltanschauung within the 
State Department and other parts of the government, the precise influence of a group like CFR is 
difficult to pinpoint. It may be the case that CFR did not shift government officials’ views, so 
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 much as confirm their beliefs about the need to expand and exert American power globally. As 
Wala writes, 
Despite critics’ claims, the Council as an organization never advocated specific 
policies and did not devise new approaches to American foreign policy during the 
beginning of the Cold war. No indication could be found that Council members had 
pressured the administration into a foreign policy measure that ran counter to State 
Department officials’ ideas.453
Initiated by the State Department, CMP operated more as an arm of State than the independent 
and grassroots citizens’ group portrayed by its participants. The widespread elite and sufficient 
public support garnered by the operation is prima facie evidence for the autonomy of state 
institutions in directing policy outcomes. Since think tanks’ role in policymaking was enabled by 
the government itself, primarily the State Department, we can say that the lack of expertise 
within the state constitutes both a deficit and exercise of state autonomy, as government officials 
recognized the gap and choose which experts to admit into sensitive positions. It is precisely the 
state’s weakness in its own expert resources that allows it to act with such autonomy.  
However, it is equally true that CMP would not have occurred without CFR, which 
provided the necessary funds, political support, and veneer of independence to advocate for the 
State Department. Neither state autonomy nor private conspiracy theories capture accurately this 
complexity as accurately as corporatism—cooperation between different functional groups 
through elite organizations.  
Previous theories of the development of the Bretton Woods financial and trade regime 
emphasize the autonomy of states apart from business interests.454 This reflects standard “realist” 
political science accounts of state actors in search of support from private firms to promote fixed 
nationalist interests.455 In a similar vein, pluralist accounts of the Marshall Plan describe the role 
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 of civil society organizations like the Committee for the Marshall Plan as an outgrowth of 
broadly shared consensus,456 not a government initiative to legitimize the views of multiple elites 
(internationalist business, labor leaders) in the eyes of the public.  
The central weakness of these accounts is that they take the ontological primacy of the 
state at face value, and mistake the random and apparently ad hoc flow of ideas and change for 
generally dispersed power, thus underestimating the structural advantages of capital in framing 
government and popular conceptions of the general interest. Keynes may be correct that the 
“gradual encroachment of ideas” constitutes an important source of political influence, but he 
may have underestimated the “power of vested interests” to influence ideas.  
The 30-year post-World War II period bridged the age of competing imperial powers and 
the age of the global economy. Neoliberal policy ideas are “the hallmark of the transition 
between two eras. The ideas are the policy changes meant to ‘harmonize’ the world of national 
capitals and nation-states, creating a global system of internationalized capital and supranational 
institutions.”457 The epochal restructuring described in chapters 2-5 parallels  the shift to a 
postindustrial information economy, accelerated rich-poor gaps globally, centralized power in 
transnational corporations, constrained labor power, and reduced public sector spending 
described in chapters 6-8. Conservative policy networks were not dormant, but were a minority 
through 1960s national discourse, in part because the continuation of middle class prosperity and 
various forms of activism had produced a public willingness to embrace an expanding welfare 
state. The conservative movement waited until the paroxysms of the 1960s expired before 
launching a counter attack. It produced a new policy consensus that said the postwar accord 
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 between labor and capital as unsustainable given the internal and external limits of capital 
expansion.  
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6. Crisis and Opportunity: From Corporate- to Neo-liberalism, 1973-1992 
As political assassinations, the Vietnam War, and economic decline eroded multiple 
elites’ faith in reformist social science and activist government, the TT field adapted458 to meet a 
growing demand for symbolic workers capable of providing a set of ideas and channels for 
integrating multiple elites around a new policy regime. I call the regime “neoliberal” because it 
derives from the “classical” liberalism of British and Austrian economic thought. Its 
organizations cluster around the sanctity of private property, and articulate “free market” policy 
solutions to social and economic problems as an antithesis to corporate liberal planning.  
Philanthropists and business executives, disenchanted by the late 1960s ideological 
atmosphere of militant working class, youth, and African-American movements, targeted the 
most massive investment in TTs since the Progressive era. During this cycle of investment 
however, the donors bet against reformist social science, giving instead to heavily marketed and 
avowedly anti-government “advocacy” nonprofits like the Heritage Foundation (HF), American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI), and Manhattan Institute (MI). This explosion of New Right risk 
capital philanthropy coincided with a drift by corporate liberal tanks like the Progressive Policy 
Institute (PPI), Brookings Institution (BI), Trilateral Commission (TC), and Club of Rome 
(COR) towards market piety and social policy research that did not raise the expectations of the 
masses, overburden state capacities, or otherwise undermine capitalism. Over a sweep of several 
decades, the bulk of the TT field advocated a range of policies initiated by conservative 
governments in America and Western Europe, and adopted by developing countries through 
“stabilization” and “structural adjustment” programs. Central to the neoliberal framework was a 
                                                 
458 Three quarters of tanks in 1995 were created after 1970 (Rich 1999). Thirty-two think tanks were established in 
Washington from 1910-1969, versus fifty-six from 1970-1989 (Ricci 1993:281 n76).  
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 simple critique of the Keynesian consensus as unworkable and out of line with basic human 
tendencies towards freedom, and the application of micro-economic rationality to all aspects of 
culture. The mark of their success is the extent to which deregulation, privatization, downsizing, 
structural adjustment, flexible production, tort reform, reduced public sector spending, reduced 
union power, and unfettered trade and financial flows appear “a set of ideas ‘whose time has 
come,’ while social democracy, trade unionism, and the Keynesian welfare state have begun to 
appear more and more anachronistic.”459
6.1 Preparing the ground: the long march of Anglo-American free market tanks 
To reconstruct the role of “New Right” think tanks, we return to the origins of the 
modern conservative movement and a small number of British and U.S. outfits. British historian 
Richard Cockett credits the Mont Pélerin Society (MPS) and its Austrian émigré stars for laying 
the basis for attacks on dominant Keynesian ideas.460 He describes how in 1938, visiting London 
School of Economics economists Fredrich Von Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises, and philosopher 
Karl Popper ran a ten-day conference devoted to reversing trends towards “collectivism,” i.e. 
socialism, fascism, nationalism. The Colloque Walter Lippmann participants rued the emergence 
of a center-left consensus in British politics, and held Keynesian theories of demand 
management and full employment responsible for leading “the naïve down the dark road of 
totalitarianism.”461 Rather than meeting the challenge of socialism as Keynesians had, by 
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effective or ‘target audiences’ was well within the reach of these few well-located institutions” (1994:31).  
461 Von Hayek wrote this line and more about his despair in The Road to Serfdom (1944).  
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 modifying classical liberalism along corporatist lines, the participants sought to purge liberalism 
of its impurities, strip it to its essentials. Hayek proclaimed in his opening address to the 
colloquium that the resuscitation of classical liberalism was “a great intellectual task” involving 
both  
Purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become 
attached to it in the course of time, and also facing up to some real problems which an 
oversimplified liberalism has shirked or which have become apparent only since it has 
turned into a somewhat stationary and rigid creed.462
 
Where corporate liberals had sought to integrate corporatist and welfare elements, Hayek et al 
rejected such elements as anachronistic—contrary to the needs of world, contrary to the essence 
of human nature, and to the character and destiny of the spirit of freedom.  
Hayek hoped the colloquium would be the start of an international network and 
emotional refuge for like minded people were otherwise isolated and  
Constantly forced to defend the basic elements of their beliefs and rarely have 
opportunity for an interchange of opinion on the more technical problems which arise 
only if a certain common basis for convictions and ideals is present….. I am perfectly 
confident that each of us has been enabled to persist in this effort and to do it with more 
confidence and satisfaction, because we had the comfort of knowing that we could agree 
about its intellectual justification at least with some other people.463
 
The MPS project did indeed become a resource of free market ideas for many countries. MPS 
developed a network of organizations including the well-known Institute of Economic Affairs 
(est. 1955 U.K.), under an umbrella organization known as Atlas. Through this network, British 
market ideologues developed ties with New Right think tanks in America.464  The conference 
commenced bi-annual meetings that adopted the name of its second meeting place in Mont 
Pélerin, Switzerland. With aid from Swiss bankers and executives, MPS incorporated in 1947.465 
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 MPS institutionalized the pre-WWII criticisms of the New Deal launched by people like Walter 
Lippmann,466 and established a foothold in a think tank field dominated by corporate liberals. 
In America, a post-WWII conservative cadre nested in relatively marginal free market 
TTs. AEI in particular staked its early identity on the idea that liberals had a “monopoly” on 
national political discourse which only an injection of conservative “competition” could 
counter.467 Modeling the policy entrepreneurship of Robert S. Brookings, industrialist Lewis 
Brown established AEI in 1943 as a center-right pro-business research group alternative to the 
think tank order he found. Its articles of incorporation state that AEI seeks to bring about  
A greater public knowledge and understanding of the social and economic advantages 
accruing to the American people through the maintenance of the system of free, 
competitive enterprise…[by] preparing, publishing, and distributing studies, analyses, 
and reports to its members, institutions of learning, public officials, corporate officers, 
[and] the press and periodicals given to public circulation.468
 
So sanguine were AEI members of the factual demonstrability of the social, political, and 
economic advantages, they thought simply disseminating rigorous studies would be enough to 
sway audiences towards their plans for reconstruction after World War II. However, the 
dominance of corporate liberal tanks like the Committee for Economic Development469 forced 
AEI to become more brand and advertising conscious. According to AEI President Chris 
Demuth, well before social constructionist and hegemony theory bloomed in academia, the 
founders of AEI came to understand that  
The free enterprise system…is not natural: it is not foreordained, and it cannot be taken 
for granted, even in America. It is rather a social and political artifact, requiring for its 
survival the understanding and consent of the public and of leaders in education, 
government, business, and the media.470
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 Through the 1950s, AEI carved out an image as a conservative counter-establishment. When 
Chamber of Commerce official William Baroody became president in 1954, he sought to identify 
scholars and issues that bucked corporate liberal wisdom.471 Its first bit of publicity came in a 
1954 Wall Street Journal piece featuring an AEI argument for floating exchange rates.472 In the 
1960s, the Brookings Institution—at its zenith as a brain trust to the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations—served as a useful foil for AEI. As former director of Brookings Outreach 
division Lawrence Korb noted, “When [the conservative] American Enterprise Institute was 
trying to get its day in the sun they pinned the [liberal] label on Brookings.”473 It took several 
decades of significant financial and psychic investment before obscure groups like AEI and the 
British Mont Pélerin Society (MPS) could come “out of the wilderness.” They acted as marginal 
“institutions in waiting,” biding their time until the emergence of an historical conjuncture 
amenable to action.  
6.2.  Structural context: crises and institutional Change 
The year 1968 encompassed the King and Kennedy assassinations and the Tet offensive 
in Vietnam. The murder of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. April 4 in Memphis, Tennessee 
prompted rioting in black urban neighborhoods nationwide, the imposition of martial law, more 
than forty deaths, and extensive property damage and looting. The dramatic televised events 
wounded, perhaps fatally, the spirit of trust uniting whites and blacks during the Civil Rights 
movement. The murder of presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy’s June 5 in Los Angeles, 
California came to represent the symbolic end of 1960s progressivism, the optimism of the Great 
Society, and mainstreaming of the civil rights and environmental movements.  
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 The increasingly visible carnage in Vietnam revealed deep rifts in the Cold War 
consensus, and the stunning technocratic hubris of thinking that management expertise, 
behavioral social science, and systems theory could address the challenge of Third World 
colonial revolts and Soviet support.474 The breakdown in elite consensus manifested in Council 
on Foreign Relations types like Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Dean Acheson, George Ball, 
Dean Rusk, John McCloy, and Cyrus Vance splitting over the issue. As President Johnson 
promised to close the chapter in 1968, the disputes emerged in public, ranging from unrepentant 
hawkishness to charges of criminality in pressing for war.475 Democrats were frustrated and 
disunited. Apprehensive Republicans coalesced around Nixon and a conservative cluster of 
ideas. Acting at the height of their power, the failure of Kennedy’ “best and the brightest”476 to 
manage the Cold War in Vietnam coincided with the breakdown of the economic basis for the 
corporate liberal class compromise.  
Just as with waning confidence in the technocratic mechanisms of warfare, confidence in 
the fine-tuning mechanisms of postwar economic management sunk among both elites and 
citizens. The ability of the U.S. system to support simultaneously war spending, large profits, 
middle class entitlements, and the aspirations of previously excluded groups came into doubt, the 
consensus guiding economic policy since 1945 broke down. President Lyndon B. Johnson 
conducted Vietnam War without raising taxes, resulting in a long-term drain on federal coffers 
and an inflationary spiral. A severe budget crunch heightened competition for resources and 
divided elites as to what to do about prices, wages, productivity, taxation, and unemployment.477 
Growing competition from Europe, Japan and developing states undermined America’s role in 
                                                 
474 The critique of instrumental rationality on the right came from think tanks detailed in this chapter. On the left, it 
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 the global economy it had structured and dominated for decades. U.S. economic supremacy and 
profits diminished further as developing states contended for a reordering of the global political 
economy in a New International Economic Order (NIEO).478 As the mass industries of American 
Fordism turned into a “rust belt,” the first OPEC energy embargo in 1973 exacerbated inflation 
and revealed further the vulnerability of the American economy. An extended recession ended 
the postwar period of uninterrupted economic health.  
Changes in political institutions also altered the environment of the D.C.-based 
professional managerial class. As issues took the place of parties in importance to voters, and 
candidates relied more on television than party machines to air their message, Washington 
became more receptive to ideas, analysis and advice. First, changes in the presidential 
nominating process for both parties (especially primary elections and televised campaigning) led 
to a decline in party loyalty and greater independence of candidates from parties. The 
Democratic Party initiated a change in the nominating system following the 1968 process which 
some in the party charged did not nominate the man most favored by party members. The 
changes put primary elections rather than state conventions and caucuses at the head of the 
selection process. This gave party voters greater power in selecting delegates to national 
conventions than back room bosses. Candidates could then bypass state party officials and appeal 
directly to voters. The decline in party loyalty in these years meant that people were more likely 
to think of themselves as “independent” and less likely to vote out of habit.479 Candidates could 
carve out identities on television independent of parties, leaving voters not necessarily sure of 
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 what party affiliation really meant. As the institutional environment separated voters from 
parties, voters took more of a pick-and-choose approach to voting. 
Second, new voting behavior resulting from the influence of television shook up the 
nominating and campaign process, political parties, and Congressional work. Television became 
people’s primary source for political information in the 1960s.480 From John F. Kennedy’s 
influential performance in his 1960 presidential debate with Richard M. Nixon, to the coverage 
putting Vietnam, segregation and the environment onto the public agenda, 481 television’s 
growing importance to those seeking to shape public opinion and policy in America came from 
the much more intense emotional response it evoked in viewers than print media. The lesson 
drawn by many political actors was that they must air on TV and do so in an effective manner. 
The increasing use of expensive television techniques ratcheted up campaign financing 
costs. Where total election spending sat at $140 million in 1952, by 1972 the figure was $425 
million.482 Campaign finance reforms in 1971 limited individual contributions to $1,000 per 
federal candidate and $5,000 per political committee in any year, but effectively allowed 
contributors to give an unlimited amount to the process by giving to as many political action 
committees (PACs) as they wanted, provided those PACs did not coordinate their spending with 
candidates or campaign organizations.483 The growth of PACs from 113 in 1972 to 3,371 in 1982 
to over four thousand by 1986 further undermined party control over candidates, opening more 
opportunities for think tanks.484 The other “unintended consequence” of the 1971 law was a 
sharp growth in fund raising using direct mail to make up for diminished large scale donations 
                                                 
480 Ricci 1993:108 
481 Robinson 1977:10-13 
482 Ricci 1993:111 
483 The 1976 Buckley v. Valeo Supreme Court decision established the rights of “independent” PACs.  
484 Stern 1988  
 164
 with numerous small contributors.485 The technique—perfectly suited to segment marketing—
uses databases of people classified by age, sex, ethnicity, education, income, occupation, 
religion, etc. to target particular messages and winnow out those who do not respond to the 
mailings.486 New right PACs became expert in using fear-based direct mail marketing.487
These changes to the institutional environment gave rise to a new class of political 
consultants charged with branding and marketing politicians. Drawing on techniques developed 
on Madison Avenue to sell consumer products, political consulting firms employed pollsters, 
telemarketers, demographic and market researchers, makeup artists, television coaches, graphic 
designers, and direct mail marketers.488  
New knowledge workers from lobbyists, lawyers, consultants, government agencies, 
newspapers overran Washington. The information explosion489 forced decision makers and their 
staffs to spend more time extrapolating and interpreting information than ever, sifting through 
reams of data for relevant knowledge. In such a context, actors who could do the sifting for 
others, and provide analysis of it from a position not obviously tied to particular interests, in a 
manner usable and professionally presented, took on increased importance. The proliferation of 
organizations in the think tank field reflects in part this new demand, though in some cases, as 
we will see, TTs created their own demand.490  
Marketing in the twentieth century had evolved sophisticated methods for persuading 
consumers to buy commodities they did not need by fashioning images and ideas and distributing 
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 those ideas through various communication technologies, especially television.491 A marketing 
approach to major political institutions, including parties, Congress, the executive, and the media 
positions audiences as consumers rather than citizens.492 Like contemporary consumer products, 
techniques that work to sell commercial products such as tailoring messages to population 
segments or “niches” and using quotable “clips” and exciting images, also sell policy ideas and 
politicians. Applied to politics, the concepts of niche and market segment conceive the public as 
a complex amalgam of audiences to address according to their respective hopes, fears, and 
attitudes. Where general audience messages tend towards vague statements, messages to local or 
homogeneous audiences are more precise. Once polling data ascertain the attitudes of a given 
audience,493 consultants step in to package candidates along lines suitable to electoral opinion, 
through television commercials,494 stage-managed pseudo-events and public appearances, 
bumper stickers, etc.  
Much tank activity treats citizens more like consumers of information than shapers of 
collective solutions. A steady flow of editorial page articles, TV show appearances, and 
publications available to colleges and universities, has eroded the role of the book-length study 
in earlier institutional forms.  The gradual shortening of tank talk reflects shortened political 
communication across the board, most notably in the units of television time purchased for 
political ads.495 As political messages shrunk to fit the units of television time purchased for 
political ads, they took on emotional and imagistic aspects of their consumer culture, relying on 
negative appeals of fear, anger, alienation, and frustration, as much or more than positive 
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 associations, and more than rational information and analysis.496 Like TV ads for consumer 
goods, the trend is for tanks to treat audiences as passive and selfish political agents.  
The approach mirrors Lippmann’s classic formulation of public opinion as something to 
shape and manipulate, not simply take into account. A key difference is Lippmann theorized a 
“two-step” process of public opinion formation whereby citizens took their cues from “opinion 
leaders” such as respected journalists, civic leaders, and local party elites (e.g. the CMP and local 
Councils on Foreign Relations, see chapter 5). By contrast, the contemporary decline in party 
affiliation, rise of mass media, and proliferation of special interest groups encourages a more 
direct form of political communication straight from candidates to voters, usually through 
television.497  
It is within this milieu that conservatives launched an all out effort to provide such ideas 
and sell them with marketing techniques drawn from Madison Avenue. Privately funded, 
politically committed research products entered public policy discourse through a host of 
conservative think tanks, whose expansion freed capital to adapt to its conditions of possibility 
by shopping around for institutions to suit its ideological needs.  
6.3  The proliferation of conservative advocacy tanks  
As the corporate liberal consensus faltered and the new institutional environment 
redefined the space of national politics, an ideological community invigorated by a sense of 
historic mission made the most massive financial investment in policy ideas since the 
Progressive years, donating billions to support the election of governments, austere social 
support policies, and reduced democratic controls over economic affairs. The most exponential 
growth in number, size, and wealth during the post 1970s era occurred among free market 
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 organizations pushing for the “privatization” of state industries, “deregulation” of industries and 
markets, cuts in state social programs (especially redistributive payments to the poor), and cuts in 
taxes (especially on business). This institutional growth helped to direct debate away from 
capitalism and towards social democracy as the cause of the crisis. Drawing on Friedrich Hayek 
and Milton Friedman, they proffered ideas for altering the economic and social policy of the 
postwar regime. 
As with previous periods of think tank proliferation, the 1970s network of tanks 
depended on seminal policy entrepreneurs to catalyze a nexus between intellectuals and 
corporate financiers. Two men stand out: prominent Richmond, VA lawyer Lewis F. Powell, and 
Treasury Secretary under Presidents Nixon and Ford, and John N. Olin Foundation, William 
Simon. Powell was on the verge of a U.S. Supreme Court appointment in September 1971 when 
he penned a confidential memorandum circulated to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Published 
as an eight-page article the Chamber’s Washington Report as the “ATTACK ON AMERICAN 
FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM,” the memo urged concerted action against liberal elements in 
academe, television and other media, politics, and the courts: 
Business and the enterprise system are in deep trouble. It’s time for American 
business…to apply their great talents vigorously to the preservation of the system 
itself.498
 
In militant tones, Powell warned the very “survival” of the system was “under broad attack” by 
“Communists, New Leftists and other revolutionaries who would destroy the entire system, both 
political and economic.” Business should “confront this problem as a primary responsibility of 
corporate management,” and learn “that political power is necessary; that such power must be 
assiduously cultivated; and that, when necessary, it must be used aggressively” and “without 
embarrassment.” He proposed that business needed to “enlighten public thinking” about business 
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 by building organizations to use “careful long-range planning and implantation, in consistency of 
action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of financing only available in joint effort, 
and in the political power available only through united action and national organizations.” Such 
organizations should employ a “faculty of scholars” to publish journals, write “books, 
paperbacks and pamphlets,” and engage in a “long range effort” to correct liberal professors who 
were wielding “enormous influence far out of proportion to their numbers” and radicalizing 
students “to the point of being revolutionaries.” Further, “the television networks should be 
monitored in the same way that textbooks should be kept under constant surveillance” for their 
“insidious criticism of the enterprise system,” and “there should be no reluctance to penalize 
politically those who oppose [the free enterprise system].” Powell observed “the judiciary may 
be the most important instrument for social, economic, and political change” and recommended 
establishing a legal center modeled on the American Civil Liberties Union to “undertake the role 
of spokesman” on business’ behalf in the courts against environmental and consumer activists 
like Nader “who seek the destruction of the system.” 499  
The other seminal policy entrepreneur, William Simon, echoed similar themes. His 1978 
manifesto A Time for Truth synthesized arguments he had been making for years to friendly 
audiences. Simon demanded that corporations support new institutions to usher in a new 
conservative age, claiming that 
…few voluntary institutions in America today are … organized to finance intellectuals 
who fight for economic, as well as political liberty. Most private funds—inevitably from 
business itself—flow ceaselessly to the very institutions which are philosophically 
committed to the destruction of capitalism. The great corporations of America sustain the 
major universities, with no regard for the content of their teachings. They sustain the 
major foundations which nurture the most destructive egalitarian trends. And with their 
advertising, they sustain the mass media, which today inevitably serve as a national 
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 megaphone for every egalitarian crusade. In the last analysis, American business is 
financing the destruction of both free enterprise and political freedom.500  
 
He called for a 
…courageous group of businessmen … [to] start the needed crusade to divert the 
immense corporate funds presently earmarked for education, “public relations,” and 
“institutional advertising” into the organizations needed to sustain and expand the 
conterintelligentsia. 
 
The task ahead:  
Funds generated by business [and foundations]...must rush by the multimillions to the aid 
of.... scholars, social scientists, writers and journalists who understand the relationship 
between political and economic liberty and whose work will supplement and inspire and 
enhance the understanding and the work of others still to come.”501     
 
In a context of rising government regulation, corporate taxes, inflation, oil prices, and declining 
balance of trade and GNP growth, business leaders from both major parties were open to 
proposals to help employers. The Powell and Simon manifestos became organizing principles for 
an emergent network of conservative businesspeople and foundation heads.502 According to 
Heritage in-house historian Lee Edwards, beer magnate Adolph Coors was “stirred up” by the 
Powell memo, which reinforced his decision to “commit his company to a prominent role in 
public affairs.”503 Once they had accepted the tenets of the Powell and Simon manifestoes, 
corporate conservatives and affiliated foundations like Adolph Coors, John M. Olin, Sarah 
Scaife, and Smith Richardson began to serve as clearing houses linking large donors, scholars, 
and corporations.  By 1993, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, which along with Joseph Coors 
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 established Heritage in 1973 and remains its largest contributor, would be giving some $17.6 
million to 150 nonprofit policy organizations.504  
The targeted investment by big business in free market think tanks in the 1970s integrated 
an already dense community of corporate entities with the policy network. Two national 
quantitative studies show how corporate and policy interlocks integrated American elites in the 
1970s.505 Bonacich and Domhoff (1981) used a centrality measure to analyze Dye’s 1970 
database of the largest corporate, legal, foundation, university, civic/cultural, think tank, and 
policy discussion actors. They found a tightly integrated corporate community and policy-
planning network.506 Harold Salzman and Domhoff (1983) show an overlapping membership of 
the conservative Conference Board (NICB), the corporate liberal Committee for Economic 
Development (CED) and Business Council (BAC), social clubs in New York, Pittsburgh, and 
Chicago, with the directors of large corporations occupying the most central node in the 
network.507
This network provided much of the policy planning and personnel for the Reagan 
“Revolution.” Reagan’s address at its 10th anniversary openly acknowledged that Heritage had 
provided the “blueprint” for the administration’s approaches in almost all areas.508 Its greatest 
first achievement was presenting a 1,093-page tome of policy analysis and advice to Reagan’s 
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 transition team called Mandate for Leadership.509 Received by the team in prepublication form in 
1980, Mandate offered a “blueprint for the construction of a conservative government” that 
included diagnoses and solutions for all executive departments and most regulatory agencies 
from over three hundred contributors. Reagan’s network also received support from the South 
Korean Reverend Sun Myung Moon. The wealthy head of both the Tongil financial group and 
the Unification Church, Moon encouraged far right elements in Japan and Taiwan to support 
Reagan’s aggressive interventionism, and launched the Washington Times in 1982 to push the 
establishment U.S. press, perceived as passive Trilateralists, in a more combative stance towards 
third world communism.    
6.3.1. Case 23: American Enterprise Institute 
AEI’s success in branding itself as the conservative “other” to Brookings put it in great 
position to be the target of massive investment from business and pro-business foundations. 
Where it had operated on a modest budget its first twenty-five years, AEI’s president Baroody, 
Sr. grew its annual budget ten fold, from $1 million in 1970 to $10.4 million in 1980 and close to 
$12 million by 1982.510 Secretary of defense Melvin Laird led a fund-raising effort in this period, 
and ex-Nixon appointees became fellows or resident scholars after Gerald Ford’s defeat to 
Jimmy Carter in 1976. Since becoming president in 1978, William Baroody Jr. made it a 
personal mission to enhance AEI’s prestige by luring in influential intellectuals and politicians 
with fellowships and resident positions. Former or future cabinet members who served on 
advisory councils in the 1970s included President Ford, George Bush Sr., George Schultz, David 
Stockman, treasury secretary William Simon, Melvin Laird, Fed chairman Arthur Burns, and 
Jack Kemp. Other public figures who have called AEI home include Irving Kristol, Supreme 
Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Milton Friedman, Ben J. Wattenberg, Judge Robert H. Bork, 
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 affirmative action critic Dinesh D’Souza, and race-IQ researcher Charles Murray.511 Today AEI 
has toughly 120 employees, 45 resident scholars and an annual budget of $12.6 million.512 
Through grants targeted directly to ideological writing and promotional projects at AEI, Olin 
gave Bork, Irving Kristol, and D’Souza a combined $375,000 in 1991.513 It also pays for the 
Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, a television show on the Public Broadcasting System.  
AEI was the first right-leaning think tank to challenge seriously the postwar social and 
economic reforms embodied in the Brookings Institution. Throughout its period of tremendous 
growth, AEI maintained the center-right ideology preferred by “neoconservatives” and moderate 
Republicans. For more uncompromising conservatives however, AEI was not sufficiently pure, 
or aggressive enough in its tactics. They turned to the Heritage Foundation. 
6.3.2. Case 24: Heritage Foundation 
The new Heritage Foundation also capitalized on the largesse of disenchanted business 
executives. Founded by Congressional staffers Paul Weyrich and Edwin Feulner Heritage 
Foundation in 1973 with $250k from Coors and conservative philanthropist Richard Mellon 
Scaife, Heritage developed a powerful direct mail program over the years from which it raises a 
significant portion of its annual budget.514 Within a year, eighty-seven corporations gave 
financial support, supplemented heavily by six or seven foundations. Two years into existence, 
Heritage raised over $1 million in revenues. Today it has the largest think tank budget in 
Washington at over $25 million.515 Like the Institute for Contemporary Studies (1972 by ex-
Gov. Reagan administration members), the Cato Institute (1977), the Business Roundtable 
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 (1973),516 and the Committee on the Present Danger,517 Heritage came into being in part to 
provide a haven for conservative “free market” and “Cold warrior” academics that felt 
“besieged” by liberal faculty at American universities.   
Heritage is significant not only because of its real or perceived influence on public 
policy, but because it stood as a model for other explicitly ideological and aggressively marketed 
think tanks (Citizens for a Sound Economy, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Heartland Institute, 
and others). The New Right think tanks sloughed off the nonpartisan self-understanding of the 
proto-tanks as a useless anxiety, wearing their conservative ideology on their sleeves. The desire 
to be objective and perceived as such, an anxiety rife through much of think tank history, doesn’t 
vex advocacy tanks, except to the extent that they need to employ such rhetoric to maintain a 
non-profit, tax-exempt status. As self-conscious proponents of a neoliberal system, they are 
proud hired guns who know that their own viability depends on their ability represent the 
interests of their corporate benefactors as common interests, and have had no problem entering 
the fray of ideas with explicit agendas, offering the free market as a corrective to “creeping 
socialism” and “liberal elites” in America. While speaking of Great Britain, Stuart Hall’s 
pioneering Gramscian interpretation of “Thatcherism” applies just as well to this aspect of the 
American case518: 
                                                 
516 One hundred ninety CEOs infused with the newly felt activism in the business community formed the 
Roundtable with the expressed purpose of representing business’ voice in politics.  The Roundtable was an offshoot 
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Roundtable was to be the advocacy arm of the Business Council, and was more of a discussion group than a research 
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successful in castrating the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill, and consumer and labor protection legislation 
during the Carter Administration (Gross 1980:76). 
517 CPD was an initiative of the Department of Defense to promote increased military spending to the public. CFR 
members Altschul, Clayton, and Henry Wriston participated. 
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 Thatcherism…[is] not simply a worthy opponent of the Left, but in some deeper way its 
nemesis, the force that is capable in this historical moment of unhingeing it from 
below.519  
 
Its sheer audacity as an ideological crusade marks conservatism as a hegemonic project.  
As Stuart Butler of the Heritage Foundation explained, “Unlike other institutions that 
pretend ideological neutrality, we’re conservative, no bones about it.  We don’t pretend to be 
anything different from what we are.”520 The thick blue and silver cover of its 1997 annual report 
marking its twenty-five year anniversary proclaims below an iconic liberty bell that is its 
trademark, 
The Heritage Foundation is committed to rolling back the liberal welfare state and 
building an America where freedom, opportunity, and civil society flourish.  
 
Rather than strict affiliation to party, the New Right aligns itself with ideas, such as government 
is bad, the poor need discipline, the rich need tax cuts, the Cold War is over but the Pentagon 
needs big money, and corporations need latitude with labor.  Blumenthal writes,  
Conservatives are replacing the old party politics with an ideological politics....  In their 
view, the party was useful only when it served the ends of ideology....  By rendering the 
RNC a robotic factory without a program, the manufacture of the policy agenda is left 
outside the party.  
 
As Counsel to Attorney General Edwin Meese T. Kenneth Cribb put it, conservatives are 
“effective through the mechanism of the Republican party” but not tied to it.521   
In addition to the lack of any anxiety whatsoever about the tension between such explicit 
ideology and objective scholarship, conservative tanks of the 1970s expressed a commitment to 
marketing ideas in the public square as effectively as possible. The goal was not just to allow 
conservatives to compete in the marketplace of ideas, but to shape the marketplace to their 
advantage, creating a demand for their own products. Conservatives use all manner of media 
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 from talk shows, direct mail, newspaper ads, fax trees, rolodexes, books, etc. to mobilize people. 
They finance book projects from the initial proposal to marketing, lavishing sums to scholars 
willing to demonstrate a race-IQ connection, or find that upper end tax cuts help everybody. The 
direct-mail phenomenon may be the sine qua non of the conservative movement, as its use in 
issue campaigns is central.522  
Heritage brought ideology and marketing together like never before, and thought of itself 
largely in marketing terms. It proudly proclaims its brand affiliation with the conservative 
movement and its aggressive marketing practices, describing itself as “the institutional center of 
the conservative movement.”523 The 1997 annual report states Heritage’s goal  
Is to formulate and promote conservative public policies…by performing timely, accurate 
research on key policy issues and effectively marketing these findings to our primary 
audiences: members of Congress, key congressional staff members, policymakers in the 
executive branch, the nation’s news media, and the academic and policy communities.524
 
Heritage notes in a section titled “Marketing and Outreach: Communicating the Conservative 
Message” that its 
Genius has been to recognize the capital for what it is and jump in with the financial 
resources to make itself really count. To think of the place as a [mere] think tank 
underestimates its importance. Heritage is a production company…. It is the city’s 
Disney….525
 
The report describes the “marketing efforts” used to “communicate Heritage’s message” in four 
departments: Government Relations (lawmakers), Public Relations (media), Education Affairs 
(universities, and External Relations (conservative activists, the states, business, and cyberspace.  
Rather than concentrating on original research, Heritage attempts to “spin” existing 
research. In most cases managers direct young staffers on how to research topics and write up 
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 results, rather than relying on prestigious experts in the manner of AEI and Brookings. Heritage 
produces hundreds of books, monographs, newsletters, and other publications on all areas of 
policy reform, often hand delivering or mailing them free to hundreds of policymakers in 
Congress and the administration, and thousands of journalists and academics.  
According to President Edwin Feulner, a key innovation was its brief and timely 
“background papers” and “bulletins” designed to meet the “briefcase test” of being digestible in 
the twenty-minute cab ride from National Airport to Capitol Hill.526 Feulner boasts in the 1997 
annual report that “we redefined the role of the Washington think tank in 1977 when we 
introduced heritage Backgrounders….”527 Heritage can churn out researched and footnoted 
essays in weeks or days if necessary, covering all variety of current public affairs. As Citicorp 
CEO Walter Wriston put it, 
It takes about twenty years for a research paper at Harvard to become a law. There 
weren’t any people feeding the intellectual argument on the other side…. AEI…puts an 
idea into the market. We figured it out: I write the songs the world sings.528
 
Heritage’s marketing innovations influenced other think tanks, which now also encourage 
their workers to publish occasional articles in magazines and newspapers, and provide frequent 
symposia and workshops for officials and the press, covering the gamut of public affairs issues. 
This does not mean such activity is entirely new within the TT field. As I have emphasized, 
publicity has been important to think tanks since their inception, and some mix of business, 
government administrators, media, and public has always been their audience. Their preferred 
metaphors change, but their generic embrace public education remains the same. Yet the 
emphasis education529 has displaced to a greater or lesser extent the focus on research that 
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 characterized certain first and second-generation think tanks.530 Many tanks still do research, but 
promoting the results has become a highly valued activity in the field. According to Dr. W. 
Glenn Campbell, a former director of the Hoover Institution,531  
A program has been devised to get these ideas before the public in a timely fashion in 
daily newspapers throughout the country. We urge scholars to extend their writing 
beyond books and professional journals into the general public arena. Research results in 
the form of short essays written by scholars are sent to newspapers for publication on the 
page opposite the editorial page.532  
 
Similarly, AEI under Baroody Jr. shifted away from lengthy books and studies of the previous 
generation, promoting easy-to-read edited collections of essays, conferences, op-ed articles, and 
public affairs television programs.533 In 1977, AEI began to publish its own periodicals such as 
Public Opinion, AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, and Regulation to afford scholars 
around the country an opportunity to contribute to a conservative project. Several publications 
merged into American Enterprise magazine in 1990. In 1982, AEI spent 2.6 million out of its 
11.7 million dollar budget on outreach efforts.  “AEI fellows”534 Irving, Ben Wattenberg, and 
Norman Ornstein were regular TV pundits at that time, and new experts are perpetually being 
groomed. A “punditocracy” or class of usual suspects dominates policy discussions in the mass 
media.535
To the extent that the conservative movement is unable to saturate existing media, it has 
sought to create new media as a way to eliminate alternatives to conservatism in the popular 
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 mind. For example, right wing visionary Paul Weyrich, who helped form both the Heritage 
Foundation and Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, started National Empowerment Television, a 24-
hour cable network. Like local Christian programming across the country, the station billed itself 
as both educational and entertaining, and running talk shows and “family programs” three times 
a day.  The station enlisted prominent leaders in the movement such as Newt Gingrich and 
Edwin Meese to host or appear as guests on shows, and Newt Gingrich began hosting a “lively 
engaging” weekly program titled “Renewing American Civilization.”  
6.3.3 Diagnosing the crisis: democracy and liberal elites run amok 
Like the late 1890s, the language coming out of 1970s policy research institutes projected 
a fear of democracy run amok. Where Marxists saw crises arising from the internal 
contradictions of functioning capitalism, neoliberals saw system dysfunction caused by the 
demands of groups politicized in the 1960s such as women, blacks, students, and 
environmentalists, fanned by the social research of liberal elites. These demands overburdened 
the state, eroded government and business authority, and paralyzed management of looming 
economic and strategic crises.  
Free market tanks diagnosed an intellectual establishment that unduly highlighted 
systemic defects like inequity. Self proclaimed “neoconservatives” at AEI and other tanks saw an 
inherent tension in the New Right stemming from the tension between economic freedom and 
social virtue, and worked to fuse the free market and Judeo-Christian strands of New Right 
movement. Writing with sparkling prose and social scientific references in magazines like Public 
Interest (edited by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol) and Commentary (edited by Norman 
Podhoretz), “neocons” unified the strands of conservatism by pointing to a common enemy. 
They argued the threat to both free market economics and Judeo-Christian morality was an over 
regulatory government bureaucracy, a lazy underclass that drained tax revenues with welfare 
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 requests, and a crisis of authority that let riots, student rebellions, homosexuality, and other 
forms of cultural relativism run rampant.536 At the root of such undermining tendencies was a 
“New Class” of social scientists, urban planners, social workers, criminologists, sociologists, 
journalists, broadcasters and more that constituted the an “adversary culture.”537 New Class 
bureaucrats, professionals, professors, etc. represented a neat rhetorical target that appealed both 
to market oriented conservatives seeking to free business, and religious conservatives seeking to 
tamp secular humanism, thus unifying both strands around a common bogeyman. Armed with 
the thesis that government actions actually caused poverty, AEI sought to render such 
intellectuals and the very idea of a welfare state anachronistic.  
Because conservatives believed most leading social scientists in the United States lean 
towards progressivism, they developed an alternative way to martial facts and expertise. Along 
with campus organizations, think tanks formed an interlocking set of institutions designed to 
bypass the credential function of the university system, and rapidly groom and invest 
conservative ideas and intellectuals with intellectual capital. The right invested tremendous sums 
in leadership training and other opportunities for up and coming conservatives. Senior 
conservatives like Irving Kristol acted as talent scouts for young conservatives, guiding them 
into fellowships, research grants, and staff positions.538 Foundations fund campus newspapers 
like the Dartmouth Review to raise conservative ire on campus and train young writers and 
speakers to staff think tanks later. The disingenuous counterpart to the unrepentant marketing of 
ideological policy expertise is the charge of “politicized standards” in the academy. Graduates of 
conservative campus programs like Dinesh D’Souza go on to positions at think tanks where they 
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 are paid to write books and articles, and from there become effective and well-known pundits, 
editors, and government workers.539
Consistent with their own claims about the liberal stranglehold in academia, writer Irving 
Kristol and Olin Foundation board president William Simon, with money from the Olin, Sarah 
Scaife, Smith Richardson, and JM foundations, founded the Institute for Educational Affairs 
(IEA) in 1978 to bring conservative scholars, corporations, and foundations together to promote 
their ideas on campuses.540 IEA gave $5,000-$10,000 grants to start some thirty newspapers on 
campuses around the country and dubbed it the Collegiate Network. The first and most 
controversial, the Dartmouth Review, was founded in 1980, and spawned Dinesh D’Souza. 
Papers at Harvard, Yale, Duke, Kenyon, and other schools took a hard line against multicultural 
curricula and affirmative action, and urged a return to the Western canon and traditional 
values.541 IEA merged with the Madison Center in 1990 to form the Madison Center for 
Educational Affairs (MCEA), which by this time funded the network of now seventy campus 
newspapers to the tune $400,000 per year.542 MCEA provides the Collegiate Network with a 
number of free services including a writing and editing advice hotline, a nationally syndicated 
column, internships at The New Republic, Roll Call, and NBC News, summer programs in 
Washington, D.C., and annual publications awards.543
IEA also established a conservative legal group in 1982, The Federalist Society, which 
within three years had thirty chapters at many top law schools. Members often clerk for 
conservative judges and find jobs in the Justice Department or other government legal offices. 
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 Throughout the 1980s, the federal judicial system was broadly seeded with young conservative 
activists taking this career placement route.544  
Another group offering a leg up to young conservatives is the Leadership Institute (LI). 
Founded in 1979 with Coors money, the institute trains young professionals in nine public policy 
programs, including journalism, campus activism, campaign leadership, rhetoric and campaign 
skills, public relations, foreign service, and candidate development. LI offers an intern and 
placement service, and a speaker’s bureau.545  
When Republicans took control of Congress in November 1994, groups like IEA and LI 
had developed a cadre of eager conservatives ready to step into new job openings. LI, Heritage, 
and the GOP study committee vetted thousands of resumes for junior legislative staff positions, 
screening them for ideological correctness.546  
The National Association of Scholars (NAS), founded in 1987 to battle multiculturalism 
and “political correctness” on campuses emerged from New York City academics whose 
founding credo was “Only through an informed understanding of the Western intellectual 
heritage and the realities of the contemporary world can citizen and scholar be equipped to 
sustain our civilization’s achievements.”547 With funding from graduate student, professor, and 
administrator dues, and a much larger portion from conservative foundations,548 the NAS 
publishes a quarterly journal, Academic Questions, a newsletter, NAS Update, runs a speakers 
bureau, placement service, fellowships, and conferences. At its 1998 annual meeting titled 
“Reclaiming the Academy: Responses to the Radicalization of the University,” professor Alan 
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 Kors railed against multicultural awareness as “thought control” and told NAS members to “use 
ridicule against blacks, feminists, and gays.”549  
NAS is part of the broader effort to “de-fund the left” initiated by Powell’s assertion that 
campuses were dependant on funds “generated largely from American business.”550 NAS set up 
the National Alumni Forum in 1995 to lobby alumni, trustees, and philanthropists to use their 
money and participation in campus governance to withhold gifts to institutions that support 
multicultural education, speech codes, and affirmative action.551  
 6.4 Social and economic policy 
Examining conservative campaigns in seven social policy areas552 Jean Stefancic and 
Richard Delgado demonstrate “a successful war of position over the past decades…that shifted 
the ground of discussion away from liberal solutions to what many Americans believed were real 
social problems.”553 They show how business-oriented foundations supported curricular reforms 
like teaching economics in junior high school and deregulation in law school, while grassroots 
contributions from middle- and working-class people funded movements for immigration 
reform, school prayer, English-only, and other “family values” issues.  
Liberal foundations, perhaps resting on the gains accumulated in the post-New Deal era, 
remained committed to principles of neutrality and more interested in “action” than a protracted 
war of position. They failed to counter the conservative investment in programmatic thinking.554  
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 6.4.1.   Case 25: The Manhattan Institute  
The Manhattan Institute is a bastion of conservative social policy thinking. Created by Reagan’s 
future CIA chief William J. Casey in 1978, its sponsorship of two influential books in the 1980s, 
Wealth and Poverty by George Gilder and Losing Ground by Charles Murray, gave it a national 
profile. With an annual budget of around $5 million, Manhattan functions like a smaller Heritage 
Foundation in its aggressive marketing of its work. It maintains a staff of thirty or so, a quarterly 
City Journal, and numerous books, articles and symposia. It publishes more op-ed pieces relative 
to its size than any other think tank.555 Major donors include the Bradley Foundation, which has 
given over $1 million largely for book projects since 1986, as well as Sarah Scaife, Olin, Smith-
Richardson, and even mainstream foundations like the J.M. Kaplan Fund and the 
Commonwealth Fund.556  
Thinkers at Manhattan, AEI, Heritage, and other conservative tanks promote today’s 
IQ/eugenics movement to persuade policymakers of the link between genetically inferior black 
America and the need to downsize affirmative action, Head Start, welfare, and other social 
policies. They fostered an intellectual atmosphere in which attacks on welfare and the poor 
became acceptable.  
In a book produced and promoted by the Heritage Foundation and Manhattan Institute, 
Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980, Charles Murray inveighed against welfare. 
The book extended the argument of an earlier pamphlet Murray penned while affiliated with 
Heritage called “Safety nets and the Truly Needy” that asserted federal poverty programs are a 
prime reason America is losing the war on poverty. Manhattan offered an unknown Murray a 
senior research fellowship in 1982 to complete Losing Ground, raising $125,000 from Scaife and 
Olin foundations to pay him a stipend and promote the book. It sent seven hundred free copies to 
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 scholars, journalists, and officials, held seminars on the book, and sponsored a national book tour 
for Murray.557  Losing Ground suggests government aid to single women with young kids in the 
form of food stamps, welfare checks, and housing subsidies reduces stigma once attached to out-
of-wedlock births, and the incentives for those women to seek a wage-earning father. The result 
has been that U.S. social policy from 1964 to 1980 “went from the dream of ending the dole to 
the institution of permanent income transfers.”558  Murray proposed phasing out the entire 
welfare system and forcing single mothers to rely on social networks and orphanages.559 
Murray’s book was one of two best-sellers associated with right wing think tanks 
espousing “supply side” economics. AEI fellow Jude Wanniski’s The Way the World Works560 
also claimed reducing taxes and government regulation on upper income groups would enhance 
profits and cause investment in productive enterprises and an abundance of goods. Wanniski’s 
book popularized the “Laffer Curve” statistical chart, which purported to be scientific proof of 
the theory that government revenues fell when business investment contracts in the face of 
growing tax burdens.561 The Laffer curve showed reducing burdens on the wealthy would help 
middle and lower classes more than government programs, because light tax and regulatory 
policies stimulate business to produce new factories, goods, profits, employment, thereby 
increasing government revenues and allowing for a reduction in middle- and lower-class taxes. 
Supply side offered an appealingly clean and simple description that became a paradigm idea for 
macroeconomic policymaking in the late 1970s and early 1980s.   
At Heritage, self-proclaimed entrepreneur of ideas Robert Rector is the foremost 
advocate of the idea that welfare erodes morality and makes poor families dependent. He has 
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 written numerous policy papers in that vein, and helped draft the welfare bill passed by the 
House in 1995. He wrote an editorial distributed nationwide on June 20, 1995 in support of the 
bill to cap welfare at 3 percent a year, limit benefits to unwed teen mothers, mandate mothers on 
AFDC identify their baby’s fathers, and give tax credits to low income couples with children if 
one parent is employed.562 Heritage sponsored William Bennett’s Index of Leading Cultural 
Indicators, a March 1993 compilation of graphs and charts purporting to show an inverse 
relationship between government spending and rates of illegitimacy, divorce, crime, over a 
dozen other social issues.  
At AEI, theologian Michael Novak promotes the notion that welfare engenders 
dishonesty amongst both recipients who try to bend the rules, and taxpayers who avoid payment 
as a form of resistance to the system they feel forced to support. AEI seminars on welfare are 
numerous.563  
The Hudson Institute, whose contributions come mainly from Bradley, Olin, and Sarah 
Scaife foundations, has also been a key player in welfare debates. President Leslie Lenkowsky 
affirms the theory that welfare increases teen pregnancy rates by making it acceptable to behave 
irresponsibly, while senior fellows Michael Horowitz and Anna Kondratas have each testified 
before the House about the harms resulting from welfare and the need to abolish the system.564  
Other organizations deeply invested in the war on welfare revolve around former 
Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. He joined other young conservatives in 1982 
to foster a “Conservative Opportunity Society” (versus the “liberal welfare state”). Gingrich 
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 controls the $2 million per year GOPAC, which trains candidates in Gingrich’s ideology, 
Renewing American Civilization, a satellite college course transmitted to colleges and 
conservative groups, and the Progress and Freedom Foundation, a think tank founded with 
corporate money by Vin Weber and other Gingrich comrades to promulgate the idea of 
privatizing the welfare system.565
Conservatives designed slogans with the intent of garnering public support for the idea 
that the poor are siphoning resources from ‘hard working Americans.’ Reagan’s use of the term 
“welfare queens” drove public perceptions that women on welfare drive Cadillacs and spend 
welfare checks on lobsters, while George H.W. Bush’s “thousand points of light” evoked state 
and local alternatives to federal programs. Vivid stories of pregnant, lazy, drug addled women, 
and hyperbolic statements about welfare being ‘out of control,’ as in Heritage’s Robert Rector’s 
claim that the U.S. has spent 70 percent more on welfare in the past thirty years than it did 
defeating Germany and Japan in World War II, add to the public sense of shock and moral 
outrage.566  
The supply side argument underlay the deregulatory reforms initiated under Carter then 
Reagan. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, business leaders began to perceive new regulatory 
agencies like EEOC, OSHA, and EPA as threats. At AEI, regulatory specialists from the Ford 
administration helped set up the Center for the Study of Government Regulation at AEI, a joint 
project with the Brookings Institution, laying the intellectual groundwork for deregulation.567 
The word deregulation is misleading since neoliberalism involves re-regulation more than de-
regulation of the economy.  
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 Like the welfare reform campaign, the campaign to repeal affirmative action draws out 
similar fears and anomie towards minorities and the poor, but builds them into an intellectually 
respectable position.568 The personnel and money of the anti-affirmative action campaign also 
overlaps with campaigns against welfare. Conservatives first challenged affirmative action in the 
early Reagan administration. Heritage’s 1980 Mandate for Leadership called the Civil Rights 
Division “radicalized” and argued President-elect Reagan should rescind federal requirements 
for affirmative action in government hiring and contracting.569 In similar report Agenda ’83, 
Heritage called for the U.S. Justice Department to conduct studies on how affirmative action 
increased racial resentment.  
AEI celebrated the launch Charles Murray and Richard J. Herrnstein’s The Bell Curve: 
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life,570 with a party and press conference for major 
newspapers, news magazines, and talk shows.571  After eight years as a Bradley Fellow, Murray 
had moved to AEI when Manhattan declined to sponsor his research on black/white intelligence 
differences that became The Bell Curve.572 Still, when The Bell Curve came out, Manhattan 
welcomed Murray with a luncheon to honor him and his gene-based dismissals of affirmative 
action.573 The Pioneer Fund, the main source for race-based intelligence research in English-
speaking countries and a promoter of the eugenics movement and the idea of minorities’ genetic 
inferiority since 1937, underwrote much of the research cited in the book.574 The book held that 
intelligence is inherited and immutable; minority group (primarily black) social problems like 
teenage pregnancy, poverty, and crime derive from low IQ; and therefore government social 
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 reform programs are futile since they cannot overcome this biological determinants. The authors 
accuse affirmative action of “leaking poison into the American soul” by dividing American 
society. The policy backfired, they argue, by pitting poorly performing blacks and Hispanics 
against academically superior students, and fostering white resentment.  
Tanks use a number of venues to denigrate affirmative action as contrary to principles of 
equality. They sponsor numerous conferences on the issue featuring the likes of Clarence 
Thomas, Robert Bork, Edwin Meese II, and television host Tony Brown.575 A January 1994 
Heritage seminar on “The Conservative Virtues of Martin Luther King” was based on the idea 
that the “reverse discrimination” of affirmative action betrayed King’s vision, and featured 
Reagan’s education secretary and Heritage’s own distinguished fellow for the study of cultural 
policy, William Bennett.576  
They allow high profile academics like Walter E. Williams, Linda Chavez, and Ward 
Connerly to write on the problems with affirmative action. The Heritage Foundation Policy 
Review is a favorite venue.577 Manhattan books critical of affirmative action include Linda 
Chavez’ Out of the Barrio: Toward a new Politics of Hispanic Assimilation. It says government 
aid, affirmative action, and bilingual education programs lead Hispanics to dependency and hurt 
their ability to assimilate. In 1995, Manhattan’s former John M. Olin Fellow Chavez used Olin 
funds to start the Center for Equal Opportunity, a public policy think tank to race, ethnicity, and 
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 immigration. She appears frequently on television and speaks by invitation to campuses, 
opposing affirmative action at every opportunity.578
AEI propelled the affirmative action critique with stipends and promotional efforts for 
legal experts like Bruce E. Fein and former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork to publish 
articles and books analyzing court cases bearing on the issue. Bork, for example, described the 
1978 Supreme Court Bakke decision upholding affirmative action as offensive to “both ideas of 
common justice and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection to persons, not 
classes.”579 Dinesh D’Souza uses a more popular writing style and “nice guy” personality580 to 
decry the vicious cycle of racial anger and minority underperformance affirmative action creates 
on college campuses. In Illiberal Education: The politics of Race and Sex on Campus and The 
End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society, Dinesh D’Souza charges that affirmative 
action inflates minorities with a false assurance that they can compete. Minorities then confront 
an “academic mismatch” that leads to frustration and attribution of their problems to racism. As 
minorities retreat into balkanized groups, aggrieved white students turn to racial violence, 
anonymous leaflets and graffiti, and other acts.  
AEI also conducted a widely cited poll in its Public Opinion journal showing  77 percent 
of blacks oppose affirmative action while 77 percent of black leaders. Jesse Jackson challenged 
the validity of the poll as conducted by “a right-wing institution,” and Joint Center for Political 
and Economic Studies Gallup poll contracted the findings.581  
As with the campaigns against welfare and affirmative action, the conservative 
movement’s lobbying and advertising efforts concerning “tort reform” rely on conservative think 
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 tanks to lend intellectual respectability to the effort. Tanks, supported by insurance companies, 
legal scholars, trade organizations and coalitions, have worked mightily to convince people that 
the body of law devoted to enabling people to be “made whole” for injuries caused by others is 
in a state of crisis. They have attempted to convince people that tort system us not a vehicle for 
victims to seek redress for suffering, and to think of themselves as victims of “lawsuit abuse” (in 
the form of higher costs for products and insurance costs), as claimants are undeservedly 
enriched due to their own stupidity. By using think tanks and other organizations as front groups, 
tort reformers have constructed a “litigation crisis,” and cast themselves as the little person 
battling against the behemoth American Trial Lawyer’s Association.  
The Manhattan Institute exercises impact in this area through pamphlets, conferences, 
books, and videos. Two books by senior fellow Peter Huber and one by senior fellow Walter K. 
Olson have been particularly useful to the reformers. Huber’s Liability: The Legal Revolution 
and Its Consequences (1988) and Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (1991), 
along with Olson’s The Litigation Explosion (1991) marketed ideas used by Bush and Quayle’s 
1992 re-election team, as well as Congress people involved in tort reform debates. Liability 
claimed dubiously that tort costs amounted to $300 billion, a figure that the Rand Corporation 
puts closer to $15 billion.582 Galileo’s Revenge, based mainly on anecdotes says, “Junk science 
verdicts, once rare, are now common.” 
A video produced by Manhattan Institute and narrated by Walter Cronkite tells of the 
detriments suffered by an executive after a $5 million judgment rendered against his company, 
Cooper Industries (the video does not mention that Cooper Industries donated $50,000 to the 
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 video’s production).583 Manhattan helped draft a “loser pays” provision in a tort reform bill 
proposed in the House.584  
The movement relies on such slick media action to simulate grassroots activity in what 
people refer to as “Astroturf” campaigns.585 The amazing success of the health insurance 
industry’s “Harry and Louise” commercials in defeating President Clinton’s health care plan 
taught lobbyists the ability to go beyond office visits and contributions to politicians. Astroturf 
advocacy can legally conceal the sponsors behind the campaign from the Federal Election 
Commission. Ads that convey the tort reform message include one featuring a Girl Scout 
claiming it takes 87,000 boxes of cookies to pay for liability insurance,586 and a radio ad whose 
narrator is shocked that “A jury awarded a woman $2.0 million in a lawsuit against McDonald’s. 
She spilled coffee on her lap and claimed it was hot…. Every day there is another outrageous 
lawsuit. Who pays? You do.”587
The outcomes generated by tort reformers are significant. Every state has placed limits on 
medical malpractice liability. Forty-one have abolished or limited the ability of plaintiffs to 
collect entire judgment from one negligent party of other defendants cannot pay. Thirty-one have 
restricted product liability claims. Twenty-seven have abolished, capped, or made punitive 
damages more difficult to impose. Seventeen have capped pain and suffering damages.588 At the 
federal level, the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 led to two failed attempts at passing 
bills, which will surely come up again. Perhaps the greatest impact has been on public 
perceptions of torts. A University of Delaware study demonstrates that jurors are “suspicious of 
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 the legitimacy of plaintiff’s claims…, concerned about the personal and social costs of large jury 
awards…generally favorable toward business, skeptical more about the profit motives of 
individual plaintiffs than of business defendants, and committed to holding down awards.”589  
6.5  Corporate liberal convergence 
In addition to a rising class of Neoconservative intellectuals, corporate liberals were 
shifting rightwards. Corporate liberalism adapted to a field increasingly influenced by intense 
business investment in free market ideas. The following cases are representative of research 
organizations forced to move to the right in order to maintain a veneer of objectivity as the center 
of the policymaking community itself moved right.    
6.5.1.   Case 26: Club of Rome  
OECD planner Alexander King and Olivetti manager A. Peccei brought professional managerial 
types together through the Club of Rome (COR) to conceive a class compromise alternative to 
the purely market solutions proposed by other think tanks to the crisis of corporate liberalism. 
COR, along with the Trilateral Commission (see below) represents an aspect of the transnational 
professional managerial class that reacted to colonial defeats for the West (culminating in 
Vietnam), radicalizing students, working class militancy, and rising global competitiveness from 
peripheral countries, with a notion of “planned interdependence.” COR depicted an “exhausted” 
system spreading a level of disorder that only integrated global planning could counter. MIT’s 
1971 report to COR, The Limits to Growth was a systems projection based on linear 
extrapolations into the future that showed the Fordist regime of accumulation was dysfunctional 
and would exhaust the biosphere on which it rested.590 A 1974 COR report by a team led by 
Dutch Social Democratic economist Jan Tinbergen, Reshaping the International Order, echoed 
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 the call for an overhaul of the entire political and economic structures of the world. Like Limits 
to Growth, Reshaping emphasized “a broadened social rationality.”591
 This “functionalism” is inscribed in an ethic of international integration, described by 
Ernst Haas as a logic that  
“…relies heavily on the use of dispassionate inquiries, based on value-free modes of 
research, to expose problems and lay the groundwork for eventual policy compromises. 
Experts, not politicians, are singled out as the agents for defining the limits of 
accommodation, preferably along lines of pure computation and problem-solving” (1964: 
153).  
 
This rhetoric recalled the planning notions of the short-lived WW II National Resources 
Planning Board (NRPB), extrapolated to the international level. However, in the same way that 
the NRPB represented a “highpoint” for socialist tendencies within corporate liberalism, and the 
Russell Sage Foundation studies represented a “highpoint” for ameliorative goals of social 
research, COR represented a “highpoint” for the notion of placing capital under state surveillance 
and planning in the 1970s. This notion soon receded as a movement to release capital from a host 
of state controls arose, pushing even “liberal” think tanks to the right.  
6.5.2 Case 27: Brookings Institution 
Supported by substantial corporate and foundation sources, the Brookings Institution (BI) 
had been the consensus position of establishment liberalism in the 60s. Its scholars promoted 
Keynesian fiscal policy and progressive taxes, and administered New Frontier and Great Society 
programs.592 BI responded to 70s stagflation by shifting to the right in a retreat from 
Keynesianism.  Although Brookings still maintained the importance of economic planning, it 
conceded that fewer demands on government were desirable. Arthur Okun, a left of center 
economist at Brookings, published a 1975 study titled Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. 
In it, he took the line that an overzealous commitment to equality shrinks the economic pie for 
                                                 
591 Tinbergen 1977: 314 
592 Smith 1991a  
 194
 rich and poor alike, and that a friendly business climate and restraint in social welfare outlays are 
essential to grow the economy out of crisis. Similarly, BI fellow Charles Schultze’s The Public 
Use of Private Interest (1977) held out the ideal of a rationalized society, but argued that 
government intervention in the economy should turn away from “clumsy” oversight and 
redistribution, policies that were not rooted in “sound economic principles”.593  
6.5.3 Case 28: The Trilateral Commission 
The Trilateral Commission (TC) emerged at the watershed of 1973 out of Bilderberg 
meetings. David Rockefeller’s ruminations in early 1970s meetings on expanding the planning of 
Bilderberg beyond the U.S. and Western Europe to include Japan (the “triad”) provided the 
impetus for TC.594 Bilderberg members recoiled at Nixon’s unilateral approach to the declining 
trade and finance status of the U.S., and praised TC as an idea whose time had come. Whereas 
Bilderberg chair Prince Bernhard and other members had scandal involving arms trade bribery 
and the Lockheed airplane company, TC sought a more transparent profile and greater sensitivity 
towards public activities and relations than the secretive Bilderberg.595 Its magazine Trialogue 
debuted in October 1973 and functions to disseminate the opinion and analysis developed among 
transnational business elites.  
Corporate liberal business and union leaders, Social Democratic politicians, and 
journalists comprised TC.596  Gill points out that in the mid-1980s two-thirds of the world’s 100 
largest companies had TC affiliations through membership in its directorship.597 TC allowed 
corporate heads representing rival capital sectors (financial groups, manufacturing) to present 
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 and accommodate different perspectives. A director, three regional chairs, and three regional 
executive committees steer TC and chose its 350 members on a national basis.  
Its overall project was to institutionalize elite networks between North Atlantic states and 
Asia-Pacific states, strengthen neoliberal internationalism with fine tuning regulatory 
mechanisms, and develop a long-term foreign policy outlook based not on strict anticommunism, 
but the universal moral category of human rights. Its central concern, like the Council on Foreign 
Relations a generation earlier, was taming the forces undermining Western cohesion.598 Its 
members sought the creation of “a global system where the communist philosophy withers and 
has no new converts,”599 a position most forcefully articulated in the influential 1975 report, The 
Crisis of Democracy.600 Crisis called for strengthened economic planning like job training. U.S. 
In his contribution to the TC The Crisis of Democracy report, AEI fellow Samuel Huntington 
bluntly confronts the question of whether liberal democracy and capitalism can thrive together, 
or whether the “democratic distemper” must give way to the laws of accumulation. His answer to 
a contradiction between democracy and governance is a call for lowered expectations and “a 
greater degree of moderation in democracy,” and a specific role for elite policy planning 
knowledge in bypassing popular political participation:  
…some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of 
democracy…. In many situations the claims of expertise, seniority, experience, and special 
talents may override the claims of democracy as a way of constituting authority…. The 
arenas where democratic procedures are appropriate are, in short, limited…. The effective 
operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and 
noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups…. In itself, this marginality on 
the part of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the factors 
which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal social groups, as in the case 
of the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political system. Yet the danger of 
overloading the political system with demands which extend its functions and undermine its 
authority still remains…. We have come to recognize that there are potentially desirable 
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 limits to economic growth. There are also potentially desirable limits to the indefinite 
extension of political democracy. Democracy will have a longer life if it has a more balanced 
existence.601
President Carter, whose key cabinet posts TC members like Zbignew Brzezinski came to 
occupy,602 reflected this way of thinking in his January 19, 1978 State of the Union address on 
19 January 1978: 
Government cannot solve our problems….Government cannot eliminate poverty, or 
provide a bountiful economy, or reduce inflation, or save our cities, or cure illiteracy, or 
provide energy.603
 
The Crisis of Democracy included Brian Crozier’s critique of “value-oriented intellectuals”, 
academics and cultural-media elites who debunk authority and so constitute “a challenge to 
democratic government which is, potentially at least, as serious as those posed in the past by the 
aristocratic cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties.”604 In a precursor to the culture 
wars around “political correctness” to come, his solution to this “treason of the intellectuals” 
rang eerily similar to the Powell and Simon manifestos: “restore an appropriate balance between 
the press, the government, and other institutions in society” and to “relate educational planning 
to economic and political goals.”605 In contrast to the pure neoclassical economic strain in 
neoliberalism, TC generally favored some regulation. In this sense, TC is closer ideologically to 
Rhodes-Milner and Bilderberg groups than the Club of Rome. Such groups kept the 
internationalist strand of corporate liberalism alive within neoliberalism, and kept protectionist 
(mercantilist) tendencies at bay.  
6.5.4 Case 29: Bilderberg  
The Bilderberg Conferences represents the first stable North Atlantic policy planning 
organization. Founded in 1952 and named for the Hotel de Bilderberg in Oosterbeek, Holland, 
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 the group “assembled in the spirit of corporate liberalism, representatives of Right and Left, 
capital and organized labor.”606 Its long term planning of the international order occurs through 
confidential meetings among corporate, political, intellectual, military, and trade union elites in 
the North Atlantic states, especially the NATO Alliance signatories. Its membership is not 
permanent, which makes it a flexible venue for the development of broad elite consensus. A 
chair and a small permanent steering committee invite roughly 115 people to its yearly 
conference. Much like the field of think tanks generally, its initial corporate liberal tendency has 
evolved into a position more closely aligned with an internationalist strain of neoliberalism. 
Bilderberg mostly excluded organized labor by the mid 1990s while neoliberals like Michael 
Armacost, president of the Brookings Institution, have been welcomed.607
6.5.5 Case 30: Progressive Policy Institute  
Like Heritage in the 1970s, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) seized political 
initiative in the 1980s and 1990s touting its “innovative” ideas.608 The Democratic Leadership 
Council (DLC), a lobby formed in 1985 by conservative and moderate “New Democrats”609 
dismayed at the party’s lack of “new thinking,” created PPI to respond to the conservative 
labyrinth of idea factories.610   DLC members believed that “the entitlement strain of liberalism” 
dominant in the party since 1972 had made it an easy target for the conservatives, resulting in 
Ronald Reagan’s landslide victory over Walter Mondale.611   Sensing the party was out of touch 
with the ordinary day-to-day concerns of many working Americans, New Democrats urged 
presidential and Congressional candidates to reconnect with the lives and values of ordinary 
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 families, especially by stressing the values of work and parental responsibility.  The DLC hoped 
to broaden the centrist base of the party by developing a public philosophy that depicted both 
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans as failed ideologies. The DLC got a cold 
reception from establishment Democrats.612 By 1988, its viability was questionable, but when 
George Bush Sr. defeated Michael Dukakis, the DLC reinvigorated its case that only its 
reformulation could save the party, and when its former chair Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton 
became U.S. President in 1992, it realized its greatest achievement.   
The New Democrat movement recast the party in images of family and community 
integrity, and appealed to middle-class white voters who had voted in substantial majorities for 
Reagan and Bush (so called “Reagan Democrats”).  The movement was successful in adapting to 
themes and images made popular by neoconservatives in the 1970s.  Its message of “welfare to 
work,” parental responsibility, etc, won two presidential elections.   
The DLC was also very conscious of how coherence and comprehensiveness enhanced 
the effectiveness of conservatives’ social diagnoses613.  The PPI articulates a rigid commitment 
to market discipline in almost every public policy area. Supporting this ideology is a rosy vision 
of the American economy in which “pioneers” build “new knowledge industries” in which 
workers may exchange “the mind-numbing drudgery of manual labor for jobs that allow them to 
think, create, and share in decisions.” The 1996 DLC “New Progressive Declaration” (reprinted 
in Marshall 1997) emphasized this positive vision of an economy that has tended to benefit 
mostly wealthy suburban voters614.   
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 Clinton’s relationship to the DLC/PPI demonstrates the loose coupling between decision 
makers and organizations. Once in office, Clinton was obviously less dependent on PPI 
resources, and therefore better able to position himself between the international financial 
institutions on the one hand, and the pro-labor, environmental, and consumer organizations 
pressuring from the left. Under the New Democrats, the party took away traditional Republican 
arguments by being able to promise both fiscal responsibility and increased social spending, and 
even some tax cuts, but they did this by conceding the necessity for balanced budgets. The new 
synthesis achieved by the assault on corporate liberalism included a shift in the Democratic Party 
to the agenda set out by conservatives. The successful shift of national and global politics 
rightwards redefined the “center” of acceptable debate, and forced Democrats into an adaptive 
mode in which they felt compelled to adopt the rhetoric and policies of conservatives. 
6.6 Conclusion: Sloughing off modernism; ideology and the hard sell 
In chapters 2-5, we saw corporate liberal tanks reflect the modernist belief in improving 
society through rational social science.615 The guiding rationale of these organizations was not 
overtly ideological. They considered their mission above politics, championing objectivity, 
science and expertise over partisanship.616 This approach contrasts with many of today’s policy 
research organizations, which place a twin emphasis on political commitment (ideology) and 
public relations (marketing ideas heavily, or advocacy) replaced the veneer of neutrality that had 
proven so successfully in structuring the corporate liberal regime.  
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 However, it is incorrect to identify the 1970s, as many do, with the “politicization of 
think tanks”617 since even the “disinterested” research during the Progressive years was on the 
whole every bit interested and value-laden as today’s free market advocacy tanks. The rhetorical 
struggle over which ideas societies ought to aspire to through policy is constitutive of the 
Modern project. At each historical turn in that project—from the invention of think tanks through 
the Cold War—we see a continual concern with advocacy, signaling the complex and 
contradictory efforts of agents in the political realm. The lapse of faith in state solutions thus 
exposed an ideological component of the social sciences obscured by the consensus that social 
science was a neutral guide to policy making.  
What makes the post-1970s think tank era unique is not just right wing public relations 
techniques, or the shift by all tanks to be “much more self-conscious about getting the word 
out.”618 What the sloughing of the rhetoric of neutral objectivity indicates is that pretense of 
neutrality and dispassionate research is simply no longer necessary to intensify capitalist 
economic development. From capital’s perspective, the intensification of a war of ideas through 
the political mobilization of business and the marketing of ideological think tanks was an 
appropriate response to systemic crises. The criteria for political judgment in this jungle of 
competing language games were up for grabs, as Lyotard might say.619 If we receive the 
traditional view that Marx ‘turned Hegel on his head’ by promoting materialism over idealism, 
then we might say that free market think tanks have returned the production and circulation of 
intellectual credibility to the center as a motor force in history. An AEI “fellow” has all of the 
benefits and much of the prestige of academia without the burdensome tasks of teaching, 
grading, or going up for tenure. When congressional or news  workers look for authoritative 
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 expertise, a Heritage Foundation backgrounder or book can have as much sway as a peer-
reviewed academic journal article or study. In this context it is not scientific expertise, but the 
“the political mood of the times, along with the persuasiveness or prestige of the policy advocate, 
[that] will usually be the primary determinants of the acceptability of a particular policy 
proposal.”620
Advocacy tanks’ remorseless politicization of research performs the very mode of 
production they hope to bring about—a pure free market. Capital has always recognized that 
ideas themselves are a sort of venture capital, but the advocacy think tanks intensify the process 
of thought “becoming capital.”  By transferring the market metaphor to the realm of intellectual 
production, tanks forge a link between ideological commitment and marketing practices. A 
commitment to free enterprise allows for an unabashed self-image as an idea-pusher. Pure 
deference to the market makes it perfectly sensible to extend market logic to the realm of policy 
research. If the hand of the market best allocates resources, the marketplace should produce the 
highest quality, most truthful ideas. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher notes a 
triumphant section of Heritage’s 25-year anniversary annual report titled “Message from the 
President and Chairman,” “only truthful ideas – ideas that are in tune with the essential dignity of 
man – can prevail over the years.”621  
This highlights the key difference between traditional conservatism and the New Right: 
modern conservatism does not work to conserve the status quo, but to overturn a “liberal” status 
quo. Part of the structure of the conservative movement is an “otherness” which sees itself as 
perpetually crashing the gates of an elite establishment. Gingrich’s Republican Revolution of 
1994 sees itself as the progeny of the American Revolution. The 1960s counterculture, urban 
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 unrest, antiwar protests, the Great Society, and reformist social science convinced conservatives 
that a liberal establishment controlled country’s government, civic, foundation, and media 
institutions.622 Blumenthal points out even after Reagan’s second landslide, conservatives  
…self-consciousness as outsiders was not abated but intensified.  They had traveled so 
far and yet still thought of themselves as a persecuted minority....  To the degree that the 
ideal world did not come to pass, conservatives credited the Liberal Establishment with 
insidious powers.623   
 
Thus, although conservative think tanks compete for dollars, their personnel, rhetoric, and 
methods indicate a cooperative, if unspoken, arrangement. A division of labor operates in which 
traditionalists like Pat Buchanan maintain an anti-intellectual façade, while neoconservatives 
proudly embrace the technocratic pathos. Held together in a productive if sometimes-
uncomfortable alliance, the movement simultaneously crashes the gates of the “liberal 
establishment” while claiming to defend western civilization against barbarian gatecrashers. 
Such informal coordination is also able to keep “two or three issues on the front burner at a given 
time.” 624 Stefancic and Delgado (1994:140) show how the same group of social policy tanks 
moved shifted from English only bills at the state then federal level, to immigration reform, 
speech codes and multicultural curricula, and finally affirmative action.625 Making efficient use 
of available talent whether the topic is social, foreign, or economic, tanks deploy key 
personalities from issue to issue as needed. The interchangeability of actors in conservatism 
further reinforces their sense that they are part of a movement, and should be ready to bounce 
around the television talking about tax cuts, preventive war, or abortion when called upon. 
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 This self-image conforms to a vision of the American experiment which sees the US as a 
land bounded by oceans and rivers, but perhaps more importantly by an idea: freedom 
(economic) for a class of mobile elites.626  America has always wanted to make the world safe 
for a small group of people to get very rich.  After brief and unsuccessful experiments with social 
welfare from the New Deal to the Great Society, Americans have rejected the promises of liberal 
elites, and come back around to the original meaning of the American Revolution, the warm 
bosom of the free market. 
Gingrich’s revolutionaries remain comfortable in the knowledge that despite eight years 
of Bill Clinton, middle class austerity will continue to slouch towards the national agenda. Issues 
like health care, education, social security, and industry regulation might still spark popular 
opposition to the logic of profit, but the New Democrats phenomenon raises the possibility that 
the issue will be framed in terms of whether these programs will be cut back a little or a lot. New 
Democrats like Clinton and his neoliberal economists at the Progressive Policy Institute may in 
fact be the supreme achievement of the conservative movement, having allowed conservative 
ideas to hold sway even when they are not in power. The right continues to mold conservative 
democrats into neo-liberals who accept the unrestrained power of private property, downsizing, 
spending limits, laissez faire economics, and anti-union positions. The New Democrats, still 
stigmatized by the “liberal” label despite their rightward lurch, adopted the conservative 
definition of social reality and abandoned much hope of reforming capitalism through state 
intervention. As Teeple (1995:145) explains, the “entire economic and political foundation on 
which social democratic parties were able to promote capitalism as reformed is eroding, forcing 
them to accept what global capital requires, the neo-liberal agenda.  As long as capitalism is 
                                                 
626 Christopher Lasch (1995) has described this as global class who share more in common with each other than with 
the citizens from their own countries.   
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 accepted as the mode of production, there are few possibilities of going against the tide. In fact, 
there is no significant resistance on the part of any social democratic party or government in any 
industrial nation to this agenda.” 
The paradigm ideas that under gird tank position papers follow the advice of F.A. Hayek, 
who implored conservatives to 
Learn from the success of the socialists. That it was their courage to be Utopian which 
gained them the support of the intellectuals and thereby an influence on public opinion 
which is daily making possible what only recently seemed utterly remote.627
 
They frame issues to remove certain ideas from mainstream policy debate and political culture, 
and provide a utopian agenda from which a conservative administration can select depending on 
political exigency.628 Even when their proposals remained unimplemented, such as a flat tax or 
eliminating the Department of Education, the ideas stretch the bounds of the imaginable, and 
shift the acceptable terms of debate rightwards. By daring to provide an all-encompassing vision 
that dares to “think the unthinkable,” think tanks demonstrate the reach of conservative ideology.  
Finally, the paradigm ideas hang together well. There is a seamless quality to their work. 
Cultural critiques of immigration, multiculturalism, and secularism appeal to the same middle 
class fears that animate economic critiques of government regulations, unionization, and 
international diplomacy, and all arguments work to deflect attention from the policies that 
generally favor concentrated corporate interests. The coherence of conservative ideas stems in 
part from the long view they take. While the ideas animating the Old Right of the 1950s and 
1960s—anti-communism, the moral superiority of Western tradition, individual freedom and 
private property—found their way into the New Right amalgam of ideas, the new conservatives 
                                                 
627 Hayek 1967: 194 
628 From a cross-national perspective, neoliberalism appears to be even less coherent than often assumed by both 
proponents and opponents, and more of a smorgasbord of paradigms and policies that can be cherry picked 
depending on their tactical and strategic value. See Campbell and Pedersen 2001.  
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 believed their predecessors to be short on strategic thought. Conservative policy research groups 
learned the importance of incorporating a long term, strategic dimension, and began to create a 
policy framework, the paradigm ideas of globalization, which delimited both the available 
explanations of the crisis’ causes, and its possible solutions. 
In the next chapter, we will see how the neoliberal regime or “Washington consensus” 
experienced its own crisis in the 1990s, and how transnational think tanks associated with a 
“Global Justice Movement” attempted with limited success to capitalize on the crisis, while 
transnational capital think tanks spackled the fissures of the “Washington consensus.” It is to 
these developments in the field of policy expertise that I now turn. 
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 7 Cracks and Spackles in the Global Governance Architecture 
Bolstered by the ideological marketing strategies developed in tank networks throughout the 
1970s, western governments and a growing transnational network of business friendly tanks 
pushed neoliberal policies through International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) in 
the 1980s.629 When communism fell in 1989-1991, a palpably euphoric tank community 
triumphantly pronounced that history was over – and capitalism won.630 The Clinton-Blair ascent 
on a “Third Way” platform of free trade and welfare reform also demonstrated the rhetorical 
power of market piety.  
The neoliberal regime was able to release the market from a host of states controls, and 
extend capital into new areas of social and natural life. A technologically innovative type of 
capital accumulation rooted in instant communication between financial markets and floating 
currency rates empowered a new sector of business actors. Where both the U.S. and UK had lost 
ground in productive capital in the 1970s and 1980s, they were able to use the new prominence 
of financial capital to build a strong position through neoliberal restructuring of developing 
economies, a significant expansion of loan capital in London “Euro” markets, and investment in 
“virtual accumulation.” World Bank Chief Economist for South Asia (1996-1999) John 
Williamson coined the term that stuck to the 1990s financial regime—the “Washington 
consensus.”631  
The “end of history” thesis began to crack with elite and popular challenges to a pure free 
market in investment, trade, development, and finance. These challenges to the Washington 
                                                 
629 “Structural adjustment policies” conditioned development and balance of payments loans to developing countries 
on reductions in basic social services (food, health, education), privatization of state companies, reducing taxes and 
tariffs on imports), export-led development (exploiting cheap labor and natural resources; versus 
subsistence/sustainable economies), currency devaluation, and limiting labor power. 
630 I call this the “globalization thesis.”  Cf. Thomas Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999), Mort 
Zuckerman’s “A Second American Century,” Foreign Affairs 77:3 (1998), Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of 
History” (1989).  
631 Williamson 1990  
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 consensus called the ability of the regime to secure the stability of the global system into 
question.  Pithy statements about the end of history became less tenable as the financial crises in 
the 1990s632 cast shadows on rosy visions of globalization, and led even hardcore neoclassical 
economists to reconsider of the IMF headlong dive into financial deregulation. The triumph of 
neoliberalism generated new forms of resistance. A “global justice movement” (GJM) 
disenchanted with neoliberal governance institutions633 mobilized broad coalitions to defeat the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1998), shut down the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
meeting of ministers from its 134 member countries in Seattle (1999), and alter World Bank debt 
and development policies. The confluence of these popular and elite challenges to capitalist 
development constituted the first “legitimacy crisis” of the post-Cold War global governance 
complex, and reshuffled the tank field once again.  
7.1 Transnational tanks and global governance 
Major national and transnational tanks and global governance institutions form a network 
in which global business elites cohered on strategy and tactics to translate collective will into a 
global synchronization of finance, investment, and trade, state policy. Their pronouncements, 
recommendations, and dictates are an elite management strategy propelling the apparently 
inevitable process of globalization. These groups are engines of transnational capitalist class 
formation. They foster the intellectual and moral leadership essential to the abiding effort to 
transmute transnational elite classes into representatives of a “general interest.”  
                                                 
632 These include Mexico (1995), Asia (1997), and Russia and Brazil (1998) 
633 Groups mobilized to defeat the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998, prevent the World Trade 
Organization’s ministers meeting in Seattle in 1999, and extract significant concessions from the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund.  
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 Network analysis,634 case studies635 and other analyses636 at the global level suggest 
corporate directors at the center of the think tank field, and interlocking directorates and 
overlapping membership among think tanks, create an inner circle of policy planning and 
contribute significantly to transnational corporate-elite integration. Fennema’s (1982)637 study of 
interlocking bank and industry directorates between 1976 and 1996 extended Useem (1984) and 
Domhoff’s (1998) network analysis (which gave empirical support for the notion of elite 
integration at the national level) to outline a transnational “kind of superstructure that rests on 
rather resilient national bases.”638 More recently, Robinson and Harris find a transnational 
capitalist class whose “organic composition, objective position and subjective constitution” is 
“no longer tied to the nation state.” 639 Carroll and Carson map the “social structure of the global 
corporate elite, the collection of leading corporate directors who participate in the network of 
major corporations and transnational policy groups” like the World Economic Forum and 
Trilateral Commission. They find that Van der Pijl’s (1984) notion of a North Atlantic ruling 
class still holds, that elements of fragmentation within neoliberalism “barely register,”640 that “a 
well-integrated global corporate elite or business community has formed, and that global policy 
groups have been instrumental in its formation.”641  
                                                 
634 Caroll and Carson 2003:97. In this study TC, along with other neoliberal internationalist (they use the term 
“structural neoliberalism”) groups like WEF and the World Business Council on Sustainable Development “are 
deeply enmeshed within the corporate elite. They are substantially interlocked with each other as well as with 
common corporate boards….” TC in particular emerges as a central node for transnational corporate elite 
integration. It finds that “a few dozen cosmopolitans—primarily men based in Europe and North America and 
actively engaged in corporate management—knit the corporate-policy network together by participating in 
transnational interlocking and/or multiple policy groups. This inner circle creates the interlocks that make the 
network a transnational formation. A mere 17 corporate directors, some of whom serve on as many as four policy 
boards, create a plethora of relations among policy groups.”  
635 Gill 1990 
636 Van der Pijl 1998 
637 Fennema 1982 
638 2002:14 
639 Robinson and Harris 2000:14 
640 Caroll and Carson 2003:77, 98 
641 2003:98 
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 In facilitating an adaptable elite consensus, these entities act as Gramsci’s “collective 
intellectuals” of the capitalist class “entrusted with the activity of organizing the general system 
of relationships external to…business itself.”642 The social structure that links corporate and 
policy elites allows capitalists to rise above immediate economic interests to take up 
“enlightened” concerns of global system stability. Van der Pijl (1998:5), Cox (1987), Gill (1990, 
1992) and Overbeek and van der Pijl (1993) all emphasize the role of policy planning groups in 
developing the long term vision necessary for transnational capitalist class formation under 
conditions of restructuring and stabilizing capitalist fractions.  
Transnational business tanks integrate globally economic, social, and political life into a 
“global governance” complex of authoritative state actors and nonstate actors including 
nongovernmental organizations and a denationalized capital class of international and national 
finance bankers. This is not the “integrated planning” instituted by Wilson through the War 
Industries Board or FDR through National Resources Planning Board, but is a type of planning 
nonetheless, visible at the level of the policy field as a whole. As Robert Cox argues, “There is 
no explicit political or authority structure for the global economy, there is, nevertheless, 
something there that remains to be deciphered, something that could be described by the French 
word nebuleuse or by the notion of “governance without government”643.  
7.1.1 Case 31: World Economic Forum 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is today the largest such forum. It brings together the 
ascendant classes of developing states with the established elites of capitalism’s core states. 
Begun in 1971 by Swiss business policy expert Klaus Schwab, its yearly forum in Davos, 
Switzerland brings world leaders in business and politics together on the assumption that “the 
best way to achieve progress is through interaction among those who really carry the 
                                                 
642 Gramsci 1971:6 
643 Cox 1996: 301 
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 responsibility.” It is a key institutional nexus for the elaboration of neoliberal ideas and 
strategies, a comprehensive transnational body for the debate and creation of hegemonic 
concepts. Its membership includes foundation members, economic “partners” in government and 
international organizations, chief executives of industry, editors-in-chief and commentators from 
major media, academics and experts in social science and technological fields, and distinguished 
cultural and arts leaders. The membership structure is exclusive, “subject to strict conditions of 
admission in order to preserve their peer character,” and “participation in the activities of the 
WEF is reserved for its members and constituents…special guests [may be allowed] if their 
presence creates additional value for other members.” 644 This structure ensures that participation 
occurs only among those that share or conform to WEF principles. It limits its elite “Foundation 
Membership” core to “1,000 of the foremost global enterprises, but its invited “constituents” 
include a wide range of scientific, academic, media, public, and NGO elites that participate in 
various work groups in WEF.645
 By bringing together the established leaders of core American and European states with 
sympathetic elites in developing and newly industrialized states, WEF functions to integrate a 
“class-conscious transnational bourgeoisie.”646 According to its founder Schwab and managing 
director Claude Smadja, WEF is necessary due to the exigencies wrought by the global network 
society: 
[The] economic globalization and the information-technologies revolution [is] a quantum 
leap from what we are used to…. It tests the to the limit the ability of political and economic 
leaders to manage repercussions of the changes.647  
The WEF operates squarely within the neoliberal paradigm, urging competition as an inherent 
value promoted by further opening social and natural life to market discipline. Its general 
                                                 
644 Quoted in the July/August 1994 edition of WEF’s bimonthly publication World Link. 
645 http://members.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Our+Organization%5CForum+Centres  
646 Quoted in Robinson, W.I. 1992:8 
647 International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1997 
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 tendency had been towards pure free market ideas, but as we shall see below, in response to the 
growing capitalist crises and globalization backlash of the 1990s, including surging worker 
strikes in France beginning in December 1995, WEF went further than TC in seeking a kinder 
gentler neoliberal variant.  
7.2 Financial capital flows and the 1997-1998 Asian Economic “Flu” 
In the summer of 1997, Thailand experienced a financial crisis that spread like a flu 
through Southeast Asia, then Russia, and Brazil.  In the herd mentality characteristic of 
international investors648 panic selling ensued when the Thai baht began to devalue in August, 
sending the currency into freefall.  The fears and selling quickly spread to regional countries 
(South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines) whose currencies devalued up to 80 percent in a 
matter of months.  This sent Asian currency markets into free-fall, and prompted massive panic 
by foreign investors who quickly sold off stocks and bonds.   
The IMF and U.S. Treasury quickly put together largest financial rescue plan in history, 
superseding the Mexico bailout of 1995649.  To rebuild business confidence and persuade foreign 
investors to return, the IMF, World Bank, and other institutions sent $120 billion to South Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines to help pay billions owed to European, U.S., and 
                                                 
648 Friedman 1999 
649The bailout passed by large majority in Senate in March 1998, but not without firm opposition from both the left 
and the right, who challenged $18 billion U.S. contribution to the IMF as taxpayer money to bail out international 
banks for bad investments.  In the House, most opposition came from Republicans who argued the very existence of 
the IMF violated free market principles.  Democrats like David Bonoir (MI) and Barney Frank (MA) signed on 
condition that IMF pay more attention to labor and environmental issues.  In response, the Treasury established an 
advisory panel for business and labor in the U.S. to review IMF programs. The global collapse a la ‘29-’32 was a 
representative anecdote for those wishing to justify bailouts.  It became increasingly clear around the world that 
“rescue” of Asia was not for working people, but to make sure various countries could service their debt obligations 
to the same big foreign institutional speculators who had precipitated the crisis in the first place.  Critics saw every 
crisis bailout leading to more speculation, and a bigger crisis later, resulting in perpetual indulgence towards rentiers 
– a vicious cycle that enriches handful of banks/brokerage houses, and increases their stranglehold over 
governments around the world.  
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 Japanese banks.  In return, the four countries agreed to restructure their economies, which meant 
shutting down insolvent businesses/banks, ending monopolies, phasing out restrictions on 
investment, and opening markets to even more foreign capital650. The IMF rescue effort -- loans 
conditioned on high interest rates, cutting government spending, and raising taxes—were unable 
to stem the outflow of foreign currency.  As the IMF would come to admit itself, its actions had 
probably exacerbated regional instability by shrinking Japan’s most important regional export 
markets.  Millions of laid off workers suffered serious hardship and impoverishment.  As foreign 
companies bought Asian assets in massive amounts, states phased out controls on food prices 
and other goods, and food riots resulted in the overthrow of Suharto regime in Indonesia. 
The crisis became an opportunity for centrist and ideological U.S. think tanks, the IMF 
and World Bank, and policy-focused NGOs in the countries most impacted by the crisis to 
rethink the pace of financial capital transactions between countries. The currency collapse 
surprised most economists, since for years the rapid growth in Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Singapore, and Taiwan had engendered an image of Asia as a “miracle” growth region.  
The shock was severe enough to provoke a serious controversy over global governance in 
rarefied government and expert forums, the first in decades, opening the 20-year commitment to 
freeing international financial transactions to serious modification.   
The most visible criticism of IMF piety within the global governance complex was World 
Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz’ accusation that when Asian banks began to topple as a 
result of a glut in real estate and slowdown in exports, the IMF made things worse by requiring 
austerity, when it should have stimulated the economies through social spending. On 15 
September 1998 at the presentation of the WB’s annual “World Development Review” 
                                                 
650 Then Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin argued the IMF bailout was needed to restore economic stability and  
prevent a broader crisis that could affect the U.S.  He also warned that social unrest could lead to U.S. military 
involvement. 
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 document, Stiglitz noted that state intervention, not the orthodox prescriptions of austerity, 
privatization, and deregulation, facilitated East Asia’s rapid growth.  He also blamed the 1997 
financial crisis on reckless private investors, not, as free market tanks (e.g., IIE) had argued, a 
lack of market liberalization or crony capitalism.  He also pointed to “a fundamental change in 
mindset on the issue of short-term capital flows and these kinds of interventions – a change in 
the mind set that began two years ago.”   
Economists at mainstream publications such as Businessweek and The Economist echoed 
Stiglitz’ blunt accusation that structural adjustment policies had exacerbated the crisis, and urged 
states to intervene to control capital flight. Authority still rested with US Trade Representative 
Lawrence Summers, who remained committed to an unrestrained free marketer-ism, but the open 
reconsideration of the globalization thesis meant the free market honeymoon was over.  As 
Institute for Policy Studies President John Cavanagh put it, “Even though economies recovered 
somewhat, and the financial indicators are better, the most commentators, including elites, agree 
it’s not good idea to run global finance like a casino.”651   
7.2.1 Spackling cracks in the globalization thesis 
The IMF and sympathetic think tanks worked overtime to entice politicians and the 
public to neoliberal ideas in the face of its increasingly unappealing side effects in advanced 
capitalist countries, as well as the rest of the world. Mainstream think tanks, whether they 
specialize in international trade and finance issues (IIE) or have research wings devoted to the 
issue (Brookings, AEI), continued to represent globalization as an inevitable telos with objective 
constraints, and understand opposition to globalization as an obstacle to be overcome. 
IIE and other market ideologues saw the answer to financial crises to be more 
liberalization, not less, and used the Asian crisis to discredit state intervention.  C. Fred Bergsten 
                                                 
651 Cavanagh, interview by Amos Tevelow 1999 
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 of IIE was explicit about “putting protectionist forces on the defensive” in order to “keep the 
bicycle [of free trade] moving,” lest it tip over from lack of inertia.  The economists at Brookings 
also did not view the Asian flu as necessitating drastic reforms.  The lesson taken was that the 
financial architecture should be amended only insofar as to “prevent and better manage” future 
crises committed to amending the Washington consensus rather than overturning it. 
Globaphobia, a pamphlet from the director of the economic studies program, Robert Litan, billed 
as a “common sense” rebuttal to those who fear globalization, depicted such thinking.652  In a 
radio roundtable with Diane Rhem, Litan explained that capitalism is not “coming apart at the 
seams” (a reference to a comment by George Soros), rather “crony capitalism” is faltering, or, as 
in the case of Russia, they “never tried capitalism” really. In the same program, Catherine Mann 
of Brookings cautions against killing “the golden goose” of globalization, since its rapid growth 
and low inflation benefits everyone. Litan attributed increasing inequalities in wages and wealth 
over the past twenty-five years to technological change instead of globalization per se, and while 
willing to tolerate some controls on foreign currency borrowing, did not see the need for any 
sweeping reform.   
The response of tanks sponsored by the international financial community was even less 
surprising.  In a formal letter in April 1997, 2 months before Asian crisis, the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), Washington, D.C. based think tank representing interests of some 
                                                 
652 Brookings Institution Forum, Asian recovery: is it for real? Fri September 24, 1999. The discussion foregrounded 
questions of a surprising recovery in Asia. The participants were Michael Armacost (Brookings’ current president, 
former U.S. ambassador to Japanand the Philippines, and under secretary of state for political affairs), Robert 
Hormats (vice chairman for powerhouse investment firm Goldman Sachs), C.H. Kwan (visiting fellow in 
Brookings’ Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and senior economist at Japan’s Nomura Research Institute), 
Edward Lincoln (Brookings senior. fellow and author of Japan’s Unequal Trade), and Robert Litan (vice president 
and director of the Economic Studies Program at Brookings).  In his opening statements, Armacost signalled his 
support for China’s entry into the WTO, and expressed wariness of “protectionist sentiments” in Congress.  Robert 
Hormats commented that even though China’s insulation protected it, China recognized the crisis as a message, and 
is reforming/restructring their own banking system (setting up asset management companies like Korea’s KAMCO, 
and U.S.’ RTC).  C.H. Kwan argued that China’s lack of a liberal foreign exchange rate (tight controls on inflow and 
outflow of capital; no convertibility on capital accounts) protected it from the crisis.  
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 290 global banks and brokerage houses urged the IMF to counter upward exchange rate 
pressures by allowing national currencies to slide. Just such a policy would contribute to the 
coming crisis, but one would not find IIF issuing any apologies. Instead, in April 1998, IIF 
proposed a “Private Sector Advisory Council” to act as a “watchdog” of the IMF. The intent was 
to strengthen private sector involvement in crisis management through a sort of power sharing 
between the IMF and global banks, and to transform IMF from an intergovernmental body to a 
bureaucracy serving global banks.  To IIF, “transparency” means access to the details of IMF 
negotiations with member governments reason they want access to details of IMF negotiations 
with member governments as a way to strategize assaults on financial markets before and after 
IMF bailout agreements. 
7.2.2 The IMF response 
Rather than take responsibility for creating the conditions underlying the 1997 East Asian 
financial crisis, IMF leadership tried to spin the Asian crisis as a rebuke to “crony capitalism.” 
However, when IMF solutions seem to exacerbate the problem, economists in elite forums 
decried the “excesses” that external critics had been voicing for twenty years (and internal 
critics, famously WB Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, more recently). The failed IMF response 
led to a genuine debate among mainstream economists on the ability of the free market to 
mitigate the dislocations resulting from globalization.653 The notion that free markets and 
reduced government will not work if not embedded in civil society institutions began to emerge. 
It produced deep self-questioning among officials and think tankers who had advocated 
neoliberalism in the region for years, who now had to admit that a less ideologically driven 
approach might have produced a better response.654 The Asian flu started a debate in the 
economics profession over whether markets were too open.  The result of the debate was a 
                                                 
653 E.g. Rodrik, 1997; Krugman, 1999. 
654 Kristof and Sanger 2003 
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 consensus strongly around free trade, even though citizens have halted their agenda (fast track, 
MAI).  The consensus around financial liberalization was much more porous.  A new consensus 
emerged that recognized governments’ needs to put controls on short-term international 
borrowing, lending, investment, and conversion of currencies. Advocates believed such “capital 
controls” would allow governments the flexibility to restrict the amount domestic banks and 
firms could borrow in foreign currency, especially in the short-term.   
Where the bulk of opinion among economists and policy networks had been that currency 
controls cause “distortions” in the “natural” prices of the market, high profile statements began 
to veer away.655   Following internal and external criticisms, the IMF conceded its handling of 
the Asian crisis was wrong.   
Mainstream economists who limited their definition of the “Washington Consensus” to 
the steadfast commitment by the IMF to liberalize portfolio investment rapidly (a group that 
includes the economist who coined the term)656 was careful to limit their criticism of the system 
to opposing further opening capital accounts. However, IIE economist John Williamson would 
come to regret that the terminology he coined657 “invited the interpretation that ideas emanating 
from Washington were being imposed on developing countries (2000).  Williamson has said his 
ideas were “caricatured” by “those who have lost the intellectual war” to “re-fight the battles that 
seemed to… have been decisively settled.”658    
                                                 
655 “On the finance side you saw these big cracks in the actual consensus, Joe Stiglitz (wb), etc. saying the 
unthinkable, which is that govt has a role in putting some constraints on capital,” Cavanagh, interview. 
656 Williamson 1994: 26-28 
657 Williamson 1994: 26-8 
658 “I regret my choice of terminology in part because I do not believe that there was anything special about the 
extent to which views had coalesced in Washington; actually I think it more interesting that a similar intellectual 
evolution had occurred among the economists and policy makers in many developing countries….  It is doubtless 
too late to restore the term to its original meaning, but I would at least ask of those who use the term in this populist 
way that they have the integrity to recognize that others have used it differently” (2000). Williamson also said he 
meant to describe a consensus around the parts of Neoliberalism that had survived the end of the Reagan-Thatcher 
political regime (such as privatization and a recognition of the positive role markets can play) rather than extremist 
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 He was referring to the ability of NGO networks, connected through both strong and 
weak ties to the global protest movement, to expand the meaning of “Washington consensus” to 
a geographical metonym for the whole array of policy prescriptions uttered with orthodox 
regularity by the IMF and its most influential shareholder, the U.S. Treasury Department.659 
More broadly, they used the moniker signified predictable statements issued by the World Bank, 
Davos Forum, WTO, G-7, and key think tanks and public relations firms.  These institutions’ 
policy positions, argued the protesters, worked generally to reduce public control over 
development by restricting states from acting to manage their own economies.  
7.2.3 Case 32: Hong Kong based Regional NGOs  
Regional policy elites in Latin America and East Asia reacted to the crisis by developing 
increasingly negative attitudes towards IMF-US Treasury prescriptions.  For policy researchers 
and analysts in the areas affected by the crisis, a fundamental question was to what extent flaws 
in structure of the international economic order were responsible for the crisis, and for the 
increasing gap in global income distribution.  
From June 15-18 1998, 25 representatives from local and regional NGOs in Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, met at the Hong Kong YMCA on the 
theme “Financial Crisis: Our Response.”  The Final Statement issued by the attendees660 offers 
an analysis of the crisis very different from that put forth by the IMF defenders.    
Where the IMF thought the “currency crisis” would only require a minor tune up in 
financial transparency, a network of Pacific Rim NGOs emphasized the IMF and U.S. Treasury’s 
continuing commitment to the view that global economic growth is best promoted through more 
                                                                                                                                                             
versions that “would certainly not command a consensus in Washington or anywhere else except a few “right-wing 
think tanks” (such as a fixed growth rate in the money supply, or the idea that re-distributive taxation amounts to 
plunder), (2000).  
 
659 IMF decision making authority is distributed according to the member nations’ contributions to the fund.   
660 Regional NGOs in Hong Kong (1998) 
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 open trade, export oriented growth, deregulation, and liberalization of financial markets.  The 
participants described the situation as  
…not just a financial crisis but an economic crisis….  While it is true that the crisis first 
made itself known in the Asian monetary values and exchange rates, participants of this 
conference do not believe that it is simply a currency crisis.  It is a crisis of the economic 
structures and paradigms promoted by the economic elites, the multilateral financial 
institutions such as the IMF and WB and the governments subservient to their interests.661
 
By broadening the analysis from currency to paradigms, the NGOs offer a picture that called into 
question the very basis of the global economic system.  The roots of the crisis are not merely 
financial, but are  
…related to the kind of economic models that many Asian societies have been pursuing 
for many years, the inability of national governments to exercise leadership that is 
responsive to people’s needs and interests, the dominant role that multilateral financial 
institutions have had in shaping economic and social policies of Asian countries, and the 
entire globalization process which has aggressively pushed for ‘free market’ economic 
policies and practices worldwide in the service of global capital and the economic elite.662
From the Hong Kong NGOs perspective, a solution that reoriented policies towards meeting 
basic needs lied in hands of grassroots organizations, and the Asian people who were the victims 
and real stakeholders in the crisis.   
The Hong Kong TT group rejected the major western media’s most frequent explanation 
of the crisis. They argued that the “cronyism” explanation concealed the involvement of the 
IMF/WB and financial speculators in the collapse of East Asian economies.663  Instead, they the 
real culprit to be the integration of national economies in a system of economic liberalization, 
structural adjustment programs, export-oriented growth, and profits for the few, in other words, 
globalization itself. They refer to “elites and the private sector” who seek to profiteer from 
currency fluctuations, exacerbate instability through speculation, and then force governments and 
the people to bail out the accumulated debt burden. 
                                                 
661 Ibid p.1-2, my emphasis 
662 Ibid p.1  
663 Corporate Watch, 10/28/99, “Global Financial Crisis”, www.corpwatch.org/trac/globalization/financial/  
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 The Hong Kong tank group did identify a certain type of cronyism—“poor governance” 
and “no substantive democracy”—as structural causes. By this, they meant that the authoritarian 
regimes remaining in the region after de-colonization in the 1950s and 1960s had integrated their 
countries into the world market by using education, military violence, media, and meaningless 
general elections to repress politics and labor unions. The Asian high growth “miracle” depended 
precisely on export-led development policies crafted by a tiny group of elites exercising social 
control. The Hong Kong group argued that the identical strategies that built up the image of Asia 
as a model for developing countries pushed the Asian economies over the edge. They decried US 
analysts who hypocritically denounced the corruption and opacity of Asian capitalism even 
though they made big investments and raved about the “Asian Miracle” before the decline, and 
then, “posing as saviors,”664 enacted the same policies short-term recovery programs and bail out 
packages 665 in what amounted to a form of re-colonization. What the Asian flu showed the Hong 
Kong think tank was that dictatorial regimes can no longer handle the situation, and therefore 
participatory democracy should be a key policy concern.   
The NGOs referred to China and in particular, Malaysia as representative anecdotes of 
what countries could do by resisting incorporation into the global regime.  Mahathir used George 
Soros to personify a system of capital flows run by a small number of hedge fund managers 
whose profits came from relatively small differentials in currencies produced by sudden outflows 
of capital, often to the detriment of the affected countries, and that therefore capital controls were 
                                                 
664 Hong Kong NGOs, p.1 
665 These policies and their effects were: 1) capital accounts liberalization, deemed necessary by the IMF to 
encourage foreign capital to finance economic projects at growth rates, led to massive short-term capital flight and 
rendered the economy vulnerable to sudden movements 2) high interest rate regimes espoused for years by the IMF 
as a way to attract foreign capital, fueled speculative economic activity and undermined domestic production 3) the 
privatization promoted to raise government revenues by commercializing public services undermined safety nets for 
the poor 4) trade liberalization was pursued to stimulate market, but marginalized small producers and consumers.   
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 necessary.  At the time, he was ridiculed; conventional economics had it that such controls would 
devastate the economy.  However, when IMF/WB actions backfired in other parts of Asia, while 
Malaysia (and China) remained relatively secure, the necessity of capital controls received near 
universal acknowledgement, and the country showed what you could do if you rejected IMF 
prescriptions. The Malaysian case refocused from the Asia-specific roots of the crisis to alleged 
defects in the international system, allowing Mahathir and others to depict the crisis as 
originating from the failure of the international financial architecture structures to manage 
international currency flows.  
7.2.4 Case 33: Liberal left think tanks  
Liberal left tanks mirrored the GJM critiques of the international financial architecture in 
that they addressed root causes and proposed radical change. They point out that as productivity 
has increased fifty percent in the past thirty years, the social safety net, standard of living, and 
average wage have declined.    
The Campaign for America’s Future (CAF) launched in the summer of 1996 to 
counterbalance the DLC’s economic conservatism with a populist message that promoted 
unionization, workplace reforms, restrictions on corporate power, and an international trade 
regime to protect Americans’ wages and benefits. Along with the EPI, the CAF provided a much 
less rosy picture of employment in the United States: “Inequality has risen to heights not seen 
since before the Great Depression.  CEO salaries have soared, while wages have fallen…. 
America, which once grew together, is now growing apart.”666
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) suggested an acknowledgement that 
deregulation of financial markets is a problem, not a solution, and substantial IMF reform to 
prevent sudden flights of capital. Proposals in labor and progressive organizations include a 
                                                 
666 As quoted in Greenberg and Skocpol 1997:4.  
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 “Tobin” transaction tax,667 a requirement that capital remain for at least a year,668 an 
International Credit Insurance Corporation,669 making IMF procedures more transparent, and 
conditioning future IMF lending on political reforms in recipient countries.  
The Center for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR) is a D.C. based nonprofit 
organization dedicated to explaining the impact of economic policies on the least advantaged in 
the U.S. and around the world. It seeks to counter the intuition on the part of most who write 
about the issue that “globalization is an inevitable, technologically driven process that is 
increasing commercial and political relations between people of different countries [and]... it is 
not only a natural phenomenon, but primarily good for the world.....”670 Like the Hong Kong 
regional NGOs, the CEPR identified the main cause of the Asian crisis as  
…the international financial ‘liberalization’ of the previous decade.  In other words 
banks, other financial institutions, and corporations in South Korea, Indonesia, and 
elsewhere were allowed to borrow large amounts of money in international markets.  
Furthermore, a large proportion of this debt was short-term debt.  This created the 
situation in which a falling currency sets off a panic: investors, both foreign and 
domestic, have reason to fear that they will not be able to convert their domestic currency 
into ‘hard’ currency -- e.g. dollars or yet.  As everyone heads for the exists, the 
government runs low on foreign exchange reserves -- these are sums of foreign currency 
held by the central bank. This causes even more panic and further downward spiraling of 
the domestic currency.671
7.3 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
Objections from developing countries prevented rules for direct foreign investment from 
being included in the postwar General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and at its 
renegotiation in the Uruguay Round in the 1990s. After failing to incorporate direct investment 
rules in 1995, industrialized states shifted discussions to a friendlier institutional context, the 
                                                 
667 This is a small tax on overseas capital flows used as an emergency fund for future crises.  
668 Chile 
669 George Soros’ idea to force banks to finance a private bailout fund.  
670 Weisbrot 1999   
671 Weisbrot 1999 
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 OECD, which had been studying and preparing for negotiations to liberalize investment rules 
since 1991.672  
However, a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) agreement never came. 
Negotiations collapsed towards the end of 1998 after delays caused by intense public scrutiny. 
The international campaign to defeat the MAI exemplifies the ways that heterogeneous NGOs in 
different countries can draw on and build bonds of trust through social mobilization activities 
based on shared values. Someone leaked a draft text of the MAI in February 1997. A network of 
NGOs took informal leadership positions and quickly distributed the text with analysis through 
email lists.673 Feeling purposely excluded from negotiations, and outraged at the antidemocratic 
terms of agreement, a coalition of over 600 NGOs banded together with sympathetic politicians 
and trade unions dedicated to halting the MAI negotiations by publicly exposing its flaws.674
One explanation of the MAI failure is an accumulation of distrust between the OECD and 
civil society, due to OECD structural consultation procedures. Its 1960 convention mandates 
OECD act more like a think tank to promote “the further expansion of world trade.”675 OECD 
has a limited tradition of negotiation and no official role for NGOs.676 An independent 
Negotiating Group bypassed any ties environmental, fair trade, and human rights NGOs might 
have to OECD committees. The Negotiating Group was a homogeneous group of investment 
experts, policy makers and diplomats sent by the member countries, and business and trade union 
                                                 
672 Tieleman 2000:8 
673 Martin Khor of the Third World Network obtained a document from the May 1995 OECD Ministerial Meeting 
indicating that multilateral investment negotiations might proceed in the OECD. Khor passed this information out to 
various colleagues, including Tony Clarke of Canada’s Polaris Institute in Canada. Clarke got a draft of the MAI, 
translated it into a readable document, and posted on an international email distribution list, along with his own 
analysis and interpretation. Lori Wallach of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch engaged in similar interpretive 
efforts (Tieleman 2000: 12-13). 
674 Tieleman 2000: 8-15 
675 OECD 1960 
676 Business has permanent representation in the OECD through the Business Advisory Committee (BIAC), labor 
through the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) (Tieleman 2000: 6). 
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 representatives who, as Dutch assistant chair Huner observed, “…were not used to viewing from 
a political perspective the concepts that they consider logical and essential parts of an investment 
discipline.”677 Seeing their actions as largely technical in nature, the negotiators saw the benefits 
of the treaty as obvious, and the controversy genuinely surprised them. They also clearly 
underestimated NGOs capacities to coordinate an international campaign to educate and 
mobilize citizens and public officials. 
When negotiators invited NGO participation in late October, mistrust was so deep that 
most decided to fight the MAI instead of consult. Even though OECD signaled its openness to 
incorporating environmental and labor considerations for the first time into an investment treaty, 
NGOs felt that their involvement would merely legitimate a pre-decided agenda. When solicited 
for a seminar with business and labor a year later,678 many in the NGO network were not even on 
speaking terms with OECD negotiators, and saw the meeting as designed to split the movement. 
They reasoned that since the OECD had seen fit to meet with transnational corporations rather 
than civil society groups for two years, NGOs could not trust it to take their concerns seriously 
now.679
Had the OECD respected the competencies of NGOs, they might have channeled regular 
and accessible information back and forth in a continuous accountability system. Instead, a spiral 
of mistrust led to a campaign to “kill the MAI.” When the MAI was finally pulled, activists 
hailed it a victory of millions of web-based Davids versus Goliath, and it became a representative 
anecdote of a sort of ideal form of public participation characterized by publicity and 
information-sharing activities of informally-linked NGO networks, representing diverse 
geographic zones, to achieve legislative victories. 
                                                 
677 Huner 1998: 1 
678 December 2, 1998. 
679 Tieleman 2000:16 
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 7.4 The WTO “Battle in Seattle”  
Transnational justice tanks saw the mobilization against the MAI as a proving ground for 
the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle. The meeting of trade ministers from its 134 member 
countries, the largest such meeting ever in the U.S., mobilized a broad base of environmental, 
labor, human rights, and other groups to protest in large numbers.  The “mobilization against 
corporate globalization” marked a significant expansion of trade and other global governance 
controversies from elite policy circles into popular awareness. Extensive press attention enabled 
protesters to publicize the argument that the WTO, which came into existence with little fanfare 
four years earlier, favored corporations over developing countries and workers in developed 
countries. NGOs in the “50 Years is Enough” network viewed the WTO as extending 
privatization and deregulation from finance into trade by making IMF-style conditions into 
prerequisites for entry into the world market.680 Activists also pointed out that the authority to 
determine whether national laws on things like environmental protection and labor standards 
violate international trade rule infringed on the sovereignty of all nations because it shifted the 
burden of proof on to countries to prove that their regulations did not infringe on rights of 
transnational corporations.681
The international business community took seriously the widespread resistance to 
neoliberalism, and the need to counter the rhetoric of the global backlash.682 They worried that, 
on the heels of the campaigns to defeat MAI and “fast track” authority for the president, a stream 
of news stories about protest preparations for protests and activists “stunts” would mean that 
                                                 
680 Activists in the American continents similarly viewed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas embodies the 
market fundamentalism found in the IMF, WB, and WTO. It is the latest codification of the similar structural 
adjustment rules and enforcement mechanisms, allowing corporations, for example, to sue governments that impose 
pollution regulations on factories. 
681 Protest NGOs pointed out for example that in 1997 under the WTO Venezuelan gasoline producers successfully 
challenged the EPA’s standards on gasoline quality at WTO, and in 1998 the Endangered Species Act sea turtles 
protection from shrimp fishing boat nets was overturned by WTO as unfair trade practice. 
682 French 2000: 168-9 
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 business views would not receive equal coverage. Concerned over the effect media coverage of 
protesters “wearing rubber chicken suits and rappelling down the Space Needle,” and 
disappointed at the reluctance of the Clinton administration Host Committee to take on the job of 
“message” aggressively, big companies and trade associations sent PR tanks to engage in a war 
of words to defend free trade principles. US Trade683 and the U.S. Alliance for Trade Expansion 
(USATE)684 arrived in Seattle to “provide a reasoned and rational explanation of the benefits of 
global trade expansion to both workers and consumers.”  They dismissed the protesters claims as 
irrational explanations of the disadvantages of global trade to workers and consumers. Scot 
Montrey, spokesperson for the USATE, said they wanted to make “sure a lot of the crazy things 
they say don’t go unanswered….  All you have to do is read the newspaper to know that the anti-
WTO forces have been more effective, thus far, than we have, and that’s why we’re here.”685   
US Trade took a less nuts-and-bolts approach than USATE, focusing on general benefits 
of free trade rather than the technicalities involved in the WTO.  Chairman Scott Miller was 
candid about the hegemonic need to represent specific business interests as universal values: 
We have not done a good job of presenting our case to the American people.  There’s 
now a real understanding in the business community that a lot of our agenda has not 
moved forward the way we would like it because we haven’t addressed ourselves in a 
clear way to answering ‘What’s in this for Americans?’686     
 
It supplied journalists and the public with statistics and anecdotes supporting unfettered trade, 
arguing that global trade produced the long period of low unemployment and booming economy, 
lowers prices, and creates American jobs.  
Despite the visibility of the Seattle protests, the arena of trade has not been as subject to 
internal criticism or actual reform as the IMF, WB, or United Nations. This is both an effect and 
                                                 
683 funded by Proctor & Gamble 
684 a national corporate coalition that includes Boeing, Paccar, GE, and IBM 
685 Paulson 1999 
686 Paulson 1999 
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 cause of the relative insulation of WTO from NGO actors. The U.S. State Department instituted 
a largely symbolic “Trans-Atlantic Environmental Dialogue” to broker a peace with global trade 
discontents after Seattle. WTO efforts to solicit limited NGO input into trade deliberations are an 
effort to use “good governance” and “social capital” rhetoric to alter the perceptions about the 
lack of participation by developing states while continuing to dictate a neoliberal approach in 
those states. For its part, the business community agrees the WTO penchant for secrecy is 
regrettable, not because it hurts workers or the environment, but because it made it more difficult 
for business to control.  
7.5 The World Bank 
20 years of NGO activism has been a major factor impacting Bank687 projects (e.g. dams, 
highways, thermal plants, natural resources) and systematic reforms (e.g. public information 
policies, structural adjustment conditions, inspection panels, joint evaluations, and NGO 
liaisons). Over the last ten years, 150 public interest NGOs collaborated in the “Fifty Years is 
Enough” campaign for greater transparency and responsiveness at the WB/IMF.  NGOs from all 
continents focused attention on the harmful actions and secrecy of the institutions.   
The pressure exerted by the NGO networks throughout the 1990s also correlates with 
increasing levels of NGO involvement in multilateral debt and development talks at the Bank. 
Where NGO involvement in WB lending projects averaged 6 percent between 1973 and 1988, by 
1998 about half of the lending projects provided for NGO involvement.688 When the aim is to 
control project damage or shape local implementation, grassroots organizations directly affected 
                                                 
687 Parallel reforms have developed at other multilateral development banks like the Interamerican Development 
Bank, see Chiriboga 2000 
688 Simmons 1998:3 
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 by Bank projects tend to spearhead opposition.689 When the main concern is systemic reform of 
bank policies and institutional arrangements690 transnational NGO issues networks exert 
sustained pressure, and benefit from advice and information offered by sympathetic reformers 
within the Bank.691  
Religious and development NGOs vigorously promoted the cancellation of the 2.2 trillion 
dollar (1999) third world debt burden because of the unconscionable burden it places on humane 
economic development, and because corrupt authoritarian governments accumulated much of the 
debt. They argued that by demanding countries pay down debt with hard currency earned 
through exports (“export-led growth”), the IMF/WB function more as international collection 
agencies than engines of domestic investment. The debt thus functions like a credit card on 
which the interest is simply too high to service and can never be paid back. 
Rooted in econometric analyses692 showing the North’s domination over the South has 
arrested and even reversed development, NGOs focused on debt alleviation and equitable 
development strategies as reparations for IMF and World Bank failures in Africa and the South. 
Efforts to increase transparency and incorporate civil society into global governance have also 
been at the core of NGO activist demands since the Rio Earth Summit in Jun 1992. Rio a 
watershed for inroads into global governance, where there were at least twice as many (20,000) 
                                                 
689 E.g. dams, thermal plants, and natural resources.  
690 This focus may have a greater impact in the long term since it alters the context in which project managers act by 
allowing opponents to challenge and influence projects early in the design stage and leverage public opinion against 
Bank’s failures to meet their own policies (Brown & Fox 2000: 6).  
691 Brown & Fox, 2000: 2-3 
692 E.g. the Center for Economic and Policy Research report The Emperor Has no Growth (Weisbrot, Naiman & 
Kim, 2000) which demonstrated that growth rates over last 20 years were slower than previous 20, when 
Keynesianism not purist Neoliberal models, ruled the day.  Or, as Walden Bello (2001) puts it, “As for the so-called 
positive relationship between free trade and growth, the emerging consensus is laid out by Dani Rodrik, professor in 
international political economics at Harvard University: ‘Do lower trade barriers spur greater economic progress? 
The available studies reveal no systematic relationship between a country's average level of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and its subsequent economic growth. If anything, the evidence for the 1990s indicates a positive relationship 
between import tariffs and economic growth.  The only clear pattern is that countries dismantle their trade 
restrictions as they grow richer.’  This finding explains why today's rich countries, with few exceptions, embarked 
on modern economic growth behind protective barriers but now display low trade barriers.”   
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 activists from around the world than official representatives.693 The Narmada Campaign around 
the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project shows how mobilization for a project turned into a longer and 
larger mobilization to change central WB policies regarding public information and 
participation.694 In 1990, a partnership of local and international NGOs rallied against the WB’s 
role in constructing the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River in western India. An Internet 
alliance of fewer than twenty people pushed for a policy of early access to Bank information, and 
an inspection panel to investigate project damage. World Bank staff in favor of a more open 
disclosure policy supported the struggle, as did U.S. Congress members, who threatened to 
withdraw future funds if the Bank did not comply. The WB pulled out in 1991, setting the stage 
for future reforms. An independent inspection panel was created in 1994 to provide an impartial 
forum for board members and citizens to protest bank projects (World Bank, 1994).  In contrast 
to the WTO, the World Bank in the 1990s began to readily disclose many documents. Further 
steps to dialogue with NGOs were taken when James Wolfensohn became president of the Bank 
in 1995. Wolfensohn has also moved the Bank away from massive projects like hydroelectric 
dams toward education and small-business credit-assistance programs.  
One measure of the enhanced effectiveness of international NGOs is the willingness by 
IFI complex to allow NGO input during deliberations.695  Where NGO involvement in the bank’s 
lending projects averaged 6 percent between 1973 and 1988, by 1998 about half of the lending 
projects provided for NGO involvement (Simmons 1998, p.3).  While both the IMF and WB are 
starting to require that borrowing countries consult with civil society groups, the IMF still holds 
ultimate control over development strategies, hasn’t diverged from its standard macroeconomic 
and structural adjustment policies. Even the super secretive IMF has made some efforts to 
                                                 
693 Hinrichsen 1992 
694 Chiriboga, 2000 
695 Spiro 1995; Simmons 1998 
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 publicize its documents.  In June 1998 the IMF Board of Directors met with several NGO heads 
to discuss proposals to increase transparency in the IMF.  Still, the IMF has more than the UN 
and World Bank, neglected to make strides towards incorporating NGOs.696  The World Bank is 
better than IMF or WTO in its incorporation of NGO input.  
Throughout the 1990s, the World Bank responded to popular pressures from NGO 
networks, which were able to successfully publicized debt and development issues, exacting 
significant concessions from the Bank in areas of debt relief,697 transparency, and participation.  
The popular pressure exerted by the NGO networks throughout the 1990s correlated with 
increasing levels of NGO involvement in multilateral debt and development talks at the bank.  
The World Bank in the 1990s began to readily disclose many documents, and in 1994, an 
independent inspection panel was created to provide an impartial forum for board members and 
citizens to protest bank projects.698   
7.6 The United Nations 
The United Nations has been NGOs’ best ally in building social capital between 
themselves, the global justice movement, and the global governance. The United Nations has a 
culture of international assistance, equal voting rights for developing countries,699 and structural 
                                                 
696 Sachs 1997; Alexander 1999; Scholte 1998 
697 In the Lusaka Declaration of May 1999, Jubilee 2000 and other civil society groups established a framework for 
an “Africa Consensus” to replace the Washington Consensus structural adjustment programs, and its response to 
Third World debt relief. 
698 World Bank 1994 
699Contrast this with the IMF/WB/WTO complex, which distributes disparate voting rights to developed and 
developing countries. The North/South divide is an issue in the NGO sector as well. Cooperation between Northern 
and Southern NGOs appears essential to successful campaigns. But at-risk groups in international alliances against 
WB loans for example are often controlled. This is a fundamental consideration for NGOs when environmental 
priorities between northern and southern NGOs conflict, as became clear at the UNCED in Rio in 1994. Southern 
NGOs emphasized environmental impacts of multinationals and the debt crisis while northern NGOs expressed 
commitments to preserve certain resources. Nonetheless, the north-south divide eroded at Rio, as Northern NGOs 
began to learn about and incorporate Southern concerns (Meyer, 1999). The divide may be problematic when 
Northern NGO dominance bolsters interests in economic protection (cf. turtles, dolphins, tropical timber), but an 
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 participation mechanisms700 that can lay the basis for sustainable, democratic governance. After 
decades of lobbying the United Nations, NGO groups have gradually attained access to the 
organization. At the 1972 Stockholm Conference organized by the United Nations, 
environmental NGOs were for the first time recognized by nation-states as legitimate actors on 
the global stage. Over the years, they have deepened ties with the U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development.701 A watershed for inroads into global governance, at least twice 
as many (20,000) activists went to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and placed transparency at the 
core of their demands.  
Given the continued commitment to deregulation in the IMF, WB, and WTO (albeit 
tempered by a PWC), NGOs might be able to articulate a democratic and environmental vision 
of global governance at the United Nations if institutional reforms along the lines suggested by a 
recent United Nations University study were adopted.702 Stiglitz and others in the study call for a 
significant reorientation of the practices and ideologies in the Bretton Woods institutions, 
including greater transparency and public participation, more equal voting rights for developing 
countries in the IMF and World Bank, and civil society participation through a global parliament 
under UN auspices. An Economic Security Council and a Global Peoples Assembly would run 
parallel to the UN General Assembly, and take on tasks now performed by the WB and IMF. 
Down the line, perhaps a reinvigorated United Nations could oversee the Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
overemphasis on the divide may also delegitimize NGOs generally, diminishing a focus on the affluence/poverty 
divide that cuts across North and South. 
 
701 Conca 1996; Gençkaya 2000: 74 
702 Nayyar 2000 
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 7.7 Variants of neoliberalism – the Post-Washington Consensus 
Out of the various post-Cold War neoliberal crises has emerged a consensus on the need 
for a new paradigm that takes a strict separation of state and market to be analytically and 
practically problematic—a “Post-Washington Consensus” (PWC).703 The various interpretations 
of what a PWC should look like each occupy a niche in the organizational ecology of the tank 
field. The pluralistic polyarchy of neoliberalism ensures that the consensus is flexible and 
adaptable to new exigencies.  
Many in the global justice movement704 responded to the crisis with calls to withdraw 
from global governance institutions altogether. For these “abolitionists,” the neoliberal pattern of 
production is unsustainable, and only a new synthesis beyond capitalist relations of production 
through an inversion of the priority of economy over society can counter it. However, 
abolitionist positions did not prevail among policy makers, and currently three mainstream 
versions of the PWC vie for supremacy. The variants represent a strategic response with how 
best to “re-embed the recently liberated market forces into a well-functioning market society.”705 
Each of them vary in the degree of structural intervention into the global economy, but none 
questions the basic tenets of global economic liberalization.  
The first variant we might call regulatory neoliberalism. Exemplified by former World 
Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz, it represents the biggest departure from standard 
                                                 
703 Stiglitz 1998 
704 Think tanks like the Institute for Policy Studies, and affiliated transnational organizations like Jubilee, Focus on 
the Global South, and the 50 years network saw the IMF, WB, and WTO as beholden to elites in rich governments, 
always foisting self-serving solutions, protecting creditors and assuring that costs of adjustment are borne by its 
dependent clients.  It is not necessarily contradictory to hold this abolitionist position, while pressing the institutions 
for greater public accountability, restricting IMF activities, canceling third world debt, and removing conditions 
attached to structural adjustment prescriptions. Activists who complain that client countries are more accountable to 
the IMF than their own citizens, abandon the IMF altogether, many who consider themselves abolitionists have 
complained that client countries are more accountable to the IMF than to their own citizens. Many consider 
themselves “abolitionists” and would abandon (especially) the IMF altogether unless structural mechanisms for 
broader public participation made it more directly accountable to civil society (Wood 2001). 
705 Jessop 2000 
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 neoliberalism, calling for a broad global regulatory system to stabilize finances and ameliorate its 
sharp social dislocations. Stiglitz and others did represent a significant departure from the 
narrowly technical models for decision-making in place; however, they continued to embrace 
fully the principle of opening markets. Moreover, this moderately progressive position was 
quashed, as Stiglitz was fired after making one too many uncouth statements about the IMF. 
When the wording of the World Development Report was too radical for Treasury Secretary 
Larry Summers, head author Ravi Kanbur also had to resign. Rather than taking big steps to 
rescind structural adjustment policies, or include NGOs, the governance complex has preferred 
to expel dissidents.706 Stiglitz’ moderately progressive position707 has become a marginal one in 
the emerging PWC. 
The second variant we might call unreconstructed neoclassicism. This is the GW Bush 
administration position, readable in conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, and 
the majority of the congressionally appointed and highly critical Meltzer Commission. They 
support the IMF, WB, and WTO insofar as they deregulate and privatize, and are wary of using 
the IMF/WB as aid agencies for the poverty alleviation and financial bailouts.708 Drawing on 
neoliberal (Milton Friedman) ideas of monetarism, deregulation, market piety, and individual 
greed, this variant calls for total laissez-faire in global economics. 
The third variant we might call internationalist neoliberalism, a position embodied in 
Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, The Trilateral Commission, Bilderberg, World Economic 
                                                 
706 Sachs, 1997; Alexander, 1999; Scholte, 1998; Their response to the Asian crisis earned the WB a more caring 
image, but the firing of economists Stiglitz and Kanbur from the World Bank after one too many unorthodox 
statements was another indication of the limits of acceptable discourse in that arena.  
 
707 Others in this network include minority House leader Richard Gephardt, the AFL-CIO leadership, and think tanks 
like the labor-backed Economic Policy Institute, would, enact a “Tobin tax” on speculative financial flows, and 
force the WTO to allow countries to enact labor and environmental standards, and generally pull the IMF and WB 
towards the Keynesian principles of state managed development characteristic of Robert McNamara’s tenure as WB 
President in the 1960s. 
708 Judis 2000 
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 Forum, World Bank President James Wolfensohn, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, 
and economists at the Institute for International Economics and Brookings Institution. It 
acknowledges limits to market solutions, and urges modest reforms in global institutions such as 
more “transparency,” more cautious prescription of high interest rates at IMF, and a greater focus 
on poverty and AIDS at the WB. It still accepts the basic tenets of neoliberalism, flatly denies 
neoliberalism is responsible for the crisis, and opposes considering of environmental and labor 
standards in trade treaties, and support loans with structural adjustment conditions attached.709 
This variant proposes a new world architecture that could stabilize financial volatility without 
disrupting the global economy. In contrast with unreconstructed neoclassicism, this variant 
recognizes that “ideology and market power are not enough to ensure the adequacy of neoliberal 
restructuring…[and must be] institutionalized at the macro-level of power in the quasi-legal 
restructuring of the state and international political forms.”710 WEF, for example, shifted its 
rhetoric to a more cautious tone and a more regulatory track. Financier George Soros decried 
shortly before its 1997 meeting “the destruction of those values which do not produce 
commercial return” and “the totalitarian tendency of unregulated market capitalism.” The 1997 
meeting produced a project on “human social responsibility,” headed by theologians, new AFL-
CIO head John Sweeney, and others,711 and a recognition of a wide spread perception “that the 
benefits of the changes so far have gone to shareholders and financiers, while workers were left 
to bear the costs”712  
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711 International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1997 
712 International Herald Tribune, January 31, 1997 
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 7.8 Conclusion: Governance and sovereignty 
For the global justice movement, the debate around capital controls represented a long 
overdue break from dogmatic insistence on opening financial markets, and a seam than can be 
pried open to adopt measures that are more fundamental. However, the controversy did not 
necessarily address globalization’s most significant failings. Capital controls713 are only a small 
part of the global financial architecture, so even reforms in this area do not necessarily get at the 
most significant dislocations of globalization, which may be due more to trade dogma 
(harmonization of labor and environmental standards with deregulation) than the insistence on 
opening financial markets. Capital controls may stabilize the financial system, but not reverse 
trends towards poverty, inequality, harmonization of labor and environmental standards “race to 
the bottom” since corporations are still able to avoid regulation by playing governments off one 
another. Thus, the debate over capital controls appears to be another case in which the TT field 
structures problems and solutions in a way that secures the long-term stability of the system.   
We see a similar dynamic in the WB and WTO approaches to transnational justice tanks. 
While it is clear that norms and networks of trust or “social capital” appear to be an important 
condition for effective NGO campaigns,714 the use of social capital as a policy model can 
incorporate and deflect criticism. Its use a development concept at the Bank in particular shows 
the extent to which it can sidestep issues of power and overcome resistance, and prevent 
                                                 
713 Krugman 1998 
714 For sociologists, social capital refers generally to advantages gained by being active in networks that solidify 
trust and shared norms over time (Bourdieu, 1986; Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993). Investing in 
inter-organizational chains across differences in culture, geography, and economic and political power, has made 
productive coalitions. Transnational coalitions built on trust and mutual influences are able to respond quickly and 
cohesively through the Internet. A small number of people connected together in a global public policy network can 
exert power disproportionate to their resources by bridging major gaps in culture, power, and resources. By drawing 
on and fostering public demands for transparency, transnational justice tanks have rendered closed-door negotiations 
led by corporate elites in global governance institutions increasingly controversial.  
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 fundamental reforms by “humanizing” governance without addressing rigorously and explicitly 
issues of equity and justice.  
The Bank maintains a website dedicated to the notion of social capital 
(http://worldbank.org/poverty/scapital). The site is organized around sources of social capital 
(family, communities, civil society) and topics such as economics, trade, finance, health, 
nutrition, technology, sanitation, water supply, and urban development. Nowhere on the site is 
social capital used to critique existing structural adjustment policies, or call into question basic 
economic assumptions at the Bank. Fine715 shows how social capital rhetoric at the WB 
represents a minor tweaking of economic theory, and functions to broaden the scope of 
intervention into non-market spheres. As orthodox economics becomes applicable to previously 
untapped areas of “the social,” impoverished neighborhoods, cities, regions, and countries may 
“converge” not just on the economic norms of structural adjustment, but now also on a set of 
socio-political norms imposed by the WB. Good government may come to entail the 
manipulation of public participation and democratic accountability as variables towards efficient 
and effective outcomes.716  
Its language is friendly to both state and social institutions, and thus palatable to both 
state clients and once-marginalized social theorists. It is true that Washington consensus hardly 
countenanced equity and justice as normative concerns to begin with, so even addressing them 
obliquely through buzzwords like governance, capacity building, social capital, institution 
building, safety nets etc., represents a subtle improvement on neoliberal conceptions of market 
dynamics. However, as Fine cautions, the Post-Washington Consensus opening is small, and 
                                                 
715 Fein 2001 
716 Reinecke 1998 
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 sociologists and anthropologists should not mistake their newfound rush of legitimacy and 
acceptance within the bank for a substantive challenge to the economists.717
The cases in this chapter suggest that the global governance complex will continue to 
view civil society, not as a deep seat of representation and accountability, but as a location or 
effect of market imperfections – a type of manageable capital (social)718 that can make 
governments and intergovernmental institutions efficient and effective.719 While the proliferation 
of transnational justice tanks has incubated new forms of political opposition, and played a role 
in resurrecting democracy on emerging structures of global governance, their newfound power 
rests on a claim to represent cross-national interests such as environment health, sustainable 
development, and human rights, and exacerbates tension with the traditional authority of states 
and interstate institutions.  
The growth in transnational alliances has enhanced the claim to representation, but it is 
not clear to whom NGOs are accountable. Accelerated flows of commerce and information 
already strain sovereignty. NGOs can still only approximate the legitimacy claimed by national 
states, especially in cases when NGOs are less democratically organized and accountable than 
their participatory rhetoric suggests.720 Their lack of formal representation and accountability 
makes it difficult to avoid cooptation by powerful state and corporate actors who incorporate 
NGOs or not according to their adherence to a range of ready-made agendas and solutions. For 
                                                 
717 Fine (2001; 2000) explains that the notion of social capital derives inescapably from rational choice theories, and 
should be understood in the context of the colonization of the social sciences by neoclassical economics. This 
mainstream economic theory, a reaction to the stagflation crisis of the 1970s, is based on the idea that optimizing 
and efficient actors counteract state intervention by rationally anticipating its impacts. This “rational expectations” 
model suggests that all human activity, including non-market, social, and even irrational behavior, can be 
understood on the basis of methodological individualism, thus widening the analytic scope of economics to include 
the other social sciences (2001:10). Although social capital “purports to civilise economists by forcing them to take 
account of the social … it opens the way for economists to colonise the other social sciences by appropriating the 
social in … ways with which it is entirely comfortable” (2000:199). This process has been facilitated by the social 
sciences’ retreat from postmodernism and return to material reality (2001:12-15; 2000:7). 
718 This managerial perspective is most clear in, for example, corporate campaigns. 
719 Phillips & Higgott 1999 
720 Most NGOs do not elect their leaders, for example. Simmons 1998; Gordenker 1995 
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 the Global Justice Movement to assume the responsibility that comes with authority and 
legitimacy, the principle of sovereignty may have to be adapted to multi-lateral 
interdependence.721 This seems unlikely to occur if the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
proceeds apace. I conclude my study in the next chapter with an analysis of the role of think 
tanks in responding to the attacks of 9/11.  
                                                 
721 Commission on Global Governance 1995: 68-72  
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8. Think Tanks and the Global War on Terrorism 
We saw in chapter 5 how from 1945-1950, think tanks funded by internationally oriented 
capital helped plan the grand strategy to secure safe markets for American producers. They 
advocated containment, deterrence, and the maintenance of a global balance of power and 
multilateral institutions and agreements to promote free trade and democratic values. During the 
early Cold War, a faction of the U.S. right advocated a move beyond the containment doctrine 
proposed by George F. Kennan to a “rollback” agenda advocated by John Foster Dulles. The 
idea that America should use its military early and often to advance its interests is an idea that 
did not carry the day. Instead, the idea that nuclear deterrence and diplomacy would manage the 
incontrovertible fact of a cold war became the consensus position. The rollback fraction 
reinvigorated somewhat in Reagan’s “evil empire” foreign policy of large military budget 
increases, Star Wars, and covert operations, 722 but retreated to TTs in the 1990s. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the anticommunist right broke up, with neoconservatives like 
Charles Krauthammer723 pushing empire and new justifications for military buildup, and 
libertarians and isolationists pushing instead to complete Reagan’s rollback of the U.S. welfare 
state. The neoconservative faction began to articulate terrorism and “civilization clash” as the 
                                                 
722 Ideological scholars and partisans of the 1970s housed in conservative think tanks and media outlets helped fuse 
diverse conservative constituencies around a shared foreign and defense policy through sophisticated public 
outreach and media campaigns. Their targets were Carter, détente, and arms control agreements. They provided the 
blueprints what became the operational doctrine of the Reagan administration in Central America, Angola, and 
Afghanistan (Reagan brought Perle and Wolfowitz into his administration) (Diamond 1996).   
723 Krauthammer 1990-91 
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 main threats to America and Judeo-Christian values, replacing communism as the main 
rhetorical figure to advance a foreign policy agenda724 based in American supremacy. 
Today we see a return of the rollback faction, and a “radical break with 55 years of 
bipartisan tradition.”725 This is not a direct result of 9/11, though the attacks did establish the 
pretext for and accelerated the break. The new imperial stance represents a correction of the 
disoriented drift of the conservative movement. The radical utopian character of its vision is 
indicative of a general tendency within the TT stratum to take a utopian-totalitarian approach to 
open opportunity structures. It reflects the “missionary and didactic” pathos that informed early 
think tanks, the systematic bombing of Vietnam, and the comprehensive planning and imposition 
of universal norms of development on the entire world under the “Washington Consensus.”   
Given the administration’s heavy reliance on the staff and boards of neoconservative 
TTs, it is perhaps not surprising that their analysis (along with sympathetic media like the 
editorial pages of Wall Street Journal and the Weekly Standard) coincide with administration 
rhetoric and behavior. A small number of experts, news media, ideologues and operatives have 
captured the US foreign policy apparatus. They are therefore both creating and reflecting policy. 
8.1. Preparing the ground: the neoconservative network  
A cursory network analysis of those most directly involved in shaping current foreign 
policy shows an interlocking directorate among organizations affiliated with the new right social 
movement of the 1970s, especially its “neoconservative” wing.726 Ideological foundations like 
Bradley, Olin, and Scaife, and right wing media organizations shared a sense of purpose with 
                                                 
724 missile defense, counterinsurgency in Columbia, Likud militarists in Israel, Central Asian oil supplies, Saddam 
Hussein 
725 Former UN ambassador Richard Holbrooke quoted in Purdum 2002 
726 They are so called because many were former members of the anti-Stalinist Trotskyist movement of the ‘30s and 
‘40s, and Democrats of the Henry “Scoop” Jackson variety, before moving right. They openly ally with the Likud 
Party in Israel.  
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 Christian and social conservatives. A network of defense experts at the Project for a New 
American Century (PNAC), Center for Security Policy (CSP), American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI), Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and others provided an infrastructure 
of advice and personnel to promote a hard right shift in foreign policy.  
Some names are familiar from routine appearance on television and other major media, 
congressional committees, brown bags and other D.C. policy symposia.727 William Kristol heads 
PNAC and edits The Weekly Standard, which echoes the defense posture of Netanyahu and Ariel 
Sharon’s in Israel. Richard Perle, longtime AEI fellow, helped establish the CSP and the Jewish 
Institute for National Security (JINSA). As the chair of the Defense Policy Board (DPB) under 
Bush II,728 he refashioned the Pentagon advising office into a haven for hawks. Frank Gaffney, a 
former Reagan appointee, PNAC signatory and senior AVOT adviser (see below), directs CSP, 
which has close connections to weapons manufacturers and contractors. Gaffney celebrates the 
return of “Peace through strength.” Many CSP personnel were involved with US military policy 
under Reagan. According to its web site, some 22 center advisory council members occupy key 
national security posts in government. James Woolsey, former CIA director, has consistently 
argued that we are engaged in “World War IV.” Vice President Cheney was an early board 
member, and Rumsfeld won its Keeper of the Flame award.   
Others work behind the scenes but are just as central in the network. About a dozen are in 
the state and defense departments (John Bolton of AEI pedigree, Undersecretary of State for 
                                                 
727 Members include Richard Perle, AEI Middle East studies head David Wurmser, Wurmser’s wife Meyrav of the 
Middle East Research Institute, the Hudson Institute (where Perle recently joined the board of trustees), and Middle 
East Forum, Laurie Mylroie author of Saddam Hussein’s Unfinished War Against America that claims he was 
responsible for the1993 WTC bombing, NYT journalist Judith Miller, Michael Rubin of the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy.  
728 The Charter of the Defense Policy Advisor Committee Board states it will serve the “public Interest” by 
providing “independent” advice and “research and analysis of topics, long or short range.” Its staff includes 
significant representation from the Hoover Institution, SAIS, CFR, CSIS, JINSA, and the Foundation for Defense of 
Demcoracy 
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 Arms Control, assigned to State to keep Powell on a leash; Doug Feith, a protégé of Richard 
Perle, is No. 3 at the Pentagon729). As head of the transition team Cheney handpicked most of 
these hawkish and staunch supporters of the conservative Israel Likud party. Cheney’s picks 
dominated Colin Powell, much of America’s national security establishment in the State 
Department, CIA, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially in gathering and interpreting 
intelligence.730 In Colin Powell’s 1995 memoir My American Journey, he recalls that Cheney 
and Wolfowitz turned Bush senior’s Pentagon policy staff into “a refuge for Reagan-era 
hardliners.” For Bush junior, Wolfowitz and Cheney have done the same to the entire top civilian 
staff of the Pentagon. 
Perhaps no one is more relevant as an intellectual mastermind of the current defense 
posture than Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz is. His well worked out and consistent 
post cold war grand strategy dates at least 10 years before GW Bush to a 1992 strategy document 
initiated by Defense Secretary Cheney in 1990 and drafted by Wolfowitz and Lewis “Scooter” 
Libby731 for the Bush I Pentagon in 1992. The Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) stated the US 
“must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger 
regional or global role.”732 Potential competitors included Russia and China as well as Germany, 
Japan, and rogue states. Post cold war US primacy would persevere with massive increases in 
military spending, preemptive force to stop states suspected of building WMDs. DPG called for 
military dominance over Eurasia, downplayed alliances, failed to mention the UN, and 
suggested, “We should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond 
                                                 
729 In 1996 Feith chaired a study group sponsored by a right wing think tank in Jerusalem that produced a report 
calling for incoming PM Netanyahu to strongly resist a “land for peace” settlement with Palestinians or Syria.  
730 In Colin Powell’s 1995 memoir My American Journey he recalls that Cheney and Wolfowitz turned Bush 
senior’s Pentagon policy staff into “a refuge for Reagan-era hardliners.” For Bush junior, Wolfowitz and Cheney 
have done the same to the entire top civilian staff of the Pentagon. 
731 Vice President Cheney’s current chief of staff 
732 Fitzgerald 2002 
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 the crisis being confronted….” The document predicted that US militarism overseas would 
become a “constant feature” of world affairs. 733 Someone in the military brass concerned about 
the downsides of such a sweeping vision apparently leaked the document to the NYT in early 
March 1992. It caused a firestorm that led Bush Sr.’s foreign policy advisers Brent Scowcroft, 
James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger to tone it down to make it more modest and multilateral, 
reflecting American public opinion on the issues. The ousting of the hard right faction of Bush 
Sr.’s administration from government in 1992 led that faction to continue strategic planning, 
with money from military, energy, and security complex and right wing foundations, in an 
organization known as the Project for a New American Century 
8.1.1 Case 34: The Project for the New American Century 
The new conservative coalition’s most concrete institutional form outside of the 
government itself is the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). A couple dozen 
neoconservatives and military industrial complex types who perceived a lack of leadership in 
advancing “a strategic vision for America’s role in the world” formed PNAC in 1997 to “set 
forth guiding principles for American foreign policy.”734 Communicating through a series of 
public letters whose signatories included Wolfowitz and other future foreign policy team 
members, PNAC sought “A Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity.735 In 
September 2000 before Bush came to office, PNAC drew a blueprint for US global domination 
that included a premeditated attack on Iraq. Commissioned by Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, 
                                                 
733 Fitzgerald 2002 
734 www.newamericancentury.org Spearheaded by Weekly Standard editors William Kristol and Robert Kagan, the 
original signatories to the statement of principles were Elliot Abrams, Dick Cheney, Jeb Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, 
Paul Wolfowitz, Gary Bauer, William Bennett, Eliot Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobrianski, Steve Forbes, Aaron 
Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred Ikle, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Libby, Norman 
Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Peter Rodman, Stephen Rosen, Henry Rowen, Vin Weber, George Weigel. The social 
conservatives associated with PNAC are Gary Bauer, Bill Bennett, Steve Forbes, Dan Quayle, and Vin Weber. 
PNAC is not technically think tank in that it does not conduct social science research, though it certainly draws on 
the work put out by the network, but it does fulfill common think tank functions such as the issuing of timely policy 
statements, op-ed articles, and open letters to political leaders, etc.  
735 Statement of principles, 1997, http://newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm  
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 the strategic plan Rebuilding America’s Defenses (2000) referred to the 1992 Defense Policy 
Guidance draft as “a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence, precluding the rise of a great 
power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and 
interests.” In the peaceful 1990s, this group observed that the “global Pax Americana will not 
preserve itself,” and that “the process of transformation [to a secure foundation of unquestioned 
military preeminence] is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—
like a new Pearl Harbor.” It called for unprecedented military spending, planting bases in Central 
Asia and the Middle East, taking out bad regimes like Saddam Hussein’s, militarizing outer 
space, abrogating international treaties, controlling world energy resources, and the will to use 
nuclear weapons. Many of the conclusions and recommendations are reiterated in the 2002 
White House National Security Strategy Document.  
8.2. The new sovereignty 
Neoconservatism’s core paradigm idea is an American exceptionalism that borders on a 
theological belief in America’s god given mission and blessings. It is a vision of US supremacy, 
a “New sovereignty” in diplomatic, cultural, economic and military spheres.736
 Diplomatically, the new sovereignty sees unilateralist or “selective multilateral” action as 
an American responsibility and prerogative. In this view, the US should set the rules and norms 
of international law (as it did in the Bretton Woods economic organizations and the United 
Nations) but, because of its inherent goodness and redemptive mission, not necessarily be subject 
to those rules itself. The New Sovereignty embraces multilateral action pragmatically as a cover 
for stark national interests, but discards it when it proves constraining or inconvenient, as in Iraq. 
Drawing on deep roots in American political traditions, it also expresses outright contempt for 
                                                 
736 Barry and Lobe 2002 
 244
 the rhetoric of transnational issues like HIV/AIDS, environmental standards, and new 
multilateral organs like the ICC as “globaloney” that constrains US prerogatives. The growing 
intellectual following of anti-internationalism attached to prestigious academic institutions and 
think tanks rails against collective responses to arms control, the environment, human rights, war 
crimes, and other emerging global issues.  
 Culturally, the new sovereignty sees the free market democracy of the US as a 
manifestation of the supremacy of its political, moral, religious, and social institutions. In this 
view, the US system represents the triumph of Western civilization, in Fukuyama’s phrase, “the 
end of history.” The thesis rearticulated the familiar cultural conservative attack on political 
correctness in the academy, which had since the 1960s promoted the view that American culture 
(Judeo-Christian values and patriotic virtues) was under siege by a counterculture, secular 
humanism, environmentalism, and feminism. The global threat of civilization clash between the 
West and the “rest” (for Huntington, the Islamic world and China) is paralleled by a domestic 
threat. The New Right institutionalized the exploration of links between internal and external 
threats to Judeo-Christian culture in 1976 when the Ethics and Public Policy Center, which 
incorporated “to clarify and reinforce the bond between Judeo-Christian moral tradition and the 
public policy debate over domestic and foreign policy issues.”737 The organization tried to find 
common ground on which conservative Catholics and Jews could bond with the Christian right. 
In the 1990s, neoconservatives continued to think very hard about connections between these 
internal threats and external threats to US culture. The most theoretically informed example of 
such thinking is the now classic The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by 
Samuel Huntington. 
 
                                                 
737 Eppc.org/about 
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 The war on terrorism has given new impetus to forging links between an aggressive 
foreign policy and cultural wars at home. A new group headed by PNAC signatory and veteran 
cultural warrior Bill Bennett, Americans for Victory over Terrorism (AVOT, www.avot.org, an 
offshoot of Bennett and Jack Kemp’s empower.org) has been most forceful in making the local-
global links in the culture war. The organization warned in a March 10, 2002 New York Times 
full-page ad that “the threats we face are both external and internal.”  AVOT focuses on “public 
opinion.” It warns of the internal threats “who are attempting to use this opportunity to 
promulgate their agenda of blame America first.’” For AVOT, the internal threats are tantamount 
to ideological support for terrorism, and therefore have to be defeated in the public mind.  
Leading the charge to root out harmful ideologies in the academy is Lynne Cheney, wife 
of the vice president and AEI associate. She leads the American Council of Trustees and Alumni, 
an organization that “outs” professors who are not sufficiently patriotic. Likewise, the 
Washington Institute and Middle East Forum recently launched a project to discredit middle 
eastern studies departments, based on a book Ivory Towers of Sand. The strike at the academy is 
preemptive, since the ability of academics to influence policy pale in comparison with think 
tanks. TTs can hire staff without committee procedures to develop a coherent political outlook, 
publish books without academic referees, and do not have to worry about publishing in peer 
reviewed academic journals, allowing them to spend all their time seeking avenues of direct and 
indirect influence.  
The doctrine of cultural supremacy views the growing army of transnational NGOs and 
activists involved in challenging and reshaping global governance institutions as “globaloney” 
and a prime threat to US prerogatives. The conflict is thus the transnational equivalent of the 
domestic culture wars, and the NGO networks are tantamount to the domestic subversives 
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 identified by Bennett’s AVOT and Lynn Cheney’s ACTA. Wall Street Journal features editor 
Kimberly Strassel declared that the attacks had upended  
America’s liberal activist groups—the environmental radicals, the animal-rights 
protesters, the archfeminists and the antiglobalization protestors. The indulgent world in 
which these groups had operated collapsed on Sept.11. Most found themselves 
floundering for a message and searching for funds; all are facing the realization that a 
decade of shenanigans may be over.738
Assistant Secretary of State and AEI veteran John Bolton likewise claims  
…for virtually every area of public policy there is a globalist proposal consistent with the 
overall objective of reducing individual nation-state autonomy, particularly that of the 
United States.739  
 
John Fonte of the Hudson Institute approaches the post-9/11 milieu as “a window of opportunity 
for those who favor a reaffirmation of traditional norms of liberal-democratic patriotism.” The 
emergent global civil society in diverse areas of environmental, economic, human rights, etc., are 
conducting an ideological civil war within western civilization over the concept of 
sovereignty.740  Transnational networks of social justice NGOs in other words are part of the 
problem not part of the solution to global governance.   
Economically, the prevailing conservative approach is the equivalent of selective 
multilateral action in diplomatic areas, appealing to free trade philosophy only when it benefits 
US corporations.741 One of the more blatant instances of this has been the attempt to link the 
coalition against terrorism with efforts to unfetter economic globalization through a free trade 
agenda by presenting them both as an expansion of modern democratic values. Before 
September, the administration and other neoliberal advocates were arguing that “trade is good for 
the poor” (Bush to the G-8 in Genoa, Italy: protesters are “no friends of the poor”). Now they 
                                                 
738 PR Watch vol.8 #4 p.5 
739 Spiro 2000 
740 Fonte 2002 
741 The paradigm of economic divides right wing ideologues into true believing free traders like those at Cato, and 
nationalist populists like Pat Buchanan more likely to favor protectionism and economic sanctions in response to 
human rights and other international norms violations or ideological commitments like anticommunism in Cuba, and 
conservatives who prefer to liberalize and enforce free trade only when it clearly supports corporate interests. 
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 argue that trade is good for anti-terrorism. Shortly after the attacks, US Trade Representative 
Robert Zoellick and the heads of seven major D.C. think tanks742 said a good response would be 
to grant Bush Trade Promotion Authority (TPA, formerly Fast Track), allowing the president to 
negotiate controversial trade agreements like FTAA without impediments from labor or 
environmental advocates in congress. Writing in the Washington Post, Zoellick said that 
“Throughout the Cold War, Congress empowered presidents with trade negotiating authority to 
open markets, promote private enterprise and spur liberty throughout the world—complementing 
U.S. alliances and strengthening our nation” (2001).743 “Earlier enemies learned that America is 
the arsenal of democracy. Today's enemies will learn that America is the economic engine for 
freedom, opportunity and development. To that end, U.S. leadership in promoting the 
international economic and trading system is vital. Trade is about more than economic 
efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of this protracted struggle.” 744 In a speech to the 
                                                 
742 At a Sept. 27 press conference at the National Press Club Heritage Foundation president Ed Feulner, American 
Enterprise Institute president Chris DeMuth, Brookings Institution president Michael Armacost, Institute for 
International Economics president C. Fred Bergsten, Center for Strategic and International studies president William 
Niskanen, Cato Institute chairman John Hamre, and Progressive Policy Institute president Will Marshall, made the 
linkage between trade promotion authority (TPA) and antiterrorism. Feulner opened the program with the assertion 
that “In the spirit of unity and bipartisanship, that is rightly permeating Washington…we believe it is appropriate for 
us to come together…to discuss an issue, on which we all agree. [TPA is] an issue that finds no intellectual 
disagreement among the Washington think tank community.”  Armacost argued TPA would help the U.S. assemble 
anti-terrorism alliances, and “send a message of defiance” to the terrorists that the U.S. would not back down from 
its global leadership role. Parroting a refrain we’ve heard often recently, DeMuth said terrorist attacks were in part 
attacks on “the spread of global freedom,” so “for us to assert that a strong new commitment to expanded global 
commercial freedoms…is an important part [of the U.S. response to the attacks] is perfectly appropriate.” 
Furthermore, noted DeMuth, TPA is likely to be an important component of any program for economic recovery and 
anti-terrorism mobilization.” For Bergsten, “What is more sensible and appropriate, than for the world’s countries 
who trade with each other to such an extent, to try to improve [the trade] component of their relationship, as part of 
this overall [anti-terrorism] initiative?” (Rugaber 2001).   
743 Zoellick was explicit about using sticks and carrots could secure allegiance from key countries through the war 
(the strategy seems to have worked with Pakistan). Threats of economic sanctions, promises of debt relief, IMF 
loans, and trade privileges were used to buy consent from different UN members.  Calling for a new WTO round 
and TPA (fast track), Zoellick said, “America’s trade leadership can build a coalition of countries that cherish liberty 
in all its aspects” (2001). If the G-8 and UN could be brought along so quickly to back military force, so the logic 
goes, then why not use the unity to pressure developing countries into a new round? The WTO/IMF/WB are now 
official partners in the US/G-8 pledge to “end terrorism.” This is the new economic and foreign policy dialectic. 
“You are with us, or you are with the terrorists” will be articulated to a free trade agenda, a dialectic that smacks of 
Empire.   
744 Zoellick 2001 
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 pro free trade Institute for International Economics (IIE), Zoellick not-so-subtly linked the 9/11 
bombers with the opponents of corporate globalization, saying  
On Sept. 11, America, its open society and its ideas came under attack by a malevolence 
that craves our panic, retreat and abdication of global leadership…. This president and 
this administration will fight for open markets. We will not be intimidated by those who 
have taken to the streets to blame trade—and America—for the world’s ills. 
 
He continued,  
Terrorists hate the ideas America has championed around the world…. It is inevitable 
that people will wonder if there are intellectual connections with others who have turned 
to violence to attack international finance, globalization and the United States.745
 
For the administration, neoliberal economics clearly is the flipside to antiterrorist efforts, both 
being aspects of “freedom.”746  
 Uncontested military supremacy based on superior power and the will to not just contain 
enemies but also defeat them before they can threaten the US, is the operational doctrine of the 
neoconservatives. The New Sovereignty jettisons the balance-of-power doctrine in international 
relations, and deems international security treaties (e.g. arms control) that might constrain US 
action irrelevant or unnecessary. Adherents believe that the war to bring this state of affairs about 
will be global and unending. The hawk vision, which views any coalition building as a drag on 
moral clarity, has a heroic ring to it. PNAC’s name itself, “a new American century,” draws on 
the memory of Time editor Henry Luce’s observation that WWII marked the beginning of the 
American century. As AEI’s Michael Ledeen said at an October 29 panel moderated by Perle,  
This is total war. We are fighting a variety of enemies…. If we just let our own vision of 
the world go forth, and we embrace it entirely, and we don’t try to be clever and piece 
together clever diplomatic solutions to this thing, but just wage a total war against these 
                                                 
745 Zoellick 2001a:1-3 
746 As Mokhiber and Weissman (2001) point out, “Zoellick did not explain how adopting a procedural rule designed 
to limit Congressional debate on controversial trade agreements advances the democratic and rule-of-law values he 
says the United States must now project.”   
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 tyrants, I think we will do very well, and our children will sing great songs about us years 
from now.747  
 
 The vision is a heroic Pax Americana. It is truly sweeping and Hobbesian, if not Manichean: a 
world order based on a Leviathan US military and rooted in the self-evident righteousness of the 
US. 
8.3. 9/11 and political opportunity 
The ascension of George W. Bush to the presidency is undoubtedly a central factor in 
neocon influence. Raised in a Texan militarist frontier society with a southern machismo, Bush 
embodies the Southern base of the current Republican Party.748 Unlike his father, he was not a 
“Washington insider” and had little knowledge of foreign affairs. Bush’s lack of foreign policy 
experience provided a blank slate upon which a wish list of experts and advisers could be 
imprinted. Things neoconservatives told him during the election cycle struck more of a chord 
with him than his father. He drew on over 100 experts from the Hoover Institution, American 
Enterprise Institute, Manhattan Institute, and Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Tanks deflected criticisms of his knowledge deficit before and during the 2000 presidential 
campaign, and provided opportunities for experts to wield influence. Bush’ novice skills in 
foreign policy became explicit in a Bush New York Times interview:  
I may not be able to tell you exactly the nuance of the East Timorian situation, but I’ll ask 
people who’ve had experience, like Condi Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, or Dick Cheney. I am 
smart enough to know what I don’t know, and I have good judgment about who will 
either be telling the truth, or has got some agenda that is not the right agenda.749
 
                                                 
747 Vest 2001  
748 The difference between Bush I and Bush II parallel the differences between the Republican Party of Eisenhower 
and the more ideologically coherent Republican Party of the 1970s and 1980s that drew its strength from the South 
and Southwest. Well represented in the Reagan White House, Bush I marginalized this alignment somewhat by 
rebuffing their demand that troops go all the way to Baghdad in the first Gulf WarNeocons did not find favor with 
Clinton either, though they lauded Clinton’s air strikes against Bosnia and Kosovo, and the passage of the Iraq 
Liberation Act 
749 Schmitt 1999; See also Kitfield 1999:2293, Van Slambrouck 1999, Hager 1999.  
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 In the months before 9/11 his “go it alone” foreign policy included halting negotiations with 
North Korea, withdrawing from Middle East peace negotiations, refusing to sign the Kyoto 
Protocol on global warming, blocking a number of international arms control treaties, breaking a 
promise to mutually reduce US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, and deploying national 
missile defense. Yet without a pronounced enemy, the American public was hard to sway. The 
administration was having trouble selling its foreign policy and defense priorities, getting 
resistance from both Congress and the military.  
The search for a new policy rationale came on 9/11/01. The attacks provided neocons 
with the “new Pearl Harbor” they had been looking for. They could now reprise the Reagan 
“rollback” doctrine; only in the absence of a Soviet threat, U.S. supremacy would now be global. 
Condoleezza Rice was explicit about the new opportunity GWOT offers: “this is a period not just 
of grave danger, but of enormous opportunity…a period akin to 1945-1947, when American 
leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states…to create a new balance of power 
that favored freedom.”750  
Iraq would prove to be the first major tests case for the New Sovereignty. Neocons saw 
Iraq as the first stop in a remaking of the Middle East, which in some scenarios include 
transforming countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and collapsing OPEC. As PNAC’s 
Rebuilding America’s Defenses (2000) had urged,  
While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides immediate justification [for a more 
permanent US role in Gulf regional security], the need for a substantial American force 
presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.  
 
Blueprints drawn up in the neocon network included putting Iraqi National Congress INC head 
Ahmed Chalabi in charge, and denationalizing and parceling Iraqi oil out to American 
companies. A propaganda front prepared for an Iraq invasion portrayed Chalabi’s INC as the 
                                                 
750 Fitzgerald 2002  
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 prime force involved, essentially liberating its own people with cover bombing by the US. As 
WINEP’s Clawson said, “I want to create the national story that Iraqis liberated themselves…. It 
may have no more truth than the idea that the French liberated themselves in World War II, but it 
is a story that will resonate with Iraqis.”751 While PNAC offered the blueprint, it would be up to 
neocons operating through the Pentagon to turn it into policy.  
8.4. Iraq: the strategic use of misinformation 
After 9/11, neocons urged the president to see the Israeli and American wars as 
coterminous, and therefore necessitating a war on Hussein, or as they preferred to put it, “the 
road to peace runs through Baghdad.”752 They saw Iraq as a sort of domino that will cause other 
bad regimes in the Arab world to tumble. Putting American troops and oil companies in charge 
of the region will be a fulcrum for enhancing US global hegemony. Asked if destabilizing those 
regimes may result from an Iraq invasion, Pentagon Defense Policy Board member Ken 
Adelman replied, “…all the better if you ask me.”753  
The failure to locate WMD stockpiles, links between Al Qaeda and Iraq, or throngs of 
Iraqis greeting US troops as liberators showed a discrepancy between the administration’s 
                                                 
751 See Dreyfuss 2002. The neocons lost this battle to the State department. A government-in-exile never 
materialized, though Chalabi remains a force in post-invasion politics. 
752 An interesting example is an advertisement produced by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), 
a neoconservative group founded two days after 9/11 and closely tied to pro-Likud administration hawks. The FDD 
board of directors includes Steve Forbes, former HHS Secretary Jack Kemp, former UN Ambassador and AEI Jeane 
Kirkpatrick. Its board of “distinguished advisors” includes Newt Gingrich and James Woolsey, and Israel Hawks 
like Richard Perle. Members include CSP president and former Perle aid Frank Gaffney, Charles Krauthammer, 
Weekly Standard editor and PNAC chair Bill Kristol. FDD aired 30-second TV spots in spring 2002 designed to 
conflate Palestinian suicide bombings and 9/11 hijackings. They aired shortly after Bush called on Israel to 
withdraw troops re-occupying West Bank towns, and sent Powell to the Middle East to negotiate a ceasefire that 
would allow renewed Israel-Palestine negotiations. The ad producer was FDD VP Nir Boms, former Israeli Embassy 
public affairs officer. The spot opens with “The Suicide Strategy” in bold letters. The narrator says, “It was used by 
terrorists against America on September 11. It’s being used by terrorists against Israel day after day.” The images 
include a brutish scene following a suicide bombing. The narrator continues, “If we let the suicide strategy succeed 
anywhere in the world, it will succeed everywhere.” The video shows Palestinian children dressed in suicide bomber 
costumes at a Hamas demonstration, and a burning U.S. flag. The video fades to bold type: never Appease 
Terrorism.  
753 Marshall 2002:8 
 252
 prewar assessment and today’s reality. It also revealed the administration’s obtuseness towards 
the superior assessments provided by the UN inspections teams, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), State department, and CIA. How did the U.S. end up in a long-term occupation 
without an internationally supported nation building and exit plan? How did peculiar, stretched, 
and falsified pieces of intelligence find their way into presidential speeches, expert commentary, 
and other forms of public discourse? How did the administration deceive and co-opt a large 
segment of Congress?  
The answer lies in a relatively small and coherent group in and around the administration 
who promoted intelligence without traditional oversight mechanisms. By the time of war, nearly 
all data justifying US action had come from ad hoc intelligence collection techniques that 
bypassed the American intelligence community. These alternative channels or “stovepipes” 
funneled information and requests for action directly to higher officials without subjecting it to 
rigorous scrutiny, allowing hawks to “cherry pick” the data they liked even if it was not 
corroborated by available intelligence, filter out opposing points of view that did not “fit,” and 
elevate narrow opinions into consensus facts.   
Two Defense Department agencies in particular, the Near East South Asia (NESA) and 
Office of Special Plans (OSP), operated in concert with neocon tanks and GWB political 
appointees754 throughout the national security bureaucracy. The bureaus integrated an informal 
network of political appointees and think tank allies to circumvent the standard interagency 
                                                 
754 Appointees in both offices included: Michael Rubin, Middle East specialist previously at AEI, David Schenker 
previously at Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) which functions as a think tank for the powerful 
pro-Israel/Likud AIPAC lobby, David Makovsky, Chris Lehman. 
 253
 vetting procedures and convey findings to high-ranking officials who were prepared to believe 
the best755 or worst756 case scenarios, depending on the topic.   
Created by Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz after 9/11 for the specific purpose 
of sifting raw information provided by intelligence agencies before passing it to the White 
House, Office of Special Plans was ad hoc office run by Abram Shulsky under US 
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. OSP based staffing decisions on ideological 
coherence with Rumsfeld and the hawks. Most staffers were not intelligence people but 
congressional staffers. Feith and political appointees shared close identification with the right 
wing Likud party in Israel.757 Several appointees were Richard Perle protégés. The vague name 
of the office avoided the impression of a special Pentagon unit doing its own intelligence work. 
As Feith admitted to BBC, “We didn’t think it was wise to create a brand-new office and label it 
an office of Iraq policy.”758 OSP sifted raw information provided by intelligence agencies before 
passing it to the White House. The routine was that data classified “secret” would make its way 
directly from OSP to upper policymakers in the vice president’s office, the president’s national 
Security Council, and deputy defense secretary Wolfowitz without evaluation by intelligence 
professionals.  
Most OSP intelligence came from debriefing Iraqi exiles. Its main data source was 
Ahmed Chalabi, former banker and head of an umbrella group of Iraqi exiles formed in 1992 to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein, known as the Iraqi National Congress (INC), currently heading 
                                                 
755 For example, Feith and colleagues focused not on what could go wrong but what could go right in an Iraq 
invasion. This revamped the traditional planning based on “branches and sequels,” i.e. developing plans B and C for 
contingencies. As one official in the office noted, “Their methodology was analogous to tossing a coin five times 
and assuming that it would always come up heads.” Hersh 2003:3 
756 For example, the same neocon network that estimated massive stockpiles of Iraqi WMD, in the 1970s and early 
1980s saw the USSR as an ominous and powerful presence set to overtake us, and used this argument to justify 
brutal interventions in Central America and Africa (Angola, Mozambique). We know now that the internal weakness 
of the Soviet system had brought it to the verge of collapse.   
757 Feith’s law partner is spokesmen for settlement movement in Israel, staunch opponent of oslo peace process 
758 Rieff 2003:2 
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 Iraq’s governing council.759 Despite deep skepticism towards INC from the national security 
operatives at State, CIA, and the Joint Chiefs, Chalabi had support where it counted, in 
Wolfowitz, Perle, Doug Feith, David Wurmser, Michael Rubin, Don Rumsfeld, and the network 
of tanks associated with hard right partisans in Israel.760 Chalabi had become close to Richard 
Perle in the early 1990s. In the mid-90s, Chalabi attended conferences organized by Perle and 
AEI on a post-Hussein Iraq. At AEI, he integrated with neocon and conservative intellectuals 
prominent in the Reagan-Bush administrations, including Cheney, Rumsfeld, Feith, and 
Wolfowitz, whose views cohered nicely with his. All viewed overthrowing Hussein as an 
essential first step in realizing a vision of a radically reconfigured (“democratized”) Middle East. 
He regularly appeared on think tank panels at AEI, Heritage and elsewhere, and lobbied 
Congress to take out Hussein. Chalabi and his American supporters were successful in getting 
the Iraq Liberation Act passed in 1998, making “regime change” in Iraq official US policy.761
OSP worked alongside Near East and South Asia (NESA) bureau. Retired naval officer 
and protégé of DPB member and AEI fellow Newt Gingrich, Deputy Undersecretary, Bill Luti 
headed NESA., Luti hired former Gingrich staffer William Brunner, retired lieutenant colonel, 
anti-abortion activist, and former Senate Intelligence committee staffer Chris Straub; Yousef 
Aboul-Enein to pore over Arabic-language papers and CIA transcripts of Arabic radio broadcast 
for evidence of al-Qaeda-Saddam ties. 
                                                 
759 Other defectors who had low credibility at CIA and State but friends where it counted included nuclear scientist 
Khidir Hamaza, who claimed that through the 1980s Saddam ordered nuclear sites dispersed to 400 locations across 
the country, and Gen. Hussein Kamel who headed Iraq’s weapons program.  
760 WINEP, JINSA, MEF (Lobe 2003) 
761 Through PNAC, some 40 neocon experts, including Bill Kristol, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Doug Feith, Scooter 
Libby, David Wurmser, Richard Perle who would become advisers to Governor Bush and staffers of President Bush, 
sent a letter to Clinton in 1998 urging him to oust Hussein. They argued that if Hussein got WMD, he would pose a 
threat to American troops in the region, Israel, moderate Arab states, and world oil supply. Their argument structure 
was a mechanistic syllogism: Saddam is evil tyrant with weapons of mass destruction; he is trying to get bigger 
weapons and the means to deliver them; if he does, he will use them against allies or us; therefore, we must stop 
him.  
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 Karen Kwiatkowski, a retired Air Force Lieutenant colonel who worked from May 2002-
February 2003 in the Pentagon’s office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, saw the 
alternative intelligence network at NESA first hand.762 She noted a “functional isolation of the 
professional corps” in which Israel and Iraq work was done primarily by political appointees 
rather than civil service and active duty military professionals, and “cross-agency cliques” who 
operated “solely with its membership across the various agencies—in particular the State 
Department, the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President.”763 Inter-agency 
communications occurred almost exclusively with groupthink allies, rather than official 
counterparts, including the Pentagon DIA.764  
Since most State and CIA bureaucrats viewed the idea of reducing the threat to Persian 
Gulf oil trade by creating an Iraq allied to Israel and encircling Iran as dangerously based on 
flawed intelligence, NESA and OSP cut them out of the intelligence loop. Instead of 
collaborating with the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR),765 Near 
Eastern Affairs bureau, or Iraq desk, neocon appointees went to John Bolton, Undersecretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security (and former AEI executive vice president). 
The disarmament expert Powell assigned to be the daily intelligence liaison to John Bolton and 
the State Department INR, Greg Theilmann, noticed Bolton “seemed troubled because INR was 
not telling him what he wanted to here.”766 After shutting Theilmann out of his morning staff 
meetings, Bolton demanded direct access to raw sensitive intelligence that in previous decades 
                                                 
762 Kwiatkowski 2003    
763 Kwiatkowski 2003 
764 There are also unconfirmed reports that OSP worked with a parallel ad hoc group in Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon’s office. Kwiatkowski recounts escorting six Israelis including some generals into Feith’s office. They 
“knew exactly where they were going and [were] moving fast.” Feith’s secretary said “No these guys don’t have to 
sign in” (Lobe 2003). 
765 Pilloried by CSP’s Gaffney as “obstructionists,” neocons considered the State Department INR to be “a hotbed of 
covert and occasionally overt opposition to much of President Bush’s foreign and defense policy agenda” 
(Raimondo 2003:1).  
766 Hersh 2003:2 
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 had been subject to INR review. “He surrounded himself with a hand-chosen group of loyalists, 
and found a way to get CIA information directly.”767  
Feith, in charge of postwar planning, rejected months-long studies by exiles and Middle 
East experts in State and CIA that anticipated many problems with the occupation. The State 
Department “Future of Iraq Project,” run by longtime official and special adviser to its Office of 
Northern Gulf Affairs Thomas Warrick, considered all questions concerning a post-Hussein Iraq, 
and reported that prospects for democracy after Hussein were bleak. However, since Defense 
oversaw reconstruction, it did not heed the project’s warnings of “killing, plunder and looting.” 
Rumsfeld instructed Gen. Jay Garner to ignore the report, and rejected Garner’s request to add 
Warrick to his staff. In fact none of the senior officials involved in the project were taken on 
board, a considerable loss of expertise.768 OSP also prevented Middle East experts in the State 
Department from participating in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, 
recommended companies for massive no bid contracts to firms whose consultants or officers 
often serve on the Pentagon’s DPB, also staffed by Feith appointees.  
CIA staff had specific instructions not to contact counterparts at State or NSC because 
decisions would go through a different channel. Direct communication with CIA was rare and 
left to those with more stature like Gingrich, Cheney chief of staff and national security adviser 
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, and Cheney himself. CIA analysts reportedly felt the visits amounted to 
pressure to couch analysis in hawkish language. NESA and OSP in some cases bypassed 
Pentagon line of authority, supposedly separate from VP office, by passing memos directly to 
Cheney and Libby. As the drive to war heated up in early 2002, Cheney, like Wolfowitz and 
Bolton, became more reluctant to let military and civilian analysts vet intelligence. He made a 
                                                 
767 Thielmann quoted in Hersh 2003:2 
768 Hersh 2003 
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 series of trips to CIA to pressure analysts to come up with information providing worst-case 
assessments of Iraqi weapons. Eventually they just said, “fuck it” and began providing the 
requested conclusions.769  
NESA and OSP worked closely with Perle, Gingrich and two Defense Policy Board 
members (former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey, and Kenneth Adelman) to 
ensure the intelligence developed reached a wide public audience. They created “talking points” 
and distributed them to the network, then revised them as the press poked holes in the points. 
They gave information to sympathetic media outlets like FoxNews Network, The Weekly 
Standard, Wall Street Journal editorial page, syndicated columnists like Charles Krauthammer. 
Classified reports would go to think tanks through people like AEI’s Michael Ledeen, who 
leveraged contacts in government to get information, and from there to newspapers. 770 At AEI 
breakfast meetings, people such as Perle and Woolsey would talk about the ideas and current 
thinking based on highly classified information available to DPB members, thus allowing the 
essential conclusions or “talking points” to be divulged without giving away national secrets.771
8.5. Conclusion: political competence and the New Heroism    
The full-blown wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have not as of this writing expanded into 
Iran, Syria, and other states. Still, many Americans believe a decades-long house cleaning of 
geopolitical adversaries entailing a massive military buildup and the installation of new political 
regimes abroad is desirable and/or unavoidable. As we have seen in this chapter, elite 
manipulation of a compliant media partially explains the road to perpetual war: a narrow policy 
community exploited the president’s foreign affairs naiveté, stretched intelligence, mobilized 
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 fear and vengeance, and intimidated critics and journalists. The major media in turn reported 
events uncritically, prioritized public anger and warfighting, underplayed official secrecy and 
civil liberties intrusions, and fully cooperated to re-image Bush as a wartime president because 
“he is the only president we have.”  
We have also seen how a division of labor among tanks fused various strands of 
conservatism in a dynamic reminiscent of Reagan’s first term. As Christian Josi, executive 
director of the American Conservative Union said of the Conservative Political Action 
Conference in D.C. in January, “I’ve never seen the conservative movement more energized.” 
Much as its predecessors did during the 1970s and 1980s, PNAC, CSP, and Empower America 
(AVOT) in the late have been able to congeal right wing luminaries from the Christian Right and 
other social conservatives behind an imperial foreign policy and a strategic vision of American 
global hegemony. Under the tutelage of Bennett, Elliot Abrams, and others, social conservatives 
have adopted a new identity as imperialists, founded on a Biblical vision of Middle East 
apocalypse.772 The united neocons (foreign policy advisers) and social conservatives (Bennett) 
fight against internal and external threats to Judeo-Christian values, confidently asserting the 
goals of the New Sovereignty, from national missile defense to Likud militarism to Central 
Asian oil security, Iraq, to targeting “blame America first” dissidents. So far, a 9/11-shocked 
American public has ceded the hard right shift.  
Yet the reasons a semi-permanent war against “evil” feels so good and right to so many 
people extend beyond simple manipulation by neocons and news outlets. The problem of war 
fever extends to the political competence773 of the public. The war on terror is a collective social 
                                                 
772 See Bertlet and Lyons 2000 
773 The skills, knowledge, and attitude necessary for political participation  
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 accomplishment, organized in language, produced in contingent relations between political, 
commercial, and civil society institutions.  
As people grope for a way to talk and think about 9/11, they have adopted a ready-made 
language that does not require a lot of complex content or a new competence. Focused on 
techniques of retribution, self-defense, and victory, hero talk saturates national discourse. In our 
need to narrate a vision out of the tragedy, we have identified with a series of themes774 that filter 
the event through a mythical heroism that has run through American culture.  
The search for heroism may be what we crave when the means for achieving a more 
complicated and cautious political discourse is not available because we simply have not learned 
the competence. We find it much easier and more comfortable to stay within traditional 
identities, and tend not to have the patience for developing truly innovative approaches. We have 
patience to smoke the “bad guys” out of their caves, but not the kind of patience to listen to 
people who talk about the experience of Muslims and others of the “global south.” Mainstream 
political discourse labels any acknowledgement of any American role in creating misery 
“unpatriotic and inappropriate during wartime” because it legitimizes the actions of the bombers, 
and sends the message that terrorism works. Ready-made experts and standard operating 
procedures in the media reinforce the mythology, offering scripted references to Pearl Harbor as 
the opening act of a heroic war in which we won.  
Everyone knows the emotional significance of the attack on America is potentially 
revolutionary, and that many people have an interest in rearticulating American heroism. A set of 
                                                 
774 Heroes went to put the fire out. Heroes died in the buildings and on the planes. Heroes are plumbing the 
mountains of Afghanistan and alleys of Baghdad. We are a vital country that doesn’t quit and can rebuild itself. Al 
Qaeda has aroused a sleeping beast. When a fighter gets knocked down you find out how tough a fighter he is. We 
build monuments to heroes, write books about them, and cry for them every night.  
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 key figures775 has emerged whose charisma expresses national solidarity and a unified 
commitment to heroic values. Bush is obviously one. He came to office under conditions of 
surplus and stability that quickly ran out after his tax cut and the terror attack. With Afghanistan 
and Iraq as the opening acts of America’s New War, his political career blew wide open.  
Yet in leading the charge to reclaim a heroic identity, the administration is failing to 
respond in a way that would create a truly interesting heroic period, one that opens up a dialogue 
about who we are and what we can become. Content to leverage every possible advantage from 
the tragedy while learning only some of the important lessons, the president has framed nearly 
his entire policy agenda (from taxes to trade, energy, and drug enforcement) as war by other 
means.776 His approach, which amounts to “go shopping, get a flag, join the military, be afraid, 
and shut up while I beat the shit out of some people,” lacks the expansive vision of a Lincoln or 
an FDR. Calls for radically “new thinking” and observations that “the world will never be the 
same again” sound grandiose, even apocalyptic, but are typically couched in narrowly technical 
terms: “How can we smoke the bastards out of their holes and kill them? How should I open my 
mail? How should we recalibrate civil liberties and the security apparatus? What do I do under 
an orange security alert? What is the proper way to display the flag?”  
The seductiveness of this approach is that it is half-true—we do need technical solutions, 
more security, law enforcement, intelligence reform, and smart military actions. However, as 
part of our general approach to solving terrorism, the country’s leadership has to call for a more 
complex vision, one that is not just technical, but moral. The U.S. must seek justice for the acts 
                                                 
775 Rudy Giuliani, Tony Blair, Colin Powell, John McCain, Donald Rumsfeld 
776 A clear example is the attempt link a free trade agenda to counter-terrorism by presenting both as an expansion of 
modern democratic values. Before the attacks, the administration and other neoliberal advocates were arguing that 
“trade is good for the poor” and that globalization protesters are “no friends of the poor.” Now they argue that trade 
helps fight terrorism, and wonder aloud whether there are “intellectual connections” between protesters and “others 
who have turned to violence to attack international finance, globalization, and the United States” (Zoellick 2001a).  
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 of September 11, and a defense from future attacks in a way that does not accelerate a cycle of 
rage. This must include efforts to address the roots of anger and oppression, to treat the growing 
perception of our callousness as more than just a public relations problem, and to understand 
why violent fundamentalism is on the rise in the world today.  
For what is fundamentalism but the inability to form a moral vision adaptive to the 
complexity of human experience? Instead of responding to violent fundamentalism with a 
Manichean ideology of our own, we can easily stand up and say we need to think about the 
conditions that make people turn to terrorism, and can do so in a way that in no way expresses 
sympathy for mass murder, or ties our hands in defending ourselves. Our reluctance to take even 
baby steps in this direction feeds the perception around the world that the only thing you can do 
to jog Americans out of their complacency is to bomb them. Hyper-nationalism and flag waving 
may be sending exactly the wrong message: that we are just as smug and arrogant as ever, and 
have no interest in what others define as oppression.  
Our political competence creates simple distinctions that are highly problematic. Good 
and evil is a much too simplistic dualism for the problem we are dealing with. Bin Laden calls 
America evil and does not reflect on why we are the way we are. Our government, in turn, calls 
people evil and refuses to reflect on why large swaths of the world are rooting for them, or what 
it may be doing to provoke them. Rather than talking about good and evil, forward and 
backward, modern and pre-modern, civilized and uncivilized, we can explain what the terrorists 
did and our response symmetrically. While we may not share the global south’s precise 
experience of being left behind or trampled by a security and economic regime that does not 
respect local rights, we do experience a parallel type of alienation—an erosion of cultural roots, 
civility, trust, and solidarity, in which low grade forms of terrorism erupt (e.g. Columbine, James 
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 Byrd, Matthew Shepherd). The stresses on our civic institutions result not so much from political 
oppression, but an ideology that constitutes citizenship as consumerism and entrepreneurship. 
Our civic life is now the culture of the marketplace, where technical solutions pervade the 
political discourse, and heroic questions of American identity—who are we? Where are we 
going?—are rarely posed.  
After WW II, we learned a new political competence: rebuild your enemies. If instead of 
invading Iraq, we quashed Al-Qaeda, and pledged to match global reconstruction aid to 
Afghanistan, we might have won over tens of millions of moderate Muslims, not to mention 
historic allies. It is too late for this exact sequence. The invasion of Iraq will have to stand as the 
historic blunder that it is. Yet it is not too late for an ambitious effort to “smoke out” hunger and 
infectious disease, dirty water, and indecent living conditions. Pursued with the same zeal with 
which we chased phantom weapons of mass destruction, it could go a long way towards drying 
the swamp of alienation and humiliation that even the Pentagon now acknowledges is a breeding 
ground for terrorism. A fraction of the Iraq cost to date would provide universal access to basic 
social services in all developing countries.777
I am not optimistic about the prospect of the administration making this turn. More likely 
is a ratcheting up of violence, intervention, and military technology. The U.S. has 4% of the 
world’s population and control 40% of the resources, but for the ultra-hawks, it is not about 
sharing our power. It is about spending some money, sacrificing some lives, and killing many 
people. This is model of governance premised on the cooperation between powerful nations and 
corporations to secure their access to natural resources, increase the concentration of global 
wealth, and repress reactions to that concentration.  
                                                 
777 A 1998 United Nations Development Programme report estimates that $34 billion annually would provide water 
sanitation, reproductive health care, basic health and nutrition, and basic education for every person on Earth. 
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 If the opportunity to construct a truly heroic vision out of the tragedy of 9/11 still exists, 
it will not occur under our current U.S. volition, but from American citizens and the global 
justice movement. An inclusive agenda that addresses the conditions of resentment without 
claiming them as an “excuse for terror” can raise the political competence of the public, and 
open a truly heroic dialogue about who we are, where we are going, and what we can become.  
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 9. Conclusion 
This project has been an historical analysis of the role of think tanks in shaping landmark 
social, economic, and foreign policy outcomes. We can now make some tentative generalizations 
about when and how think tanks function in the American and global political systems, and 
evaluate the potential in the present historical moment for invigorating the democratic effects of 
the TT field.  
First, recall that the pluralist model of the policy process posits an ontologically prior and 
neutral “umpire state” that mediates competition between wide varieties of groups in a rough 
equilibrium, and proposes that think tanks generally contribute to a rational and enlightened 
public discussion. Insofar as the cases in this study show the U.S. state acting as an autonomous 
force shaping expert involvement in policymaking, they confirm the pluralist thesis.778 However, 
while the cases confirm the ontological primacy of the state, they do not show that the state acts 
neutrally in this regard. The experts chosen by the U.S. government to involve in policymaking 
over one hundred years shows a pattern of containment and cooptation of radical (mostly 
economic but also political) ideas, suggesting a structural bias in the state’s employment of tank 
knowledge. The state-centrism that characterizes pluralist analyses (especially in international 
relations literature) thus fails to understand the process of state formation in relation to dynamics 
of capital accumulation and class formation.  
In addition to biases in the use of expertise, the cases demonstrate structural advantages 
of capital in the TT field, undermining the notion of an American polity made of an interest 
group anarchy in which no players are dominant. For those active in elite policy communities, 
witnessing personal rivalry and chaotic technocratic activity daily, the strata of society they 
                                                 
778 See also Skocpol 1992 
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 operate in may appear highly fragmented. Ben Wattenberg responded in interview that it was 
“salutary” to charge conservative think tanks with putting so much money into publicity versus 
scholarship, since they were just trying to get the word out. What his comment does not take into 
account is the uneven playing field created by unrepentant ideological marketing. A 
disproportionate distribution of resources (money, access to public administration) distorts a 
system of allegedly neutral adjudication of interests. The fact that corporations and conservative 
philanthropies populate the tank field at a far greater rate than other sectors is prima facie 
evidence of an imbalance in the benefits flowing from the 501c3 U.S. tax code incentives. 
Ironically, the coffers of so-called “liberal” foundations like Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and 
MacArthur dwarf those of the right wing philanthropies (Coors, Olin, Scaife, Lynde and Harry 
Bradley). Yet while conservatives have spent the last three decades targeting investment in 
sustained and programmatic policy research and advocacy in a self-conscious war of ideas, the 
liberal foundations have operated on the assumption that contributions to grassroots activities, 
demonstration projects, and relief efforts are the best way to fulfill their public mandate.  
In addition, at the purely rhetorical level, liberal foundations are not “liberal” in the same 
way that conservative ones are conservative. They have no explicit ideological program, other 
than the vague commitments to education and public service that characterize all nonprofit 
organizations. Where a Scaife foundation feels no compunction about giving money to an 
organization dedicating itself to the repeal of the welfare state (Heritage), a Ford or a Carnegie is 
much less likely to commit funds to organizations expressing even the mildest language about 
mitigating the negative effects of an unbridled free market. They will give to centrist 
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 organizations for politically safe policy research, but not to a network of committed activists 
seeking to proclaim loudly in national media outlets a wide-ranging program of social justice. 779
Given the need to make analytic arguments in order to affect the policy process, the lack 
of policy tanks among those unable to afford them reduces citizen capacities to participate in 
formulating agendas and constructing problems.780 The issue of those who do not have the power 
and resources to do policy analysis directs attention to the ways in which think tank practices 
may distort public debate and deepen inequalities, rather than provide an enlightened discussion 
of alternatives. Liberal foundations, such as George Soros’ Open Society Institute, have begun to 
make inroads into a field dominated by conservatives. In what amounts to an emergent and self-
conscious (if belated) response to the right wing infrastructure, groups like Americans Coming 
Together (voter registration), MoveOn.org (internet advocacy), Air America (talk radio), and the 
Center for American Progress (a quintessential full-service think tank) have been the 
beneficiaries of significant largesse from financiers like Soros.781  
Finally, recall the pluralist assumption that tanks help people understand public issues 
and act rationally based on sound knowledge is at the root of most tank practitioners’ self-
understanding. The cases demonstrate that most think tanks are not and have never been loci of 
impartial thought. Instead, tanks inhabit carefully crafted sets of paradigm ideas expressing what 
I have called corporate- and neo-liberal policy regimes. We saw, for example, how underlying 
the economics of monetarism and Keynesianism were fundamentally different conceptions of the 
world and assumptions about the economy not subject to empirically testing. The conversion of 
the Republican Party to monetarism turned as much on its political appeal as on its economic 
                                                 
779 See Callahan 1995  
780 Parsons 1995:167 
781 See Capital Research Center 2004  
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 validity.782 The variations in what constitutes “economic wisdom” regarding the role of the state 
in driving growth thus reflect a recursive relationship between the state, civil society, and 
market.783 Today, more than ever, the cacophonic spectacle of public life, proliferation of experts 
far removed from public view, climate of partisan rancor, and a lack of trust between citizens 
makes it difficult to speak of think tanks as contributing in any simple way to the accumulation 
of collective practical wisdom.  
Let us also now reconsider the elite model of the policy process in light of the empirical 
work done here. In several senses, the notion that think tanks parrot capitalist class initiatives 
turns out to be as unsatisfying as the pluralist notion that they are neutral representatives of 
equally competitive social groups. The cases do not indicate tanks are able to translate elite 
(either big “C” capital or social elites) consensus seamlessly into supportive policies. 
Furthermore, tanks are not ideologically homogeneous on any issue—defense spending, free 
trade, tax policy, budget deficits, etc.—among or even within themselves. There is significant 
diversity in the field as a whole (just as there is in the professional managerial classes generally), 
and, as we have seen, individual organizations themselves can drift significantly between 
ideological poles over time, mostly as a matter of institutional survival.784 Many do not seek to 
advance elite agendas. In addition, the growing array of transnational tank networks rooted in 
that have formed in opposition to corporate groups have been able to exert influence far in excess 
of their material backing.  
On the other hand, the cases do lend some empirical support to the claim that corporate 
and philanthropic funding exercise a gate keeping influence that lends a structural unity to the 
                                                 
782 As Peter Hall (1990: 66-70) wrote of the British case, “The monetarist critique of activist economic policy was 
highly congruent with Conservative arguments that state intervention in the economy should be reduced.”  
783 See McCloskey (1985); Kuhn 1962 
784 The most clear-cut case is Brookings’ move from staunch opposition to the New Deal to avid proponent of the 
Great Society). 
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 TT field.785 Corporate- and neoliberal think tanks have functioned historically to concentrate 
decision-making. In cases of both crisis and stability, tank-led cooperation between government 
agencies and large functional groups overshadows pluralist institutions. Functional elites do not 
exist and act in simple autonomous competition with one another, but through formal and 
informal mechanisms that shape elite consensus and forge popular consent. Sociologist William 
I. Robinson understands this as a “polyarchic” system in which  
A small group actually rules and mass participation in decision making is confined to 
choices carefully managed by competing [business and business-approved] elites…. [The 
system] is an effective arrangement for legitimating and sustaining inequalities within 
and between nations (deepening in a global economy) far more effectively than 
authoritarian solutions.786
 
One virtue of this explanation is it accounts for the nexus of elite and popular ideology but also 
shifts our attention disjuncture between the population and the professional managerial stratum, 
and explains the ability of multiple elites to bypass public acceptance of their ideas their own 
consensus is sufficiently strong. Desai suggests, “The most important function of hegemonic 
ideology is to subject the subordinate ranks of the ruling classes, and secure the congruence of 
their practices to the requirements of hegemony.”787 This is precisely the strategy neoliberal 
godfather Ludwig von Mises sponsored in 1962 when he charged, “What is needed to turn the 
flood is to change the mentality of the intellectuals. Then the masses will follow suit.”  
We can then understand the trends in think tanks towards ideology and marketing over the past 
few decades as a strategy for bringing about elite not an electoral realignment.788 The rhetoric 
employed by think tanks, candidates, consultants, and fund raising PACs overshadowed people’s 
                                                 
785 For example both centrist (pro- state planning/detente) and rightist (pro-free market/hard-line) economic 
responses to the 1970s economic crises agreed that state action should transfer resources to capitalists, and that 
workers should endure the most of crisis management solutions.   
786 Robinson 1996:385 
787 Desai 1994:39 
788 Blumenthal 1986:312  
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 progressivism with appeals to vague emotionally charged messages. The effort to crowd out or 
otherwise delegitimate competing ideas is also evidence of a self-conscious hegemonic 
project.789 To prevent the emergence of a serious rival, the proliferation of conservative media 
creates feedback loops or an “echo chamber” that reverberates with ideas until they take on the 
patina of common sense or legitimate concern. A group like AEI will send a paper to Congress 
and opinion leaders in the major media. As think tanks feed the media reportage back to 
congressional staffers, the issue begins to seem like a growing national concern, and Congress 
people become inclined to vote with an apparent consensus.  
This tank modality enabled market fundamentalism and Christian fundamentalism to 
achieve electoral and policy outcomes without achieving widespread popularity.790 Republicans 
could never garner a strong majority in favor of operational conservatism (which stood at only 
14 percent in 1968). The large Republican presidential victories in 1972, 1980, and 1984, similar 
congressional victories in1994, and the rightward swing of the Democratic Party do not therefore 
necessarily indicate a fundamental shift in political loyalty, but rather the culmination of an 
ideological crusade carried out primarily among elites. The apparent long-standing trends of 
Republican majorities are in reality contingent artifacts of a restructured institutional 
environment.791 The voting patterns prove conservative candidates were marketing their 
products better, but not necessarily responding to public needs. Tanks structured the identities of 
consumers of policy ideas so that they craved the product sold to them, creating, in essence, their 
own demand.  
                                                 
789 As Leys (1990:127) argues, “For an ideology to be hegemonic, it is not necessary that it be loved. It is merely 
necessary that it have no serious rival.”  
790 Free and Cantril noted in 1968 that while 65 percent of voters were “operational liberals” favoring policies like 
Social Security and unemployment insurance, 50 percent of voters were “ideological conservatives” favoring 
principles like individualism, private enterprise, and limited government (Free and Cantril 1968:15-32). 
791 See Walter Dean Burnham, “The 1984 Election and the Future of American Politics,” in Sandoz and Crabb 
1985:204-260. See also Martin P. Wattenberg 1991.  
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 Ironically, the zealous neoliberal critique of government economic intervention produced 
a greater degree of centralized planning (this time in corporate monopoly boardrooms) than ever 
before. The prospect of an economic totalitarianism of cartels, oligopolies, and conglomerates is 
eminently imaginable. Yet things can change. While there is a path to history discernable in the 
structures that constrain and enable opportunities at any given conjuncture, structures are 
contingent entities. In this study, I have found that the deeper one goes into structures the more 
one finds the process of structuration. Like a Socratic dialog of deconstruction, the structure-
action problem cannot be resolved because the apparent structures of governance—states, 
communication systems, social factions, ideologies, etc. — are emergent properties, institutions, 
limned and fluid characters. 
In historical retrospect, it may seem like think tanks never fail to develop rhetorical 
adaptations to crisis conditions—accumulation processes, interstate rivalries, and domestic 
politics. The system-calibration function of think tanks always seems asserts itself at moments of 
crisis: as hyper-acclerated levels of private accumulation start to break down social cohesion, 
tanks develop a set of policies to predict and control future crises, saving capitalism from its own 
self-destructive impulses, coopting political dissent, and maintaining the basic assumptions of 
wealth distribution. In most cases, their critiques go only so far as necessary to secure the long-
term stability of the system. This phenomenon suggests that, whatever their impact, tanks play an 
objective role in sustaining social order.  
Yet, the precise political orientation of any given order is never determinate. While 
cooptation is at one level a typical crisis management strategy, it also signals a tear in the 
ideological fabric. Even if the recent rediscovery of social needs (“sustainability” “social capital” 
“global governance”) over profit is superficial, or “merely” rhetorical, the normative shift does 
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 open possibilities for democratizing the public sphere and enacting fundamental transformations 
in the state-market-society complex. It is a dynamic recurs throughout TT history: democratic 
forces capitalize upon an initial rhetorical opening in order to bring about major changes, with at 
least a tinge of democratic improvement. Even though the general response of 20th century tanks 
to crises has been to coopt subordinate class anger and aspirations, the fact that think tanks 
sometimes follow path distinct from ruling class prescriptions points to cracks in the architecture 
of U.S. capitalism. Even if the “general interest” that think tanks claim to represent is in practice 
the specific interest of a dominant historical bloc, the tendency of think tanks to look beyond 
strict class antagonism creates a perpetual opening for significant elements in the TT field to 
unify with working and other subordinate classes to produce a new historic bloc. One cannot 
easily predict the adaptations to the TT field engendered by the crises of globalization and 
terrorism. The outcome of the current adaptations will depend in large part on whether new and 
old forces in the field seek to uphold privilege or reverse the priority of economy over society 
characteristic of the neoliberal regime.   
The success of the conservative movement in subsidizing an institutional infrastructure to 
propagate people and ideas curtailed the ability of corporate liberals to articulate a competitor to 
the free market paradigm, and severed almost any ties between leftist tanks like the Institute for 
Policy Studies and the Washington D.C. planning elite. While corporate liberals simply 
capitulated to the new paradigm, leftists retreated into greater obscurity. As the cases 
demonstrate, centrist organizations like Brookings Institution have always been able to work 
with rightists, whether with AEI on regulatory reform, IIE on defending the global financial 
architecture, or PNAC on prosecuting the global war on terrorism.  
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 Conservative tanks’ avowed ideology and well-developed marketing advantages them 
over their corporate liberal and leftist competitors, which tend to be more open-minded and 
deliberative in their thinking. As Featherman and Vinovskis note, 
It is perhaps ironic that academics in disciplines such as economics, political science, and 
sociology—in their quest for professional integrity and scientific objectivity—may have 
unintentionally undermined these disciplines’ long-term relevance to policy and thereby 
conceded the main battlefield to the private, often partisan, think tanks.792
 
It may also be the case that conservative rhetoric possesses an inherently greater capability to 
capture the narrative of threat. The perspective, which views good-hearted Americans as under 
or potentially under siege by enemies within or without appeals to a very basic impulse to look 
for differences and defend the heartland against threats to our common heritage, the gene pool, 
or national security. The nature of conservative rhetoric, in the form of catch phrases, ideas, 
narratives, and myths thus targets not just the base of the Republican Party, but also 
uncommitted and uninvolved people. The appeal to deeply ingrained icons and myths, such as 
the paradigm idea of competition and the heroic exploits of Horatio Alger, John F. Kennedy, or 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, offer people a robust dog-eat-dog vision of America and its role in the 
world. In this vision, ideals of sharing and sacrifice for the poor seem quaint or even anti-
American. The vision resonates with a narrative of a masculine, prideful, even chauvinistic 
American exceptionalism that says, “We are the best.”  
It is difficult to imagine a transition to a different policy paradigm in which elements of 
the U.S. and professional managerial class do not play a significant role. At the same time, it 
may be a mistake to believe the contemporary global “antiglobalization” movement can follow 
the model set by think tanks in any stage of their evolution. The movement against corporate 
globalization is potentially appealing and powerful precisely because it is not waged as a 
                                                 
792 Featherman and Vinovskis 2001:2 
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 campaign in the narrow corporatist sense, but from a broad popular struggle of diverse 
constituencies favoring, not socialism per se, but social goals, democracy and popular 
sovereignty.  
Any “counter-hegemonic” project will require the sort of social science research done at 
places such as the Institute for Policy Studies, which seeks to broaden an institutional base 
beyond the “vertical ghetto” of single-issue politics to support a more movement-oriented 
politics. Such a coalition of policy analysts might keep the TT field under public scrutiny and 
hold it accountable for its exercise of power. To do so, it would have to point out that the heavy 
investing in advertising techniques reveals a commitment to the movement, not to advancing 
social scientific understanding. It would recognize that New Right tanks assert ideas with a force 
and uncompromising confidence that lends a transcendental quality to them, and that because 
neoliberal ideas derive from a higher, almost Kantian principle, they are rarely open for 
discussion or subject to amendment. Indeed, the claim to act on “principles” masks an intensely 
ideological project that makes little room for introspection, compromise, or dialogic politics in a 
traditional sense, and leads to many research products that are pure propaganda. They use a pre-
determined analytic lens, and executive management selects researchers to find the results that 
comport with that lens. Working in an environment of like-minded individuals, tank personnel 
reinforce “one another’s preconceived notions and rejecting any thinking that does not fit the 
mold—practicing what consultants call the art of ‘directed conclusions.’”793  
Such a coalition would also be unwilling to cede the rhetorical ground of American 
nationalism. If globalization implies the intensification of capital, then the “nation,” as a binary 
term to the “global,” also intensifies, and becomes re-imaginable. As Eric Hobsbawm suggested 
in his 1996 E.P. Thompson memorial lecture at the University of Pittsburgh, despite its 
                                                 
793 Easterbrook 1986  
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 imperialist past, the state may remain the best or last bastion against the encroachments of 
transnational capital. The odd Buchanan-Nader-Perot alliance on international trade agreements 
suggests that it is possible at least to prevent policy outcomes in such a manner. Criticism of the 
global governance complex resonates with those on both the left and right who sanctify national 
sovereignty.  Conservatives argue global governance institutions waste taxpayer’s money, while 
liberals oppose the imposition of painful economic restrictions, and lack of environmental and 
social considerations.  Around October 1999, just such a left-right coalition came together in the 
House of Representatives to assault the IMF/WB by introducing five bills794 within a month that 
would have radically changed their practices.  Liberals were upset at structural adjustment 
policies,795 conservatives at the very idea of taxpayer money going to a seemingly endless pit of 
debt and misery.796
While the commitment to defeating outcomes is intriguing, it remains in a defensive 
mode. Moreover, it would be unfortunate if opposition to transnational capital were limited to 
purely nationalist responses. While activists in the U.S. cannot leave the national imaginary up 
for grabs, they must resist a narrowly drawn nationalism. The opposition to corporate-led 
globalization offers an opportunity to construct identities in industrialized states against capital, 
rather than against the South, the East, or other “rogue states.” The paradoxical position requires 
social justice tanks to contest their neoliberal brethren on the very idea of America. Whether the 
                                                 
794 Ecosystem and Indigenous Peoples’ Protection Act, Rep. Christopher Cox (R., Calif.) requires U.S. to cut funds 
if World Bank violates environmental and social policies; Debt Relief and IMF Reform Act of 1999, Reps. Jim 
Saxton (R., N.J.) and Dennis Kucinich (D., Ohio) Forces U.S. to oppose IMF’s low-interest loans to poor countries;  
Debt Emancipation to Enable Democracies Act, Reps. Cynthia McKinney (D., GA.) and Dana Rohrbacher (R., 
Calif.) forces IMF to forgive debts owed by poorest nations without tough economic reforms;  Foreign Money 
Laundering Deterrence and Anticorruption act, Rep. Jim Leach (R., Iowa) forces U.S. to oppose IMF and WB loans 
to corrupt countries;  Russian Economic Restoration and Justice Act, Reps. Curt Weldon (R., Pa.) and Neil 
Abercrombie (D., Hawii) creates joint U.S .-Russian push for IMF reform. 
795 For example, Georgia Democratic Representative Cynthia McKinney said that while she believed in the role of 
multilateral institutions, “that role doesn’t need to hamper the development of basic institutions and values that I 
believe we as Americans ought to foster,” such as human rights and equal economic opportunity (Michael Phillips 
1999). 
796 For example, Steve Forbes and Gary Bauer would describe IMF policy advice as “socialist.” 
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 globalization backlash can alter the momentum behind free trade and the global war on terrorism 
hinges on who controls the discourse. 
A discourse that counters the post-9/11 paradigm in America by linking economic and 
foreign policy to an inclusive vision economic globalization that addresses the conditions that 
breed resentment without claiming them as an “excuse for terror” would approach security 
threats through international intelligence, smart military operations and the peaceful building of 
democratic institutions globally. As much as neoliberals would like to equate bin Laden with 
global justice activists, protests in which broken windows in Starbucks or McDonald’s are the 
greatest damage cannot compare to the attacks of 9/11. The GJM may throw a pie in the face of a 
World Bank president, but they do not kill people. Nor does GJM even oppose trade per se, or 
blame America for the world’s ills. The opposition to the neoliberal agenda is not necessarily 
even anti-capitalist, being comprised of diverse organizations and agendas. Rather, it advocates 
solutions to common problems should be approached from the perspective of those that suffer 
the most destructive effects of economic development and political violence. The deep advantage 
of the GJM may lie precisely in this discursive position.   
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